2004 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, J.‑‑‑Leave to appeal is sought against the judgment dated 17‑3‑2003 of the learned Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, (hereinafter referred to as `the Tribunal'), whereby appeal No.411 (R)CE of 2002 filed by the respondent was accepted and she was reinstated in service with all back benefits.

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the instant petition are that the respondent joined the petitioner Corporation as Airhostess on 24‑7‑1995. She had been performing her duties with dedication and was awarded with the letter of appreciation. It was on 11‑9‑2000, she was served with show‑cause notice/charge‑sheet under PIAC Employees (Service and Discipline) Regulations, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as `the regulation). containing the allegations that she had remained absent from duty with effect from 30‑5‑2000 to 3‑6‑2000 and from 9‑6‑2000 to 23‑6‑2000 and that she had left the place of her duty without permission by the competent authorities and had also given false statement about the expiry of her emergency card, which acts on her part constituted misconduct within the purview of section II Clauses .75(h), (ah) and (aj) of the Regulation. The respondent denied the allegations in her reply to the notice and also filed a petition under section 22‑A(8)(g) of Industries Relations Ordinance; 1968 before the N.I.R.C. which was abated. Since her defence in the reply was found unsatisfactory, therefore, disciplinary proceedings under the Regulation were initiated against her and an inquiry was conducted in which she was exonerated. However, the competent authority did not agree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and decided that the second inquiry should be held against the respondent under the Removal From Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ordinance 2000'). Consequently, a full-fledged inquiry was held under the Ordinance, 2000, wherein she was found guilty of the charges and was dismissed from service vide order" dated 7‑1‑2002.

3. Feeling aggrieved, she filed departmental representation to the 'Chief Executive which remained un‑responded, whereupon she filed the abovementioned service appeal before the Tribunal.

4. Mr. Qalb‑e‑Hussain Shah, learned A.S.C. for the petitioner, seriously attacked the impugned judgment and contended that is not sustainable in the eye of law as there was no bar under the Ordinance, 2000 to initiate a fresh inquiry. According to him, the respondent joined the inquiry, proceedings and was afforded full opportunity of cross examining the witnesses produced by the petitioner, lead evidence in defence and was also heard in person, thus the order of dismissal was passed quite in accordance with law.

5. On the other side, the respondent, who is present in person, vehemently controverted the contentions and argued that she was exonerated from the charges in the 1st inquiry conducted departmentally the findings of which were based on sound reasonings and the charges of unauthorized absence from 30‑5‑2000 to 3‑6‑2000 and from 9‑6‑2000 to 23‑6‑2000 and leaving station without permission and giving false statement were not established. She urged that neither copies of inquiry proceedings and findings thereof were to her nor she was afforded an opportunity of full hearing allowing evidence in defence , thus was seriously prejudiced was dismissed from service under the Ordinance, 2000 without legal justification.

6. As per record, the inquiry was conducted against the under two different sets of law. In the inquiry Regulation, 1985 of the petitioner‑Corporation, she was exonerated by the Inquiry Officer and was, not found guilty of any of the charges. However, competent authority ordered second inquiry under the provisions of Ordinance, 2000 as amended by Ordinance V of 200l in which she was found guilty and was dismissed from service. It would be pertinent to note that show‑cause notice was issued against the respondent on 11‑9‑2000 under the Regulation while the Ordinance; 2000 was very much inexistence which was promulgated on 27‑5‑2000 and no inquiry of whatsoever nature was ordered under this Ordinance. It was apparently on the failure of the first inquiry, second inquiry was initiated under the Ordinance as amended by Ordinance No. V of 2001. This action on the face of it was unjustified and transpires that the petitioner was bent upon to remove the respondent from service in any case. It has been contemplated under section 5 of the Ordinance that in case of charge of misconduct as stipulated in; section 3 of the Ordinance a full‑, fledged inquiry is to be conducted which admittedly has not been done in this case.

7. Even otherwise, it is by now well‑settled principle of law that in case of awarding major penalty, a proper inquiry' is to be conducted in accordance with law wherein a full opportunity of defence is to be provided. In this context, reference can be made to the case of Inspector General of Police, Police Headquarters Office. Karachi and 2 others v. Shafqat Mehmood 2003 SCMR 207, in which it has been held by this Court that in the case, of imposing a major penalty, the principle of natural justice requires that a regular inquiry is to be conducted in accordance with Rule 6 of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and an opportunity of' defence and personal hearing is to be provided to civil servant proceeded again.

8. For what has been discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment is based on valid and sound reasons and is entirely in, consonance with the law laid down by this Court. Neither, there is misreading, or non‑reading of material evidence, nor misconstruction of facts and law. Moreover, the question of general public importance as contemplated under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is not involved in this case.

9. Resultantly, the appeal fails and is thus dismissed with no order 'as to costs. M. H./P‑115/SC Petition dismissed.