1989 PLP 1093 (MLD)

A registered sale, dated 16‑10‑1972 was sought to be pre‑empted by the respondents. Their plaint was admittedly received on 15‑10‑1973 by some Allah Ditta, a Reader of the Civil Judge. He recorded a note thereon for its being put up on 17‑10‑1973, after scrutiny by the office. Therein he also noted that the Presiding Officer is on leave `today'. The suit was so put up before the trial Judge on 17‑10‑1973 and was contested in due course. Objection with regard to limitation was also raised to be incorporated into Issue No.1 which was decided by the trial Court in favour of the vendee by holding the suit to be barred by time by one day and the same was dismissed on 23‑2‑1980.

2. Appeal of the plaintiffs was accepted on 10‑12-1984 by an Additional District Judge who differed with the trial Court's view and decreed the suit.

3. Vendee‑defendant maintained this second appeal for the question of limitation being re‑agitated on the basis of the instructions contained in Rule 7(c) of Chapter 1‑B of Volume I of the Lahore High Court Rules and Orders and also the provisions of Rule 1 of Order IV of the C.P.C. reproduced as under:‑‑ "l. Suit to be commenced by plaint.‑‑(1) Every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf." The abovementioned Rule 7(c) provides:‑‑ "7(c) The members of the ministerial establishment are strictly forbidden to receive petitions, plaints or other documents direct from lawyers and their clerks or from litigants except when the Judge is on leave and no other judicial officer is incharge of his current duties. District Judges should, however, invariably make arrangements for the reception of plaints and petitions, etc., by another officer of a Court when an officer is temporarily absent on leave, tour or otherwise. Where there is a single judicial officer al a station such as at Moffassal or outlying Courts, arrangements should be made for the reception of plaints, petitions, documents, etc., by the Tehsildar or the Naib‑Tehsildar in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner."

4. Since a conjuncted reading of the aforementioned two provisions gave rise to a variety of such questions as could have vital effect on the determination, one way or the other, of this litigation, therefore, it was considered fit at the preliminary hearing of the appeal that learned District Judge may be called upon to apprise this Court of the arrangements which were in vogue at Chiniot in the year 1973 for reception of plaints during the absence of the Civil Judge. He was also required to furnish copies of the relevant orders. His report dated 16‑1‑1985 submitted in pursuance thereof does not happen to be quite in point and is rather irrelevant in so far as he has not provided the required information as to whether or not there was in vogue in the year 1973 any standing arrangement at Chiniot within the contemplation of the afore‑cited Rule 7(c). However, he has confirmed that the concerned Civil Judge had proceeded on one days's casual leave for 15‑10‑1973 and has explained that since information thereabout was received on a subsequent date, therefore, it was not possible for the District Judge to authorise any officer at the Tehsil for receiving plaints etc., in his absence. Further, he has also verified that the record of his office does not show that the Reader of the said Court was authorised by the District Judge to receive the plaints in the absence of the Civil Judge and has proceeded to add therein as under:‑‑ "The Reader when asked to explain this position, has stated that the Civil Judge while proceeding on leave for 15‑10‑1973 had verbally authorised him to receive plaints m his absence in view of P L D 1971 Azad Jammu Kashmir page 19 and so he received the plaint in this case under the verbal instructions of the Civil Judge:"

5. Question legitimately arises as to how may a Reader have been able to state after 12 years about the verbal instructions given to him by a Civil Judge on any particular day? This aspect of the matter assumes prominence in the wake of the circumstance that it may not be the solitary occasion of the service‑period of either of them and there would have been several other occasions of identical h nature arisen during the tenure of the same Civil Judge being served by the same or even other Readers and also of that particular Reader with some other Civil Judges. In the presence of a duty cast upon the Court under section 3 of the Limitation Act scanty data of unsatisfactory nature provided by the District Judge does not seem to be an adequate basis for deciding the question of limitation involved in this case. The factum of the so‑called verbal authorisation of a Reader as also the legal effect thereof is in need of being decided on a deeper probe of all the facts and circumstances prevailing in this case and upon the consideration also of the fact whether or not there was in vogue any standing arrangement at Chiniot in the year 1973 within the contemplation of the above‑quoted provisions of Rule 7(c).

6. In the above view of the matter, learned counsel for the parties concur in stating that other questions falling for decision in this case may not be attended to at this stage and the findings reached below under issue No.1 may be set aside to remand the case to the trial Court for decision afresh in accordance with the law after providing opportunity to the parties to adduce necessary evidence whereabout. So far as it relates to the records of the trial Court or even of the District Court, learned trial Judge will provide necessary assistance to the parties.

7. In result of the foregoing, this appeal is accepted and setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by the two Courts below, their respective findings recorded under issue No.1 are set aside and the suit is remanded to the trial Court for being decided afresh on the basis of evidence to be adduced by the parties and proper scrutiny of the Court records, as has been indicated above. Parties have been directed to put in appearance in the trial Court at Chiniot on 1 4‑1989 and learned trial Judge will re‑admit the suit to its original number to be able to proceed to decide it afresh in accordance with the law as expeditiously as may be possible.

8. Parties are left to bear their own costs. H.B.T./F‑114/L Case remanded.