1989 PLP 977 (PLC(CS))

4. The learned Labour Court No. VI at Hyderabad allowed the grievance Petition No. 161 of 1980 which is subject‑matter of Appeal No. HYD‑152 of 1988 on 5‑4‑19KR and ordered reinstatement of respondent No. 1 in the said appeal with back benefits. He also allowed the grievance Petition No. 263 of 1987 which is subject‑matter of Appeal No. 153 of 1988 and set aside the impugned order withholding two increments of respondent No. 1 in the said appeal with consequential benefits as prayed in the grievance application.

5. I have heard Mr. Abdul Latif Malik, Advocate for the appellants in both the appeals and Mr. M. Ishaque Abbasi, Advocate for respondent No. 1 in Appeal No. 152 of 1988 and Mr. Syed Fasahat Hussain Rizvi, Advocate for Respondent No. 1 in Appeal No. 153 of 1988. 6. 1n this Tribunal as well as before the learned Labour Court the main contention of the appellant was that Industrial Relations Ordinance was not applicable to the workmen working in the appellant's organization.

7. Mr. Abdul Latif Malik, the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention has relied upon section 1(3)(b) of the I.R.O. and also on the decision of this Tribunal in Appeal No. HYD‑373 of 1982. In the decision of' this Tribunal it was held that the Sind Seed Corporation was run under the authority of Government of Sind and has its statutory rules of service therefore under proviso to Standing Order 1(4) the Standing Orders Ordinance would not be applicable to such an Organisation. The question as to whether I.R.O. was applicable or not was not considered by the Tribunal. So far section 1(3)(b) of I.R.O. is concerned, the I.R.O. is not made applicable in the case of persons employed in the administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railway, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments, The workmen employed by the appellant cannot be said to be working in the administration of the State as they are working in statutory corporation established under the Sind Seed Corporation Act, 1976. Though this Corporation is being run under the Authority and control of Government of Sind its employees cannot be said to be working in the administration of the State.

8. This question had come for consideration before the High Court of Sind in Constitutional Petition No. S‑84 of 1985. It was decided by me in my capacity as Judge of the High Court. 1n this judgment the question was not finally determined as the impugned order which was challenged was not final. Besides 4 the petitioner had not exhausted the remedy available to him under section 37(3) of I.R.O.

9. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a decision of this Tribunal in Appeal No. HYD‑206 of 1987. The Tribunal in the decision had repelled the contention of the respondent that I.R.O. and Standing Orders were not applicable. The learned Tribunal has relied upon P L D 1975 Kar, 274 and 1988 S C M R 1732. In the Supreme Court ruling cited above their Lordships have observed that proviso to section 1(4) only excludes the application of certain provisions of Standing Orders to the Industrial and Commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority of Federal or Provincial Government where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable but the corporation have been omitted from this provision. Their Lordships, therefore, held that:‑ "It is clear, therefore, that on the words of the proviso, the Standing Orders do not become inapplicable and the decision in the case of National Shipping Corporation correctly lays down the law on the subject."

10. There is no corresponding provision or proviso in the Industrial Relations Ordinance excluding the application of I.R.O. to the industrial or commercial establishments or corporations run by or under the authority of the Government. I have already held that the employees of the appellant do not fall under category of the employees employed in the administration of the State. No 18 other provision has been pointed out under which the I.R.O. has been made inapplicable to the employees of the appellant.

11. It is conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the appellant has moved the Labour Court under the 1.R.0. for cancellation of the union. In other words the appellant themselves have invoked provision of I.R.O. to seek relief. In fact an interim order passed in the Industrial Dispute filed by the C.B.A. before the Labour Court was subject‑matter of Constitution Petition No. S‑84 of 1985 which has been discussed above. The learned counsel for the respondents have also produced a Gazette Notification published in the Sind Government Gazette on September 19, 1988 being No. 21(41) S.O.(DEV)/87, under which certain categories of employees of Sind Seed Corporation were notified by the Sind Government in pursuance of the special provision under sub?clause (d) of clause (viii) of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Under this provision of 1.R.0. the persons specified in notification have been appointed as employer within the meaning of section 2(viii) of the I.R.O. Thus the admitted facts clearly show that the appellant has impliedly accepted the application of I.R.O. and, therefore, sought the cancellation of the C.B.A. by filing petition under the I.R.O. in the Labour Court. The Government of Sind under whose authority the appellant is being run has also accepted the application of the I.R.O. by notifying certain staff of the appellant to be employer under section 2(viii) of the I.R.O.

12. In view of the above discussion, in my opinion, the Labour Court has rightly held that the provisions of I.R.O. are applicable to the employees of the appellant.

13. The learned counsel for the appellant has further raised objection that the Labour Court has erred in deciding the grievance petitions without recording evidence. The only ground on which the respondents have challenged the impugned orders was that during the pendency of Industrial dispute impugned orders were passed without obtaining permission of the Labour Court under section 47(2). On going through the pleadings of the parties I find that the pendency of the Industrial dispute is not denied by the appellant. The appellant has not specifically denied the allegation that prior permission under section 47(2) of the I.R.O. was not obtained but has only contended that Industrial Relations Ordinance was not applicable to their employees. Thus impliedly the claimants have admitted that permission as required by section 47(2) of the I.R.O. was not obtained. I have already held that I.R.O. is applicable to the employees of the appellant. As such when Industrial Dispute was admittedly B pending between the parties it was obligatory for the appellant to have obtained previous permission of the Labour Court under section 47(2) of the I.R.O.; 1969, which reads as under:‑‑ "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) an officer or a registered trade union shall not, during the pendency of any proceedings referred to in subsection (1) be discharged, dismissed or otherwise punished for misconduct, except with the previous permission of the Labour Court."

14. Muhammad Ismail in his grievance petition in para. 2 has averred that he was the President of the Sind Seed Corporation Employees Union whereas appellant Shahid Mahmood has averred in his grievance application in para. 2 that he was General Secretary of the said Union. The appellant had not specifically denied the averment that the said respondents held the said posts as averred by them in their applications but have merely denied these paras on the ground that the Labour laws do not apply to the employees of the appellant. In view of the finding of this Tribunal that the I.R.O. is applicable to the employees of the appellant the fact that the above respondents were office‑bearers of the Union stands impliedly admitted.

15. Under section 36(2) of the I.R.O. "the Labour Court shall, for the purpose of adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute, be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Order XII Rule VI, C.P.C. a Civil Court can deliver judgment on the admission of the parties even without recording evidence. As I have already pointed out the pleadings of the appellant before the Labour Court clearly admit the pendency of the Industrial dispute and the fact that no previous permission under section 47(2) of the I.R.O. was obtained before passing impugned orders.

16. In view of the above discussion I find nothing wrong in the orders passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court which are maintained and both the appeals filed by the appellants are hereby dismissed. ‑‑ A.E./13.12/Lb. S . ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeals dismissed.