1976 PLP 788 (PLC(CS))

Muhammad Sardar, the appellant, was employed as a worker in Premier Cloth Mills, Lyallpur. He was removed from service by an order dated 30th May 1974. He filed a petition before the Junior Labour Court No. 2, Lyallpur, for his re-instatement under section 24-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. His petition was dismissed. He has come up in appeal. Allegedly, the appellant and his co-worker Nazir concealed some cloth, manufactured in the Mills, by tying at their backs. They crossed the outer gate with their booty but the Security Staff caught them red handed just outside the gate. The appellant was charge-sheeted, his explanation was found unsatisfactory and so a Board of Inquiry was constituted. The finding of the Board was that the appellant committed theft. He was served with a second show-cause notice and after considering this explanation, the Manage ment dismissed him from service. In his application before the Junior Labour Court, he challenged the inquiry on two grounds. First, that his nominee was not allowed to assist him in the inquiry proceedings. Second, that the Inquiry Report was not furnished to him with the show-cause notice. On the first point, the appellant stated, while appearing as his own witness that his nominee Murad Gul had been taking part in the inquiry but he was not allowed to speak. Obviously, the appellant has changed his version. There is absolutely, no proof that his nominee has not been assisting him during the inquiry and he was not allowed to speak. On the second point, it was admitted by the Management that the Inquiry Report was not given to the appellant with the show-cause notice. The question is whether non-supply of the inquiry report amounts to violation of natural justice. The mere fact that the inquiry report was not given to appellant is not sufficient to hold that the proceedings of the inquiry were nullified. The appellant must prove that some prejudice was caused to him by non-supply of the inquiry report. There is nothing on the record that any prejudice was caused to him. Both the points raised in appeal are without force. Finally, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the duty of the Labour Court was to call the record of the proceedings of the inquiry and to see if there was sufficient evidence against the appellant to give a verdict of guilty. He has relied upon the wordings of subsection (5) of section 25-A of the' Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. This subsection runs as under: - "In adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4) the Junior Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and in the proper circumstances of the case." Section 25-A is divided into seven subsections. The first five subsections relate to the grievance of a worker in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him. The other two subsections namely (6) and (7) relate to the question of termination of employment of a worker as a result of retrench ment or dismissal etc. However, it is provided in subsection (7) that the Junior Labour Court shall give its decision fn the manner, laid down in sub sections 4 and

5. The plain words "shall go into all facts of the case" does not mean that the Labour Courts have been given the authority to interfere into the internal administration of a Management. All the decisions of the superior Courts, which have come to my knowledge so far, laid down a clear principle on the subject of inquiries. This principle is that though the management of a concern has powers to direct its own internal administration and discipline, the powers are not unlimited, and when an industrial dispute arises, the Industrial Tribunal have the powers to see whether a termination of service of a workman is justified. In cases of dismissal for misconduct, however, the Industrial Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere only:

(1) when there is want of good faith; (2) when there is victimization or unfair labour practice; (3) when the management has been guilty of basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice; and (4) when on the material, the finding of the management is completely baseless or perverse. Ordinarily it is not the function of the management to prove that the enquiry was not suffering from any defects, mentioned above. It is the duty of the worker to produce evidence before the Labour Court to prove that any of the defects mentioned above existed in the inquiry. In the present case there is nothing on record to show that the inquiry was suffering from any material defects, by virtue of which interference was called by a Labour Court. For the reasons given above, there is no merit in the appeal and the same s hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.