CLC 2002

2002 PLP 1446 (CLC)

SABIR REHMAN‑‑‑Petitioner Versus SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF N.W. F. P., FORESTRY, FISHERIES, WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT AT CIVIL SECRETARIAT, PESHAWAR

Jurisdiction / Court
Peshawar
Decided Date
Writ Petition No.531 and C. M. No.756 of 2002, decided on 31st May, 2002.
Honorable Judges
Tariq Parvez Khan
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2002 PLP 1446 (CLC)
Forum / Court Peshawar
Bench Members Tariq Parvez Khan
Parties SABIR REHMAN‑‑‑Petitioner Versus SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF N.W. F. P., FORESTRY, FISHERIES, WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT AT CIVIL SECRETARIAT, PESHAWAR
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2002 PLP 1446 (CLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2002 PLP 1446 (CLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Peshawar bench comprising: Tariq Parvez Khan.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2002 PLP 1446 (CLC) (SABIR REHMAN‑‑‑Petitioner Versus SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF N.W. F. P., FORESTRY, FISHERIES, WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT AT CIVIL SECRETARIAT, PESHAWAR). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Mian Iqbal Hussain for Petitioner.
  • Date of hearing: 31st May, 2002.

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court ‑‑‑Scope Alternate remedy‑‑‑Jurisdiction conferred on High Court by Art.199 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973) is an extraordinary jurisdiction which could be invoked only to meet extraordinary situations‑‑‑Such jurisdiction was not meant to be treated as an additional or as "another" remedy provided by law‑‑‑High Court would have jurisdiction under Art. 199 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973) only when law from which a matter emanated did not provide any other adequate remedy to cater for the problem in issue‑‑‑Prime question in every case of Am. 199 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973) was whether an aggrieved person, who resorted to Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, had or had not any other adequate remedy available to him under law. (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court ‑‑‑Scope‑‑ Question of fact‑‑‑High Court in exercise of its powers under Art, 199 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973) would not ordinarily, embark upon an exercise to determine intricate contentions and complicated questions of fact‑‑‑Resolution of such controversial issues ordinarily was left to proper forums prescribed by law, because indulging in such exercise would have effect of pre‑empting and encroaching upon jurisdiction lawfully vesting in competent officers and Courts‑‑‑Involvement of High Court in matters which could be competently, properly and adequately dealt with by other forums prescribed by law, might have adverse effect on disposal of matters which had to be dealt with exclusively by High Court‑‑‑Disputed questions of fact which required recording of evidence being not the domain of High Court under Art. 199 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973), could not be decided in Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court ‑‑‑Scope‑‑ Contractual rights were not enforceable by recourse to Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. Messrs Moman Motors Co. v. Regional Transport Authority PLD 1962 ‑SC 108; Jaiey & Company v. Union of India AIR 1972 Cal. 253 and M. Muzaffar Din Industries v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Department, Lahore 1968 SCMR 1136 ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court ‑‑‑Scope‑‑ Jurisdiction under Art.199 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973) was to be exercised where no other adequate remedy was available and petitioner before seeking remedy under Art.199 of Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 had to show that he had no other adequate or efficacious remedy available to him‑‑‑Article 199(1) of Constitution of Pakistan (1973), conferred on High Court a discretion of fairly wide amplitude, but at the same time it imposed a responsibility on High Court to exercise discretion with some circumspection‑‑‑Satisfaction of High Court that no other adequate remedy provided in law was available to aggrieved party, was condition precedent for exercise of jurisdiction. under Art. 199 of Constitution of Pakistan (1973).

Judgment & Decree

IJAZ‑UL‑HASSAN, J.‑‑‑ Vide letter, dated 29‑2‑2000 (Annexure E/1 ) by Deputy Forest Manager, Alpuri Harvesting Division at Alpuri, District Shangla respondent No.7, petitioner Sabir Rehman, Work Contractor has been directed to deposit Rs.14.22,480.84 including Rs. 10,09,603.27 penalty or shortage of timber i.e. 7099.64 cft. regarding Lot No. 171/M Alpuri, District Shangla.

2. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has invoked Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by filing instant Writ Petition No.531 of 2002 accompanied by an application (C.M. No.756 of 2002), against Secretary to Government of N.W.F.P. Forestry, Fisheries, Wildlife Department, Peshawar and 7 others respondents, with the prayer that the imposition of penalty of Rs.10,09,603.27 be declared as without lawful authority and of no legal effect and respondents be directed to waive off the said penalty and to restrain from the recovery of the said penalty alongwith any other relief to which the plaintiff is entitled under the law.

3. The petitioner in pursuance of contract work of harvesting the timber and of its carriage to the Road Depot was responsible to the forest Development Corporation (FDC) in respect of Lot No.171/M Alpuri, vide agreement (Annexure "N") and work order (Annexure "O"). It appears that due to flood on 11‑3‑1993 scants of Lot No. 171/M in Alpuri were washed away, and the petitioner vide letter dated 11‑3‑1993 (Annexure "A") was directed by respondent No.7 to make arrangement for the .extraction of timber from Nalla, in terms of agreement executed between him and Forest Development Corporation. The petitioner was time and again reminded to realize his responsibility but he failed to do so which obliged the Department to impose upon him the penalty in question.

4. Mian Iqbal Hussain, Advocate for the petitioner contended before us that the harvesting of timber was done which was put for its carriage through Pathru. The shortage in delivery at the road‑side Depot of timber has occasioned due to flood beyond control of the petitioner, which was the result of unforeseen natural calamity and as such the petitioner should not have been burdened with the liability. The learned counsel also reiterated that the petitioner has been discriminated qua other work contractors placed in similar situation and were exonerated of the liability.

5. The jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 199 of the Constitution is an extraordinary jurisdiction which can be invoked only to meet extraordinary situations. This jurisdiction is or/and was never meant to be treated as an additional or as "another" remedy provided by law. It was essentially for this reason that Article 199 of the Constitution specifically provided that this Court shall have jurisdiction under the said provisions of the Constitution only when the law from which a matter emanated did not provide any other adequate remedy to cater for the problem in issue. Therefore, the prime question' in every case of Article 199 of the Constitution as also in the present case is whether an aggrieved person who resorts to the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, has or has not any other adequate remedy available to him under the law.

6. It is a wellestablished principle by now that this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 199 of the Constitution would not ordinarily, embark upon an exercise to determine intricate contentions and complicated questions of fact. Resolution of such controversial issues is ordinarily left to the proper forums prescribed by the law, because indulging in such an exercise would have the effect of pre‑empting and encroaching upon the jurisdiction lawfully vesting in the competent officers and Courts. Involvement of High Court in matters which can be competently, properly and adequately dealt with by other forums prescribed by law, might have adverse effect on the disposal of the matter which have to be dealt with exclusively by this Court.

7. It is also settled principle of law that contractual rights are not enforceable by recourse to writ jurisdiction of the High Court as held in Messrs Moman Motors Co. v. Regional Transport Authority PLD 1962 SC 108, Jaiey & Company v. Union of India AIR 1972 Cal. 253 and M. Muzaffar Din Industries v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Department, Lahore 1968 SCMR 1136. Besides disputed questions of fact are involved in this case which require recording of evidence which is not the domain of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution.

8. It needs no reiteration that the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is to be exercised where no other adequate remedy is available. Adequate remedy has also been defined to mean efficacious remedy in a number of judgments given by superior Courts. Now, therefore, before seeking the remedy under Article 199 of the Constitution the petitioner has to show that he has no other adequate or efficacious remedy available to him. Under Article 199 of the Constituti6n the High Court is empowered to issue a writ, if as borne out from sub‑Article (1) "it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law. Sub‑Article (1) thus, confers on the High Court a discretion of fairly wide amplitude but at the same time it imposes a responsibility on the High Court to exercise the discretion with some circumspection. The satisfaction of the High Court envisaged by sub- Article (1) that no other adequate remedy provided in law is available to the aggrieved party, is condition precedent for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199.

9. The petitioner is claimed to have been discriminated and treated differently qua other work contractors placed in similar situation. The submission is not tenable. Nothing has been brought on record in support of the accusation. The mere assertion of the petitioner that he has been discriminated qua other contractors, without a positive attempt on his part to substantiate the same, is of no consequence.

10. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we find that the writ petition is not maintainable. The same is dismissed in limine. The listed application also meets the same fate. H.B.T./535/P Petition dismissed.