Present : Muhammad Afzal Zullah and Mian Burhanuddin Khan, JJ (PLP)

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑Leave to appeal has been sought from order dated 27‑4‑1986 of the Lahore High Court ; whereby the petitioner's constitutional petition seeking the quashment of an order of a learned Magistrate in a criminal case, requiring the petitioner to produce the sanction to prosecute the accused respondent, was dismissed. The petitioner, a Superintending Engineer is, through a private complaint, prosecuting his Chief Engineer and a Director working in the office of the Chief Engineer for having written a letter dated 2‑5‑1983 to him, asking his explanation and to show why action should not be initiated against him under Efficiency and Disciplinary Rules. It may be noted that this letter was issued to him with the prior approval of the Secretary to Government of Punjab, Communication and Works Department. The case of the petitioner‑complainant is that the letter contains incorrect allegations in such circumstances that its preparation constitutes an offence under section 167, P. P. C. After recording preliminary evidence of the petitioner‑complainant the learned Magistrate summoned the respondents. On their application for acquittal under section 249‑A, Cr. P. C. the learned Magistrate by his order dated 25‑10‑1984 directed the petitioner to produce the sanction for the prosecution of the accused as is required under section 197, Cr. P. C. The petitioner instead of making. application to the authority concerned for seeking sanction, challenged that order in revision petition before the Sessions Court which was dismissed on 24‑1‑1985. Not satisfied the petitioner then challenged both these orders in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court which having been dismissed, he has sought leave to appeal to this Court, through this petition. The learned Judge in the High Court after making reference to the case law concerned has held that the material placed before the learned Magistrate was sufficient to hold that in this case sanction (to prosecute the respondents) under section 197, Cr. P. C. was necessary. It was also held that the case being tried by a Magistrate, the rules applicable to a trial before a Special Judge under Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, were not attracted, therefore, the learned Magistrate was not bound to obtain the sanction himself and it was within his power to direct the petitioner to produce the sanction. Accordingly, the writ petition, was dismissed. After some arguments the question also arose whether such a complaint by an accused civil servant, in a proceedings for disciplinary action under the law relating to civil servants, can be filed against the officer initiating the proceedings, before the conclusions of those proceedings. Learned counsel failed to satisfy us with regard to the competency of such a complaint except for his bald statement that if the statutes i. e., the Pakistan Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code permit the institution of such a complaint, no higher principle can prevent it. This furnishes no answer. The said law does not insist that the complaint should be filed only at such a stage which would amount to stifling the disciplinary proceedings under the law relating to civil servants. In this case, for example, the petitioner has succeeded in thwarting those proceed ings, beyond the stage of the service of show‑cause notice, for more than three years. Special laws relating to civil servants provide complete code for the adjudication of the correctness or otherwise of the allegations in show‑cause notice like the one issued to the petitioner. The assertion by the petitioner in the complaint that the contents of the show‑cause notice are in correct can be examined in the heirarchy of departmental authorities and the specially constituted Tribunal and by the Supreme Court also in specified circumstances. Assistance can be sought from those forums in proper proceedings, against the authors of the notice if any offence is committed by them. The criminal proceedings started in this case by the petitioner were absolutely ill‑advised at this stage. In this light and aspect, they amounted to abuse of process of Court. We have made this observa tion after hearing the learned counsel on the point. We also heard the learned counsel on the point whether the petitioner could not be proceeded against for additional charge of misconduct in making an attempt to thwart the departmental proceedings by launching a vexatious criminal case against those very persons who wanted to proceed against him in accordance with the law relating to civil servants, instead of responding to the show‑cause notice by submitting his version of the matter in the explanation asked for from him. He replied that even though it could be ; however, such a remark by this Court in this behalf would result in sure dismissal of the petitioner from service in the departmental proceedings, which were intended to be launched through the show‑cause notice in dispute. The apprehension of the learned counsel appears to be reasonable. It is quite possible that the petitioner was ill‑advised by some one to adopt an unjustifiable method of thwarting departmental proceedings. It is possible that he is absolutely innocent and in a mistaken zeal of avoiding the departmental proceedings and for purpose of saving the embarrassment of any action in that line, acted on misguided advice and filed the complaint. We, therefore, accept the request of the learned counsel in this behalf and refrain from making any remark for the addition of a charge of misconduct against the petitioner on account of the filing of the complaint. It is, however, observed that if it is permitted unchecked no superior officer will feel safe in initiating departmental proceedings against a delinquent subordinate and a special law to the extent it deals with corruption and misconduct on the part of the civil servants, will practically become a dead letter. On merits., the learned counsel remained unable to advance any argument with regard to the findings of the learned Judge in the High Court on the points raised before him and made a request for withdrawal of the petition. Accordingly, we do not consider it necessary to make any further comment on this point. The petition with the foregoing observations and remarks, is dismissed as withdrawn. S. Q. Petition dismissed.