P L D 1987 Lahore 298 (PLP)

Respondent‑landlord sought the ejectment of the petitioner on the ground of default, subletting and damage to the demised property. Petitioner contested the ejectment petition and necessary issues arising from the pleadings of the parties were framed. The matter was fixed for evidence when the respondent moved an application seeking to amend his ejectment petition so as to take up an additional ground of personal need. This application was resisted by the petitioner. Learned Rent Controller allowed the amendment prayed for by order dated 6‑11‑1986 which order has been brought under challenge in the present constitutional petition. 2.???????? Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no provision in the Rent Restriction Ordinance for amendment of the pleadings and provisions of C.P.C. are not applicable to the proceedings under the Punjab Urban Restriction Ordinance. Contention, therefore, is that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to allow the amendment. The contention has no merit. No doubt, provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not in terms applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. Rent Controller, however, may in his discretion, follow and apply them to meet the ends of justice particularly where A the provisions of Ordinance are silent. Question of procedure to be adopted by a Rent Controller is entirely within his discretion. (Refer P L D 1976 S C 422 and 1982 S C M R 33). Learned Rent Controller, therefore, certainly had the jurisdiction to allow the amendment.

3. It is next contended by the learned counsel that the amendment was sought at a highly belated stage. His submission is that the ejectment petition was filed on 4‑4‑1983 whereas the application for amendment was moved in April 1986 i.e. after three years. This contention, too, has no force. Law is well‑settled that the amendment can be allowed at any stage of the proceedings, original or appellate. Delay by itself is, therefore, no ground to refuse the application for amendment unless it causes injustice to the other party. It is admitted by the learned counsel that evidence had not as yet started when the application for amendment was made. Petitioner is, therefore, not likely to suffer any prejudice by the impugned amendment. Learned counsel concedes that the respondent could bring a fresh ejectment petition on the ground of personal need. That being so, he could certainly ask for the amendment of the ejectment petition so as to incorporate therein an additional ground of personal need particularly when question of limitation was not involved. There is ample authority for the view that in order to avoid multiplicity of C litigation, amendments which do not take away a legal right already accrued to the other side can be allowed in suitable cases. See 1979 SCMR

15. It is not the case of the petitioner that any right accrued in his favour has been taken away by the amendment sought and granted. For this reason also, the impugned amendment is not open to any exception.

4. Apart from what has been held above, matter of allowing or refusing the amendment rests in the discretion of the Court. Rent Controller having exercised the discretion in favour of the respondent landlord, this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction would not substitute its own view for that of the Rent Controller more so when the discretion exercised by him is not shown to be arbitrary or capricious.

5. Thus, viewed from whatever angle, the impugned order does not call for any interference. This petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed in limine. A . A . / A‑63/ L????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Petition dismissed.