P L D 1976 Lahore 144 (PLP)

The petitioner, Riaz Majid, seeks the quashment of a criminal proceeding instituted against him under sections 186, 189, 448 and 506, P. B. C. The actual offences incorporated in the F.

1. R. were only under sections, 186 and 189, P. P. C. The allegation is that the petitioner (named as Asif Majid in the F.

1. R.) came to the office of the complainant Taj Muhammad Khan D. S. P., Chiniot in connection with his application for sanction of a Petrol Pump, which had been lying with the Chiniot Police but they were not concerned with the matter as the pump site was not in their area. The D. S. P. finding that the application concerned P. S. Saddar. Jhang, directed that the same be sent there by post. The petitioner, however, insisted on taking it personally. It is alleged that he even tried to snatch it from the D. S. P. and that when it was not given to him he resorted to insolent behaviour and when asked to leave the office, uttered threats in the language "well, I will see you". Upon these allegations, challan was submitted and the case started against the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner himself also lodged a counter-case against the said D. S. P. and two Police Officers of Chiniot P. S. under sections 323, 365, 342, 500 and 504, P. P. C.

2. The contention is that the facts narrated in the F. I. R. do not disclose any offence under section 186 or 189, P. P. C. or under the sections later added in the challan, having been committed by the petitioner. Section 186 makes ,causing of voluntary obstruction to any public servant in the discharge of his public functions punishable. The words "voluntarily obstructs" in the section clearly contemplate the commission of some overt act of obstruction. Obstruction means physical obstruction, that is, actual resistance or obstacle put in the way of a public servant. See Jaswant Singh v. King-Emperor A I R 1925 Lah. 139; Thakur Prasad and another v. Emperor A I R 1936 Pat.

74. In Mst. Darkan v. Emperor A I R 1928 Lah. 827 it was held that the word "obstruction" as used in section 186 means :- "physical obstruction that is actual resistance or obstacle put in the way of a public servant. The word implies the use of criminal force and, mere threats or threatening language is insufficient." Physical obstruction need not in all cases mean application of physics force or violence, for even threats of violence made in such a way as to pre vent a public servant from carrying out his duty might amount to an obstruc tion within the meaning of the said section, but such threats must be coupled' with an aggressive or menacing attitude on the part of the person uttering the threats. The anxiety of the petitioner, in the matter before me, to secure the document for personally delivering it to the concerned police station is reasonable. If he had insisted on it, his such insistence even though accom panied with some exuberance of insolence cannot amount to voluntarily caus ing of obstruction.

3. Nor are the ingredients of section 189, P. P. C. disclosed in the F. I. R. It has been stated therein that when the D. S. P. refused to hand over the papers and asked the petitioner to get out of the office, the petitioner left uttering the threatening words "well, I will see you". Mere threat uttered as an exhibition of bad temper or in the course of an altercation is not necessarily an offence under section 189, P. P. C. The threat of some physical injury whether implied or direct must be present in the words uttered. The threa tening words allegedly used by the petitioner do not constitute any threat of such injury. In a similar situation, in Amir Muhammad v. Crown P L D 1952 Bal. 19 it had been held: '' I will see about you' cannot possibly be considered as indicating a. specific threat of injury. Moreover, this type of threat is one which. is of very common application indeed and is nothing more than a. means of giving vent to a person's immediate feelings without carrying. with it any intention of a specific threat of injury. It is apparent that the object underlying section 189, P. P. C. is to protect a Government, servant from a real fear of injury though whether that injury is or is not caused is immaterial. Unless the Government servant is in fear that some specific injury is likely to be caused to him, it would nor mally be improper to convict a member of the public of an offence under this section." The use of the words "well, I will see you" do not constitute an offence under, section 506, P. P. C. either because it cannot be assumed thereby that the petitioner bad threatened the complainant with illegal harm, nor is there any ground for an offence under section 448, P. P. C.

4. We must not lose sight of the fact that the law does not contemplate the meting out of punishment for trifling matters. It is noteworthy that the Chiniot Police had been sitting over the petitioner's application although it did not concern them. The petitioner had, therefore, reason to feel frustrated, and apprehensive of further delay. In the circumstance, the Police Officer was expected, by the very nature of his public duties, to have treated him with patience and accommodation. Men living in society must suffer some inconveniences, without which no society is possible. Public servants charged with the responsibility of removing public grievances are all the more expected to make allowance for and not to overtly react to a display of anger and even petty transgression on the part of an aggrieved member of the public. The Penal Code has by its section 95 exempted such incidents from being treated as an offence. The attempt at prosecuting the petitioner, in the circumstance, is both unfortunate and unwarranted. I, therefore, allow this application and quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioner. S. Q. Application allowed.