1976 PLP 533 (PLC)

This is an appeal against the interim award dated 18-4-1973 of the Punjab Labour Court. Northern Zone, Lahore, wherein the learned Court below held that demands involving financial implications can be raised in spite of the previous settlement Exh. R-13 dated 6-4-1972 arrived at between the parties which is still in force.

2. The facts of the case are that on 11-4-1970, settlement Exh. P-1 was executed by the Capital Industries Workers Union and the Management the life of which was lij years The same Union gave another demand notice Exh. R-1 on 18-9-1971 after the expiry of period of settlement Exh. P-1. On the same date The Eagle Cycles Industries Employees Union "vas registered and the employer recognized it on 16-11-1971. The Eagle Cycles Industries Employees Union raised demands and gave strike notice and on 6-4-1972 settlement Exh. R-13 was arrived at between them arid the Management. This settlement was to continue till 5-4-1974. Thereafter, the Capital Industries Labour Union which is respondent in this case came into existence and won the referendum. The said Union raised 14 demands as enumerated in the lower Courts interim award. This was followed by a strike notice on 15-2-1973. The conciliator gave Failure Certificate on 2-3-1973 and the present industrial dispute vi as brought before the Court below on 10-3-1973.

3. The appellant before the Court below raised preliminary objection that in view .of settlement Exh. R-13, which was to remain in force till 5-4-1974, the present industrial dispute, could not be raised.

4. The Court below held that other demands could not be raised before the expiry of the period of the settlement Exh. R-13 but demands involving financial implications could be raised and that only after inviting evidence it would be decided whether they were acceptable or not.

5. It is a well-established law that demands regarding financial implica tions can be raised in spite of the previous settlement if the conditions and circumstances have materially changed. This is a question of fact and the': party raising these demands has to satisfy tie Court that the conditions and circumstances have in fact materially changed. I am fortified in this view by the decisions of our High Court in the case : The Crescent Pak Soap and Oil Mills Labour Union v. Messrs Crescent Pak Soap & Oils Mills and 2 others (1958 P L C 87) wherein it was observed: It is my considered opinion that the employees when they make certain demands on the employer must include in the case of public utility service concerned, all their claims which they are entitled to make at the time in the strike notice. Where they omit to include certain demands in the strike notice or intentionally relinquish any portion of the demand the employees should not afterwards in respect of the demand so omitted or relinquished be entitled to serve a fresh strike notice so long as the settlement arrived at or the award given as a consequence of such strike notice is in operation. It will be an abuse of the process of law if the employees are given the right to agitate their demands, one by one both giving separate strike notice for each demand. In such an eventuality the disputes between the employers and the employees will never be settled and the purpose of law that a peaceful atmosphere be created in the public utility service and the dispute avoided so that such service may be able to run efficiently and continuously, will be completely defeated. I am prepared to concede to the employees a right to agitate the issues covered by of omitted from the settlement or the award if the circumstances have materially changed but if the circumstances remain the same then both in equity and in law the employees should not be allowed to agitate these issues or raise fresh issues which were available to them at the time when they raised the issues but they inten tionally omitted to do so. I am further fortified in this view by the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the case, Messrs Attock Oil Co. Ltd. v. The Supreme Body of 0ilfields Labour and Refinery Union, Rawalpindi (P L,D 1970 Lah. 122) wherein it was observed:- "It is the duty of the Court to examine each agreement carefully to satisfy itself that it was made in good faith and was not intended to defeat just and reasonable demands put forth by the workers. When the Court is so satisfied it is only then that the settlement can be made the basis for the award of the Court." The terms of settlement arrived at between the workers and the employers were as under: (i) accepting the terms of the agreement in full and final settlement of all demands and disputes in existence up to the time of agreement and/ or pendieg before the Industrial Court; (ii) undertaking not to raise or pursue during operation of this settlement any demand involving financial commitments/expenditure ......... The industrial dispute raised by the Workers Union regarding decease in the bonus rate by the company subsequently "was objected to as frivolous and vexatious and on the ground that the Union was precluded from raising disputes involving financial expenditure; held: , The words in the agreement 'undertaking not to raise or pursue during the operation of the Settlement any demand involving financial commit ment/expenditure direct or indirect on the heart of the Company' cannot be read independent of clause of the agreement which lays down that the terms of the agreement extend to all demands in dispute in existence up to the time of agreement order/or pending before the Industrial Court. It cannot, therefore, be argued that it `vas the intention of the parties to say the least of the Union that by this agreement they closed the doors upon themselves of all those remedies which were open to them under the law for any new dispute which might creep up during the period the agreement subsisted. I, accordingly, find no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed and remand the case back to the Court below for further proceedings in accordance with law. Lastly, it may be mentioned here that the learned Presiding Officer of the Court below after disposing of the case also disposed of all the objections. This appears to be incorrect because he had only disposed of one preliminary objection and, therefore, the appellant will not be precluded from raising other preliminary objections if any mentioned in his pleadings if any.