1992 PLP 2166 (SCMR)
PAKISTAN ENGINEERING CO. LIMITED, LAHORE through Managing Director‑‑‑Appellant Versus FAZAL BEG and 2 others‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1992 PLP 2166 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | Supreme Court of Pakistan |
| Bench Members | Shafiur Rahman and Abdul Shakurul Salam, JJ |
| Parties | PAKISTAN ENGINEERING CO. LIMITED, LAHORE through Managing Director‑‑‑Appellant Versus FAZAL BEG and 2 others‑‑‑Respondents |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1992 PLP 2166 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1992 PLP 2166 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Shafiur Rahman and Abdul Shakurul Salam, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1992 PLP 2166 (SCMR) (PAKISTAN ENGINEERING CO. LIMITED, LAHORE through Managing Director‑‑‑Appellant Versus FAZAL BEG and 2 others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Malik Bashir Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Ch. Qamar‑ud‑Din Meo, Advocate‑on‑Record for Appellant.
- Date of hearing: 10th May, 1992.
- Shahid Hussain Qadri, ,Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Ch. Muhammad Aslam, Advocate‑on‑Recorder Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment of Lahore High Court, dated 15‑4‑1989) passed in W.P. No.2011 of 1982). (a) Interpretation of statutes‑‑ ‑‑‑‑ Beneficial legislation‑‑‑Mode of construing‑‑‑Basic and first principle in construing a beneficial legislation is to interpret its provision to advance its purpose rather than thwart or subvert it by specious sophistry. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S.2(xxviii)‑‑‑West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. 2(i)‑‑‑"Workman"‑‑ Connotation‑‑‑Workman as defined in Ordinance XXIII of 1969 and Ordinance VI of 1968, is to be a person employed to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire‑‑‑Work performed by such workman is to involve physical exertion more or less, distinct from intellectual or the one involving decision‑making at a higher or lower level‑‑‑Employee designated as Jamadar drawing about four or five hundred rupees per month at the relevant time would be a "workman" to all intents and purposes. Shahzar Khan v. Sindh Labour Court and others 1977 SCMR 103; Port Trust Workers v. Karachi Port Trust etc. 1988 SCMR 922 and Black's Law Dictionary 4th Edn. rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Art.185‑‑‑Appeal‑‑‑Where order of High Court was based on precedents of Supreme Court and sound reasoning, no justification was warranted to interfere in the same. Shahid Hussain Qadri, ,Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Ch. Muhammad Aslam, Advocate‑on‑Recorder Respondents.
Judgment & Decree
ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, J.‑‑‑This appeal by leave arises in the following circumstances:
1. Relevant facts are that the respondent No.1 was working as a Security Jamadar with the appellant company. A tool cutter, was removed from the engineering shop. In the domestic enquiry, the Enquiry Officer found that, the respondent No.1 had facilitated the removal by one Muhammad Siddiq Sindhu. He was dismissed from, service on 30‑12‑1976. He filed a petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Punjab Labour Court wherein a preliminary objection was taken by the appellant that the respondent was not a "workman". The objection was overruled. However, the petition was dismissed on merits vide order of the Punjab Labour Court No.2, Lahore dated 2&2‑1980. The respondent filed an appeal and the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore re‑examined the evidence on record and held that "the learned lower Court was not justified in finding the appellant guilty in any manner abetting the commission of theft of the cutter". However, the learned Tribunal held that though the respondent No.1 was covered by definition of a workman under section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 yet he was not a workman under the definition given in section 2(1) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 which was necessary for granting him relief. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. This is vide order dated 24‑11‑1981. The respondent No.1 tiled a Constitution petition in the Lahore High Court. A learned Judge referred to the judgment of this Court in "Shahzar Khan v. Sindh Labour Court and others" (1977 SCMR 103) wherein a Chowkidar and Assistant Manager Security employed at monthly salary of Rs.350, who was besides working as a Chowkidar was also supervising three other Chowkidars, way held to be a workman and worker within the meaning of definition given in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and also to the case of "Organization of Karachi Port Trust Workers v. Karachi Port Trust etc." (1988 SCMR 922) wherein "Havildars" and "Chowkidar" were held to be "workmen" within the meaning of definition given in section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. The learned Judge pointed out that this provision defined a workman as follows: " `Workman' means any person including an apprentice employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes etc." The learned Judge observed that the definition of "workman" given above is almost the same as given in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 which is as follows: " `Workman' means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward." The learned Judge also noticed the meaning of the word "manual" as given in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the finding of the learned Appellate Tribunal that the respondent was not a workman under the definition `as given in the Standing (Orders) Ordinance which was the basis for refusing relief could not be sustained. The Constitution. petition was accordingly allowed and the learned appellate Tribunal was directed to afford necessary relief to the respondent and for passing appropriate order in accordance with law. This is vide order dated 15‑4‑1989. Hence this appeal.
2. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since the respondent was a Security Jamadar, he did pot fall under the definition of a workman as given in the (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
3. The definition of a "workman" under the (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 as quoted above, is to the following effect:‑‑ " `Workman' means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward." Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition) records that "manual" means ...done, made or operated by or used with hand or as manual labour", "manual labour performed by hand or by the exercise of physical force with or without the aid of tools or machinery or equipment but depending for its effectiveness chiefly upon personal muscular exertion rather than upon skill, intelligence or adroitness". The basic and first principle to be kept in view in construing a beneficial legislation is to interpret its provision to advance its purpose rather than thwart or subvert it by specious sophistry. The idea behind the legislation was to safeguard the rights and interests of workmen. Workman was defined to mean a person employed to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire. The work performed was to involve physical exertion more or less, distinct from intellectual or the one involving decision‑making at a higher or lower level. It would appear to be travesty of thought to say that a Jamadar drawing about 4 or 5 hundred rupees per month at the relevant time was not a workman under one statute, though he was so in another when both intended to achieve the same purpose. The order appealed against is well based on precedents of this Court and sound reasoning. Therefore there is no justification for this Court to interfere in the same. Hence, the appeal is dismissed but as it involved statutory interpretation the parties are left to bear their own costs. AA./P‑188/S Appeal dismissed.