PLC 1986

1986 PLP 530 (PLC)

HAQ NAWAZ BALOCH Versus Messrs KARACHI X‑RAYS, KARACHI

Jurisdiction / Court
1st Labour Court Sind
Decided Date
Application No. 23 of 1984, decided on 13th August, 1985.
Honorable Judges
Ghous Muhammad, Presiding Officer
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1986 PLP 530 (PLC)
Forum / Court 1st Labour Court Sind
Bench Members Ghous Muhammad, Presiding Officer
Parties HAQ NAWAZ BALOCH Versus Messrs KARACHI X‑RAYS, KARACHI
Primary Law Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1986 PLP 530 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1986 PLP 530 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the 1st Labour Court Sind bench comprising: Ghous Muhammad, Presiding Officer.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1986 PLP 530 (PLC) (HAQ NAWAZ BALOCH Versus Messrs KARACHI X‑RAYS, KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑

Representation

  • S.M. Yaqoob for Respondents.
  • 6. The parties filed their respective affidavits and witnesses from both the sides were cross‑examined by the learned Advocates.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.1(4) & S.0.12(3)‑ Termination of service allegedly wrongful‑‑Establishment proved to not having 20 or more employees at any time‑‑Provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 not applicable‑‑Grievance application under S.25‑A, in circumstances dismissed as not maintainable. Mirza M. Kazim for Applicant.

Judgment & Decree

That in spite of repeated warnings the applicant did not improve his performance and has always been negligent in the work assigned to him. The applicant was also found committing blunders resulting in heavy loss, to the respondent. That the applicant due to his misconduct, lack of interest in the work let down the reputation and goodwill of the respondent. That the applicant was caught red‑handed while taking stealthily unsigned reports to some patients for which he felt sorry and promised not to repeat such things again." The respondent also warned the applicant about his alleged intolerable conduct and performance and ultimately his services were terminated with one month's notice pay.

5. The learned Vth Sind Labour Court levelled the issue on 22‑1‑1984 which reads as under: ‑‑ (1) Whether the application as framed is not maintainable at law? (2) Whether the provisions of I.R.O. are not applicable to the matter hence barred under law? (3) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction in the matter? (4) Whether the applicant has not cause of action to file this application? (5) Whether the applicant is entitled to any relief? if so, to what extent? (6) Whether the termination of the applicant is in violation of Standing Order 12(3) hence mala fide, illegal and inoperative in the eye of law? (7) What should the order be?

6. The parties filed their respective affidavits and witnesses from both the sides were cross‑examined by the learned Advocates.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the record.

8. Now it is to be considered whether the applicant is a workman for the purpose of the Ordinance since his claim is based on the provisions of Standing Order 12 particularly clause (3), thereof. In order that any employee should be a workman for the purpose of the said Ordinance, the nature of his work must be either manual, whether skilled or unskilled, or clerical. According to this definition "workman" is employed in an industry or commercial establishment to do skilled or unskilled work, which is manual or clerical. Manual work entails physical exertion to distinguish from the mental or intellectual exertion involved in the clerical work. Both the manual and clerical work in the sense these terms are used here, connotes that it is more or less a routine work, not requiring any great amount of initiative, imagination, direction, control and supervision in discharging the same. The true nature of duties performed by the employee is the determining factor in ascertaining if he was a workman or not within this definition. In case the manual work forms only a small and an auxiliary part of his responsibilities or he is incidentally required to prepare a statement, maintain a register or submit a report he cannot be considered to be a workman if otherwise his main and primary duties do not belong to this category. Thus, the true test is to look to the direct immediate and substantial part of work for which the applicant was employed and not to the sundry duties incidentally performed by him. The applicant has mainly stated in his application as well as in his affidavit that he was performing skilled manual work at the respondent establishment and used to operate X‑Rays machines. He has not disclosed the details of actual duties that he had performed and mere designation is immaterial. In crossexamination he admitted that initially his salary was Rs.1,575 which was raised to Rs.2,000 in June, 1982. Thus, in my humble view he is not a workman as defined by law. Even otherwise on merits I have also examined carefully the oral and documentary evidence which has come on record. The payment register correspondence to the attendance register (Exhs. A‑1/4, A‑1/5 and A‑8). The part time workers have also been shown. I see no reason to doubt authenticity of those documents. The applicant admitted his signature on page 10 of the salary register and R.W. Saleem Habib who is the Administrator of the respondent establishment denied the suggestion in crossexamination that the attendance register produced in the Court were prepared after the filing of this case. Therefore, these documents clearly indicates that the total number of workers was less than 20 at the time when the services of the applicant was terminated. R.W. Saleem Habib in crossexamination also stated that at that time the total number of whole‑time employees of the respondent was about 16 and only two or three part‑times were working in the respondent clinic. He specifically denied the suggestion that at the relevant time 20 persons used to work in the respondent clinic. The applicant in para. 6 of his affidavit has stated that the number of workmen employed in the respondent establishment during the 12 months period between June, 1982 to June, 1983' was about 25 to 30 and he also produced the list of some of the employees. A.W. Muhammad Nawaz in para. 4 of his affidavit stated that during the course of his employment the total number of workers employed in the respondent establishment always remain about 20 to

30. These statements were challenged in crossexamination and R.W. Saleem Habib in his affidavit in evidence vehemently denied the above claim of the applicant. In para. 6 of the R.W. Saleem Habib the details have been given to show that either the employees named by the applicant were not in the employment of the respondent or some of them had left the job or were only part‑timers. This evidence was not seriously challenged in crossexamination. The statement of R.W. Dr. Syed Mehmood also supports the evidence of R.W. Saleem Habib. In these circumstances I find that the Standing Orders Ordinance and the I.R.O. are not applicable in this case. As was rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent at best even if for arguments sake it is conceded that the respondent establishment is governed by the West Pakistan Shops and Establishment Ordinance (VIII of 1969) the provisions of section 19 of the said Ordinance would apply in the case of the present applicant for termination of his services. According to the provisions of section 19 it was incumbent upon the respondent to serve the applicant with one month's notice in writing before terminating his services or else to pay one month's wages in lieu of notice. In other words the law provides a compensation in such a case where one month's notice for termination of services was not given. In the instant case admittedly no notice was given but he was given one month's salary and he collected his full and final dues.

9. Therefore, the upshot of the above discussion is that the provisions of I.R.O. , 1969 are not applicable in the facts of the present I case. Likewise the Standing Orders Ordinance is also not applicable due to lack of statutory number of employees working in the respondent establishment. The applicant is also not a workman and this Court has no jurisdiction to grant any relief to him. Accordingly his application is dismissed. A.E Application dismissed.