1975 PLP 33 (SCMR)

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C; J.

‑The dispute in this case relates to a house bearing No. P. 88 situated in Ward No. 7, Montgomery Bazar, Lyallpur, which was originally transferred to one Abdul Ghafoor and a P. T. O. was issued in his favour. tie then entered into an agreement with the present petitioner on the 11th of January, 1962, to transfer the property to him on the issuance of the P. T. D. on payment, it is said, of Rs. 14,

000. Unfortunately, on the information of the respondent, the P. T. O. issued in favour of Abdul Ghafoor was cancelled on the 9th of October, 1962, and the house was transferred to the respondent as an informant. Abdul Ghafoor sought to challenge this order by a writ petition in the High Court, but the writ was dismissed on the 19th of December, 1962. He came up to this Court and got leave to appeal, but the appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1964, was ultimately dismissed on the 3rd of June, 1966. The complaint of the respondent to the Enforcement Department, it appears, was that Abdul Ghafoor bad obtained the transfer by perpetrating an evident fraud by falsely alleging that he had been in occupation of the house since the 2nd of August, 1960, although, according to the Settlement records, the house had been allotted to one Iqbal Shami who was still in possession thereof. The Courts came to the finding that the said Iqbal Shami continued in occupation up to the 31st of August, 1960. Hence the state ment that Abdul Ghafoor had entered into possession on the 2nd of August, 19c0, was false. In any event, since he had not entered into possession in pursuance of any order of any competent authority, he had to show that he was in undisputed possession from before the 20th day of December, 1958, in order to be entitled to the transfer of the property. After the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court, the Settlement Department issued a permanent transfer deed in favour of the respondent on the 28th of May, 1963, who then served a notice under section 30 of the Dis placed Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and followed it up by an application under section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, for the ejectment of the petitioner. The Rent Controller passed the order of ejectment, but it was set aside on appeal by the learned District Judge, Lyallpur, and this order was confirmed by the High Court on 22‑4‑69. "Thereafter, on the 11th of July, 1970, the respondent filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, First Class, Lyallpur, for possession of the house, as also for recovery of Rs. 14,000 on account of mesne profits. I he petitioner contested the suit, and one of the issues which arose for decision in the suit was' as to whether the respondent had lawfully become the owner of the house in dispute. The trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. The petitioner came up in first appeal to the High Court, but a learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed it in limine on the 6th of March, 1974. 'The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal. The first point urged on his behalf is that the order of transfer, the P. T. O. and the P. T. D. issued in favour of the respondent were all void and without jurisdiction, for, as held by this Court in a recent judgment, in the case of Allah Ditta v. Haji Jan Muhammad (PLD1974SC113) the Settlement Authorities had no power after the 13th of January, 1962, to transfer any evacuee property to an informer who was not in possession thereof. This decision has no direct application to the facts of the present case, because, there, the order of transfer itself urns caller: in questions by a writ petition in the High Court, and in that writ petition the High Court held that the transfer was illegal, sc the power to transfer a house to an informant, not in possession thereof, had ceased to exist on or after the 13th of January, 1962, when the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Ordinance No. 11 of 1962 deleted S.R.O No. 824(K)/1961. In the present case, this point, which could have been and ought to have been taken in the writ petition filed by Abdul Ghafoor, he challenge the validity of the order of transfer in favour of the respondent, was not taken. Even when the matter came before this Court, this point was not taken and, therefore, the transfer in favour of the respondent became final and a past and closed transaction as long ago as June, 1966, when this Court dismissed the appeal of Abdul Ghafoor. The present petitioner can only claim, at best, to stand in the shoes of Abdul Ghafoor. (laving purchase only a precarious right before any P. T. D. vas actually issued in favour of Abdul Ghafoor, he ought to have been more diligent and should lave become a party to the proceedings pending in the High Court and in this Court when the transfer order was under challenge. If he did not do so, he cannot now, indirectly in proceedings for his eviction, seek to reopen this question. The petitioner has only himself to thank for the situation in which he find, himself. Even if the rule of res judicata does not directly apply in this case, the principles thereof should apply, because, there should be an end to litigation at some stage or other in the public interest. Merely because this Court has in a subsequent decision taken a different view, matters which became concluded by earlier decisions of this Court cannot be reopened. In any event, the present petitioner has no locus stands to challenge the validity of the transfer, because, he is not a person who had acquired any vested right to the transfer of the property. Learned counsel next sought to contented that the learned Judge of the High Court sitting singly could not have dismissed his first appeal in limine, but this argument is also not available to the learned counsel now after the change in the Rules of the High Court introduced by the amendments published in the Gazette of Punjab, extraordinary on the 29th November. 1971 (vide page 28 of P L D 172 Punjab Statutes). This, gave jurisdiction to a learned Single Judge to finally hear and determine any regular first appeal below Rs. 1,00,

000. This was a purely procedural amendment which took effect retroactively and applied to pending proceedings. No one has a vested right in procedure. The petitioner cannot, therefore, legitimately complain on this account. These are the only points urged in support of this petition, and since there is no substance in‑either of them, this petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.