1988 PLP 73 (PLC)

Laws Cited

Representation

• ‑‑‑Ss.25‑A & 38(3)‑‑Removal from service‑‑Reinstatement‑‑Counsel for appellant establishment failing to submit anything new to what he had already submitted before Labour Court below‑‑Case of respondent worker neither barred by time nor by principles of res judicata‑‑On merits, Labour Court thoroughly discussed every legal aspect and whole evidence brought on record and then passed a well‑reasoned order whereby respondent worker was reinstated in service‑‑Order of Labour Court was maintained and worker was ordered to be reinstated into service with fifty per cent back benefits.
• Sadiq Khan for Appellant.
• M. L. Shahani for Respondent.
• Date of hearing: 2nd April, 1987.
• 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent was a permanent employee of the appellant bank and his duties were primarily and mainly clerical in nature although he was designated as Grade III Officer. On 16‑8‑1978, the respondent was served with a charge‑sheet alleging misconduct and as his reply to the charge‑sheet was not satisfactory; therefore, the appellant bank had appointed two enquiry officers. Though, none of the enquiry officers could find the respondent guilty of the alleged misconduct yet, he was removed from employment on 29‑8‑1979. The respondent claimed that during this long period of about one year from 16‑8‑1978 till 29‑8‑1979, he was very unlawfully put under suspension. Thereafter, the respondent had served a grievance notice, dated 18‑9r‑1979 through his Advocate and thereafter filed grievance petition bearing No.369 of 1979 under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, which was allowed by the Labour Court and the appellant bank had impugned this order of the Labour Court before this Tribunal and this Tribunal had allowed the appeal, appellant bank holding that the service of the grievance notice under the signature of a Counsel was not valid. Therefore, the respondent submitted a Constitutional Petition No.12 of 1981 before the High Court of Sind which was subsequently dismissed on 28‑4‑1983. Against the order of the High Court, the respondent had filed a petition for Special Leave to Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this petition too, was rejected on 18‑3‑1984. That, just after the decision of the Supreme Court, the respondent had served a fresh grievance notice, under his own signatures, upon the appellant bank on 21‑3‑1984 and then the present grievance petition under section 25‑A I.R.O. 1969. Along with this grievance petition the respondent had also to have been filed an application under section 65‑B of I.R.O. 1969 read with section 5 of Limitation Act.
• 5. I have heard Mr. M. Sadiq Khan, the learned Advocate for the appellant bank and Mr. M. L. Shahani, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent along with Mr. Faiz Ghanghro, Advocate. I have also carefully examined the record and proceedings of the case as well as have also perused the affidavit and counter‑affidavit filed by, both the parties in this Tribunal. At the very outset, I would hold that f Mr. M. Sadiq Khan, the learned Advocate for the appellant bank had failed to submit anything now to what he had submitted before the learned Labour Court in support of his case. I, therefore, see no, force any of his contentions. Mr. M. L. Shahani, the learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that a notice given before the enunciation of Law by Supreme Court in the year 1980, came within an exception, and could be treated as a valid notice. He further pleaded that the decision was given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, hence an exception could be spelt out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court alone and so the respondent's Counsel bona fidely, and without any gross negligence or gross ignorance of the statutory provision, advisee the respondent to pursue his remedy upto Supreme Court, and the respondent who was a layman did not on this advice without any negligence or carelessness on his part. In view of these submissions I would hold the grievance petition of the respondent well within time. The learned Labour Court has also rightly observed that the present case of the respondent cannot be treated as being barred by the principle of res judicata.

Judgment & Decree