1991 PLP 790 (CLC)

(1) Whether the respondent No.1 is a defaulter in payment of rent? OPP. (2) Whether the petitioner requires the disputed premises bona fidely for re construction? OPP. (3) Whether the respondent had damaged the suit property? OPP. (4) Whether the petitioner required the' disputed premises bona fidely for her personal needs? OPP. (5) Whether the disputed premises were shops? OPR. (6) Relief. (6‑A) Whether the petition was defective because of non‑joinder of necessary parties? On the basis of the evidence led by the parties, the Rent Controller found all the issues against the landlady and dismissed the ejectment petition on 9th November, 1981.

2. Aggrieved by this order, respondent No.1 filed an appeal in the District Court which was accepted by the Additional District Judge Gujrat, on 16th February, 1983, on the ground that the premises were required by the landlady for the purposes of re‑construction bona fide and in good faith. As a consequence of this finding, the petitioner was ordered to be ejected from the shop in his possession. The findings of the Rent Controller on other issues were affirmed.

3. Sh. Naveed Shaharyar, learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon Bashir Hussain and another v. Sh. Muhammad Saeed and 2 others P L D 1976 Lah. 1095, submitted that the premises in possession of the petitioner were non residential in character while the landlady intend to reconstruct a residential building which would take away the right of the petitioner to be put back into the premises after reconstruction in terms of Section 13(5)(b) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The learned counsel submitted that a landlord cannot be allowed to frustrate the protection granted to the tenant by Section 15(5)(b) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. It was emphasized that the issue as regards the personal need of the landlady has been found against her by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge.

4. The arguments of the learned counsel on the strength of provisions of Section 15(5)(b) of the Ordinance, cannot be accepted. Similar contention was raised before the Supreme Court in Abdul Bari v. Khadim Hussain (P L D 1978 SC 78) and it was observed:‑ "Clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance does not, by itself, impose any restriction or limitation as to the nature and purpose of the new building which is to be reconstructed in place of old building. If this clause is to be read as being subject to the provisions of subsection (5‑B) of the same section in the sense that the nature and ‑character of the building cannot be changed by reconstruction, then the result would be to prevent future development of property even though its environment and the requirements of the community at large, may have changed such an interpretation would be altogether unreasonable and against the public interest, and should be avoided unless the words of the statute are so clear and unambiguous as to make it inevitable. This does not appear to be the case here. The ground of reconstruction mentioned in clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 does not limit the same to reconstruction of a building of the same type and character and for the same purpose, namely, residential or non‑residential as to the case may be. However, the provisions of subsection (5‑B) would come into play if the reconstructed building is of the same type and character and suitable for the same use as was the old building. In other words, the provisions contained in clause (vi) of subsection (2) of this section are subject to subsection (5‑B) thereof only to this limited extent, and not to the extent of preventing a conversion, by reconstruction, of one type of building into another." This precedent was followed by the Supreme Court in Ghulam Nabi v. Mushtaq Ahmad (P L D 1980 SC 206) and Zoab and 5 others v. Akbar Ali (1983 S C M R 391). In the face of these authoritative pronouncements, I am not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner.

5. In view of what has been said above, the petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed. However, the petitioner is allowed four months time to vacate the premises. There shall be no orders as to costs. H.B.T./M‑2678/L Petition dismissed.