1993 PLP 651 (PLC)

AHMAD YAR KHAN, J. ‑‑‑The petitioner‑Bank is aggrieved by the decision of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi (respondent No. 3) passed on 8‑5‑1988, in Appeal No. SUK‑90/86, whereby the Appellate Tribunal set aside the order of the Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. VII, Sukkur, who had dismissed the grievance petition of respondent No. 1 Shah Nawaz Solangi. The Appellate Tribunal by the decision impugned herein had ordered the reinstatement of respondent No. 1, in service with full back benefits. The facts briefly, sated leading to the filing of present petition are that respondent No. 1 Shahnawaz. Solangi was working as permanent cashier in Dadu Branch of the petitioner‑Bank. On 17‑4‑1984, he was directed to resume duties immediately at Kot Lal Bux Mahesar Branch. Before taking charge at Kot Lal Bux Mahesar Branch respondent No. 1 fell ill from 20th April 1984 to 31st May 1984, such certificate was issued by Dr. Karim Bux Burdi M.D. Rural Health Centre, Sehwan. The petitioner‑Bank, however, was of the view that the petitioner/respondent No. 1 was not well and the certificate was manipulated. After holding domestic enquiry respondent No. 1 was dismissed from service vide order dated 22‑8‑1984. Respondent No. 1 thereafter submitted a departmental appeal dated 28‑8‑1984, but he never received any reply. Finally, he sent a grievance notice on 7/9‑2‑1985 followed by grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in VII Labour Court, Sukkur. The petitioner‑Bank resisted the grievance petition both on legal as well as factual issues, and the same was dismissed by the aforesaid Labour Court. Respondent No. 1 preferred an Appeal before Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal who set aside the order of Labour Court and decided the appeal in favour of respondent No.

1. It is this decision, that is impugned in this petition. Mr. Rizwan Ahmed Siddiqi, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the grievance petition filed under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was hopelessly time‑barred and was liable to be dismissed. He invited our attention to subsections (1) and (4) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which read as under:‑‑ "25‑A. Redress of individual grievances. ‑‑‑A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his shop steward or (Collective Bargaining Agent) within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises. (4) If the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in subsection (2) or as the case may be subsection (3), or if he is dissatisfied with such decision, the worker or shop steward may take the matter to his (Collective Bargaining Agent) or the (Labour Court), or as the case may be, the (Collective Bargaining Agent) may take the matter to the (Labour Court), and where the matter is taken to the (Labour Court) it shall give (a decision) within (7) days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were in an industrial dispute. Provided that a worker who desires to so take the matter to the (Labour Court) shall do so within a period of two months from the date of the communication of the employer or, as the case may be, from the expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3), as the case may be. Mr. Rizwan Ahmed Siddiqi submitted that respondent No. 1 was dismissed from service on 22‑8‑1984 but the grievance notice was sent in the month of February, 1985, as such in view of the above‑quoted provisions the same was hopelessly time‑barred and the grievance petition was to be dismissed on that ground. He has placed reliance on PLD 1987 SC

447. On the other hand, Mr. M.L. Shahani, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that respondent No. 1 submitted departmental appeal to the petitioner‑Bank on 28‑8‑1984 but .the petitioner never communicated any decision taken on such appeal, as such respondent No. 1 had no other option but, to send grievance notice to the petitioner‑Bank. Mr. M.L. Shahani urged that, under the circumstances, the grievance petition could not be termed as time‑barred. He placed reliance on Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and another 1984 PLC 1149, whereby this Court at page 1151 observed as follows:‑‑ "On 26‑5‑1980 the employee filed a petition in the learned Vth Labour Court. It was argued that it was filed after delay of 25 days from the date of dismissal and was therefore time‑barred. This plea has no substance as `grievance notice' has to be sent `within three months' of the day on which cause of such grievance arises. The employee preferred an appeal before the President of petitioner‑Bank that was not rejected till 15‑3‑1980. Here it may be stated that in reply to the reminder dated 1‑3‑1980 sent by the employee he was never informed that his appeal was rejected. Rather he was told that the matter was being put before the Staff Review Committee. In the circumstances, the plea regarding any defect in the relevant `grievance notice' on the ground of limitation cannot be accepted." The facts of the present case are more or less similar to the facts of the case referred to hereinabove, as the petitioner‑Bank never decided the, appeal submitted by respondent No. 1 and no intimation was sent to the petitioner about the fate of his appeal, as such respondent No. l had no other option but to send grievance notice which led to the filing of the grievance petition under section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view expressed by the Appellate Tribunal that the grievance petition filed by respondent No. 1 was within time. Mr. Rizwan Ahmed Siddiqi has stressed on another point that Tribunal had to decide a particular matter in accordance with law and it had no jurisdiction to decide a matter rightly or wrongly. Reliance is placed on PLD 1987 SC

447. We find such argument devoid of any force as in our view; learned Tribunal has decided the present case in accordance with law on sound reasoning. As regards the finding of facts, it is settled law that the same falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal. High Court cannot re‑examine the factual finding arrived by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Reference can be made to Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited v. Ejaz Ahmad Abbasi and another 1990 SCMR 1713, wherein at page 1716 the following observation has been made: "The above observation of the High Court is against the record because the Labour Appellate Tribunal has clearly stated that the respondent No. 1 had admitted five charges, therefore, there was no basis for recording such observations. The High Court has set aside the finding of fact and it has entered into realm of facts. The Labour Appellate Tribunal has appraised the evidence. It was within the domain of the Tribunal but the High Court itself took the appraisal of evidence and travelled beyond its allotted sphere. The finding of the fact was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It is not the case of no evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLD 1987 SC 447)". As a result of the above discussion, we are of the view that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal does not call for any interference, as such the present petition is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. We had dismissed this petition with no order as to 'costs for the foregoing reasons by our short order passed on 24‑9‑1992. H.B.T./M-1830/K Petition dismissed.