1996 PLP 1715 (MLD)

Dates of hearing.: 1st and 8th November, 1995: This appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (hereinafter referred as the Ordinance) is directed against the judgment, dated. 14‑3‑1988 passed by learned Controller, Karachi East directing ejectment of the appellant from the shop premises on the ground of bona fide use and occupation for two sons of the respondent/landlady.

2. Relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is not in dispute. Tenancy commenced in the year 1955‑56 during lifetime of the husband of the respondent. Latest rate of rent is Rs.300 per month. Ejectment of the appellant was sought on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises for the use of two sons of the respondent.

3. Appellant resisted his eviction on the averments that the need of the respondent was not bona fide as her sons were well set. According to him, ejectment was sought with mala fide intentions and ulterior motives in order to realise Pugree from the new tenants.

4. Both the parties adduced evidence. On consideration of the evidence, learned Controller directed eviction of the appellant vide judgment, dated 14‑3‑1988 which has been impugned in this appeal.

5. After about two years of presentation of the appeal appellant moved an application under section 21(3) of the Ordinance for permission to adduce evidence to show that Messrs Shahid Aslam and Rashid Aslam, sons of the respondent for whom the landlady wanted the demised shop were not running any business. While Rashid Aslam had left for Saudi Arabia, Shahid Aslam had joined Karachi Electric Supply Corporation. By consent of the respondent's counsel this application was granted vide order, dated 11‑2‑1990 directing the additional evidence to be adduced by way of affidavits and cross‑examination before Mr. Laiq Ahmed Jafferi, Advocate appointed as Commissioner for the purpose. Consequently appellant Abaw Hussain filed his own affidavit‑in evidence and that of Haji Iqbal a tenant in the adjoining shop. Both the witnesses were cross‑examined before the Commissioner who returned the evidence to this Court. .

6. At the hearing, Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Khan, learned counsel for the appellant contended with reference to the additional evidence on record that from the evidence so brought on record both the sons of the appellant no more required the shop in question for their use and occupation in good faith. He has taken me through the evidence on the record to indicate that Rashid Aslam has left for Saudi Arabia whereas Shahid Aslam has taken an assignment with K.E.S.C. as Meter Reader. Besides Shop No.E/2 of the respondent is closed for the last about one year. New evidence brought on record with the leave of this Court has not been rebutted as the respondent could not shake the veracity of the witnesses before the Commissioner for recording evidence. There is no other evidence in rebuttal to conclude that the witnesses had deposed falsely. On the date fixed for hearing Mr. M.A. Lakhani did not turn up to advance the arguments when the judgment was reserved and a notice was issued to him to appear on 8‑11‑1995. He remained absent without any intimation but in the late hours of the day he appeared and pleaded no instructions.

7. It is true that rights and liabilities of the parties must be determined as i existing on‑ the day of filing a cause but at the same time subsequent events taking place after the institution of a cause must be taken into consideration in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to secure the ends of justice. In the light of fresh evidence on record, I am convinced that the shop in question is no more needed by the respondent for bona fide use and occupation of her sons in good faith. In fact she would not require the shop any longer in view of the changed circumstances and it is for this reason that she has taken no interest in defending this appeal. In this view of the matter, it would only be just, fair and appropriate to accept this appeal and set aside the eviction order. I order accordingly. Impugned judgment is set aside and the ejectment application dismissed with no order as to costs. H.B.T./A‑3/K Appeal accepted.