1980 PLP 831 (SCMR)

The Evacuee Trust Property Board, Government of Pakistan, Lahore through its Chairman and another v. Muhammad Nawaz P L D 1979 Lah.903 distinguished. Lahore Central Co‑operative Bank Ltd. v. Pit‑ Saif Ullah Shah P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 210 ref. Petitioner in person. Mamoon A. Kazi, Advocate and Aziz Khan, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent No.

1. Date of hearing: 26th May, 1980. DORAB PATEL, ACTG. C. J ‑The Pakistan Council of Scientific and Indus trial Research, to which we will refer as the respondent, was incorporated as a society under the Societies Registration Act many years ago, but it became a statutory Corporation under the Central Act XXX of 1973 published on 9‑2‑1973. The petitioner claims to have been in the respondent's service for more than two decades and since 1961, he has been litigating about his service rights. He claims to have been illegally superseded in 1961, but his representations against his illegal supersession were successful and he was promoted to the post of Superintendent in 1969. However, the same year, he was falsely charge‑sheeted, but the Enquiry Officer gave his finding in the petitioner's favour, therefore, the proceedings were dropped. However, the petitioner was served with another charge‑sheet a year later, on 20th July 1970, and the Enquiry Officer gave his finding against the petitioner because, according to the petitioner, the Enquiry Officer had a grudge against him. Be that as it may, on 3‑8‑1971, in view of the adverse report of the Enquiry Officer, the respondent's Chairman issued a show‑cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him to show‑cause why he should not be compulsorily retired. The petitioner challenged this notice in a suit in the District Court, but he withdrew the suit and filed an application in the Labour Court. But the Labour Court dismissed his application on the ground that he was not a workman within the meaning of the Indus trial Relations Ordinance. Therefore, the petitioner challenged the dismissal of the application before the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, but his appeal was dismissed, arid, meanwhile, he was compulsorily retired on 6‑11‑1971. Therefore, he challenged this order of 6‑11‑1971 in an appeal before the Cen tral Service Tribunal, but this appeal was dismissed on 7‑2‑1976 on the ground that the petitioner was not a civil servant. Although a copy of this order is crucial to the petitioner's case, he has not supplied us a copy. Be that as it may, after the order of 7‑2‑1976, the petitioner filed for the second time a declaratory suit in the District Court, Karachi, in which be challenged the order of 6‑11‑1971 as being illegal on various grounds. The respondent contested the suit and its main plea was that the petitioner had been retired long before it became a statutory corporation. Therefore, its further submis sion was that the petitioner's rights and grievances were governed by the law of master and servant, and, as‑the petitioner's claim for declaratory relief against the termination of his services was not maintainable. In a well‑considered order the VIIth Civil Judge, Ist Class, who heard the petitioner's suit held that the petitioner was not a civil servant and the remedy for his grievances, if any, was under the general law of master and servant, therefore, he dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not main tainable. The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his suit in an appeal, but as the learned Additional District Judge, who heard the appeal agreed with She view of the trial Court, he dismissed the petitioner's appeal. The petitioner, therefore, filed a revision in the Sind High Court, but as this revision was dismissed in limine, he has filed this petition for leave. The petitioner relied on the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1960, and his case in the High Court appears to have been that order of retirement passed against him was illegal, because it was in breach of these rules. But, in dismissing the revision, the learned Judge pointed out that‑ the petitioner had not beets able to convince him, how these rules were applicable to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. As we agreed with the view taken by the learned Judge, we invited the petitioner to show us how he could claim the benefit of rules for the regulation of the civil services of Pakistan. He referred us to clause (c) of Bye‑law 41 of the respondent's bye‑laws. But this clause refers to the provisions "of the Central Government Fundamental and Supplementary Rules." The petitioner did not even attempt to show its how these rules supported his case and, on the contrary, he relied solely on the Efficiency and Discipli4e Rules. But, his reliance on these rules is misconceived, because he was never in Government Service. The petitioner then stated that his argument was supported by a judg ment of the Lahore High Court reported in The Evacuee Trust Property Board, Government of Pakistan, Lahore through its Chairman and another v. Muhammad Nawaz (P L D 1979 Lab. 903). The judgment is very brief, therefore, it is difficult to gather the facts but the question was of employment in the Evacuee Trust Property Board and. we observed that the Evacuee Trust Property Board would be a branch of the Federal Government. The petitioner was not able to throw any light on tills question and it is sufficient to observe that his case falls under the rule laid down by this Court in the Lahore Central Co‑opera tive Bank Ltd. v. Pir‑ Saif Ullah Shah (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 210). Additionally, we would recall here that the Central‑Service Tribunal had expressly rejected the, petitioner's claim that he was a civil servant Although that order has been suppressed, the petitioner admitted that be had not challenged it in a petition for leave in this Court. In these circumstances, as this order became final, on this ground also, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that he is a civil servant and entitled to the protection of the rules regulating the service and employment of civil servants. The petitioner's only other submission was that his retirement could only have been ordered by the respondent's Chairman, but as, it was ordered by an Officer on Special Duty, the order of 6‑11‑1971 was illegal. The argument is based on a misreading of the order of 6‑11‑1971, because it is very clear from a perusal of the order that it has been passed on behalf of the respon dent's Chairman. In any event, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the petitioner's employment was illegally terminated, his rights wee governed by the general law of master and servant, therefore, his suit for declaratory relief was not maintainable, as rightly held by the two Lower a Courts, and even on the footing that be was illegally dismissed, his claim if any, could only have been for damages for wrongful termination of his service. The petition is without merit and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.