P (PLP)

It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the decision of the learned Sessions judge is not a judgment under section 367 of the Criminal Penal Code. Section 367 reads :‑

(1) "Every such judgment shall except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code, be written by the presiding officer of the Court (or from the dictation of such presiding officer) in the language of the Court, or in English ; and shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision ; and shall be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open Court at the time of pronouncing it and (where it is not written by the presiding officer with his own hand, every page of such judgment shall be signed by (2) It shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of the Indian Penal Code or other law under which the accused is, convicted, and the punishment to which he is sentenced. This section requires that a judgment must contain the points for determination the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. The object of these provisions is that a criminal Court should consider the case before it in all its bearings and should on such considerations arrive at definite conclusion after considering the evidence in the case. The perusal of the present judgment would show that the learned Sessions judge in this case had evidently ignored the mandatory provisions of this section. It does not show what were the point or points for determination nor it shows that any decision was given thereon. After giving a short story of the prosecution the case was conclud ed in the following terms :‑

"Pin Bakhsh, Mihan, Rahim Bakhsh, Piran Ditta and Zahra (P. Ws. 1, 6, 7 to 9) are the eye witnesses to the occurrence who narrate the story as given above. The first three are the brothers of the Attar deceased while Peeran‑Ditta is his maternal cousin. Peer Bakhsh, Milian, and Rahim Bakhsh had also received injuries in the course of the assault which undoubtedly proves their presence in the affair. Their evidence is quite consistent and convincing and I find no reason why I should not accept it as true." The most important question in this case was whether an unlawful assembly was constituted and who constituted it. There were 8 accused before the learned Sessions Judge. It was his paramount duty to discuss the evidence against each and every accused which was produced .by the prosecution in support of their case, to arrive at the right and conscientious decision. But as pointed out above the learned Sessions judge had not considered it worth while to take this trouble. In A. I. R. 1940 Sind 114 it was laid down that a judgment must conform to the provisions of section 367 which require inter alia that it shall contain the points for determination the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. These requirements must be fulfilled in respect of each individual accused or suspect separately in cases where there are more than one. It is essential that a judgment in a criminal case should scrutinize and discuss the evidence oral and documentary and should contain findings that all the ingredients to make up the offence are proved or not proved as the ca‑se may be: It has been pointed out above by me that a very important legal question had arisen in this case and that was the appli cability of section 149 Criminal Penal Code. This important question could never be decided unless the learned Sessions judge had taken the trouble of discussing the evidence against each and every accused. He had shown utter disregard to the imperative provision‑ of law and had shown extreme indifference to the case of each accused. In 1943 Cal. 612.it was held by the Division Bench that judgments ought to set out what the evidence is and not merely the conclusion of the judge. In this case the learned Sessions judge after citing the names of the witnesses and without discussing their evidence jumped to a conclusion holding the accused guilty. The grievance, of the learned counsel for the appellant was that he bad argued the case at‑ a considerable length before the learned Sessions judge of each and every accused and the learned judge had failed to make the least reference to his argument in his judgment. He further, contended that this short judgment which is not a judgment under law contains misstatements' of facts and is self‑contradictory at some places. He has referred me in support of his argument to certain observations of the learned Sessions judge on this point which it would be advisable to reproduce here "the circumstances of the case as well as the ill‑will between the parties indicate that the accused persons did not intend to cause the death of the deceased". The contention of the learned counsel was that if ill‑will was present then the intention to cause the death must necessarily be concluded to be present. However these are minor points which could be taken into consideration if the appeal were to be decided by me.. As I find that there is no judgment in the eye of the law consequently I have no alternative but to set it aside and ask the learned Sessions judge to re‑write it within the period of ten days and bearing in mind the provisions of section 367 of the Criminal Penal Code. Similar order was passed by the Division Bench in A. I. R. 1940 Sind, 114 and 45 Cr. L. J. 1944. The accused shall remain in the judicial lock‑up. A request was made by the learned counsel for the appellants that his clients be let on bail till the decision of the case by the learned Sessions Judge. But I have not agreed with his request as the learned Sessions judge is ordered to write the judgment within ten days of the receipt of the file. The file shall be sent back to the learned Sessions judge immediately. R. M. A./A. H. Appeal accepted.