1985 PLP 990 (MLD)

Nemo for Respondent No.2. Date of hearing: 18th May, 19132. The petitioner was employed by the respondent, on temporary basis as a 'Cooly' can 27- 11-1976, in the Mill. However, by order, dated 8-6-1977, his services were terminated on the ground that the Mill was shutting down the crushing of the cotton seeds. lie assailed this order by means of a petition under section 25-A of the I.R.O The learned Labour Court took the view that it was a case of retrenchment covered by Standing Order No. 14 and since six persons junior to the petitioner were in the respondent's service in the "Soopry" Section, where the petitioner was working and they were not retrenched, the order was violative of Standing Order No.

13. Accordingly, the Labour Court by order, dated 2-9-1978 accepted the petition.

2. In appeal filed by the respondent, the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, maintained that the petitioner's appointment was made purely on temporary basis; he served only for about six months, and was a temporary worker; thus under the Standing Order No. 12(2) he was not entitled to any notice before the termination of his services. The respondent's appeal was thus accepted and the petition under section 25-A dismissed. The order, dated 31-7-1979 passed by the learned Tribunal has been called in question by the petitioner through this writ petition.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the available record. The learned counsel for the petitioner has supported the reasoning which prevailed with the Labour Court. He argued that work in the "Soopry" Section is of permanent nature; it shall last as long as the Mills remain in existence and thus contended that the learned Tribunal fell in error, in holding that the petitioner was a temporary worker.

4. On behalf of the respondent it has been urged that the cotton seeds crushing, is a seasonal work and when the season starts, the work in all the sections of the Mills increases, necessitating transfer of the workers from one department to another. In the submission of the learned counsel, it was in this respect that the petitioner's services were temporarily assigned to the "Soopry" Section, which did not alter the character of his employment as a temporary worker enrolled for the crushing season only.

5. I am inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent. A perusal of the petitioner's appointment letter would amply demonstrate that he was recruited on a temporary basis as a 'Cooly' in one of the Departments of the Mills. The letter categorically embodies a condition that his services are purely temporary, liable to be dispensed with without any notice and that he is not entitled to any such privilege which are available to a permanent worker. It is not disputed that the Mills works on seasonal basis. The petitioner was essentially recruited A as a 'Cooly' to work in one of the sections of the Mill. Even if his services were lended to the 'Soopry' Section when the season was at the peak, that would not change the nature of his employment. The appointment letter, when viewed in the light of these circumstances leaves no doubt that the petitioner was a temporary worker and in this) respect I have not been persuaded to differ with the Tribunal.

6. It is also to be noticed that the question of petitioner's status largely rested on the nature of his employment. The findings given by the Tribunal in holding the petitioner as temporary worker, were within its competence. Even if the Tribunal went wrong while acting within its jurisdiction, the impugned order cannot be subjected to judicial review. In this connection a reference to Muhammad Hussain Munir v. Sikandar and others P L D 1974 S C 139 will provide:- " It is well-settled that where a Court or a tribunal has jurisdiction and it determines that question, it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity merely because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law ... .. ." The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality muchless a jurisdictional error to warrant interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction of the Court.

7. For the foregoing reasons I do trot find any merit in this petition which is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. A.A. Petition dismissed.