1977 PLP 17 (PLC)

3. The respondent No. 2 in the written statement filed by them maintained that the present petitioners Nos. 2 and 5 to 15 (these are the only persons from this set who matter for the decision of this petition were the employees of independent contractors, namely, Akhtar and Sultan, and therefore they could have no cause of action as against them. It was admitted, that the petitioners Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were their employees. As for the rest, apart from other contentions, it was urged that the grievance procedure as prescribed under section 25-A had not been followed.

4. The Junior Labour Court repelled the contentions of the respondent. It doubted the genuineness of the lease deed, and, otherwise too, was of the opinion that the petitioners 2 and 5 to 15 had been employed by the respondents very much before the period of lease, and therefore a case for re-instatement had been made out. It was further found that the respondent No: 2 had failed to produce the charge-sheet, enquiry letters, or, enquiry proceedings, in regard to the others and therefore there was no material to justify their retrenchment, or, dismissal. 5 The respondent No. 2 took an appeal to the Labour Court, which came to be allowed by the Presiding Officer by his order dated 19-5-1973. As regards the petitioners Nos. 1, 3 and 4, the learned Presiding Officer found that the case set up by them in evidence was very much different from the text of the applications under section 25-A of the I.R.O. and, under the circumstances, the order passed by the Labour Court in regard to them was unsustainable. As regards the remaining petitioners, it was observed that, on their own showing, they admitted to have worked with the contractors, who used to pay the wags to them and also grant them leave. He was also of the opinion that the lease deed did not come into existence in 1972, but, according to the Report of an Officer of the Labour Department examined in the proceedings, these contractors were in the field from 1967. As a result of these findings, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed, resulting in the present petition.

6. First I will deal with the case of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 5 to

15. Mr. A. A Fazeel, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, has taken me to the evidence led in the case, and, in particular, to the cross-examination of these petitioners. Noor Muhammad has stated that "I used to receive my wages from Sultan Contractor and my attendance was marked by him. . . . ." Munna Khan has stated that "I am working with Contractor Akhtar for the last about five years", and that is true about the others as well. Hasham Hussain also added that he was also getting leave from Sultan. The question which, therefore, needs consideration is, whether, in the face of these clear admissions, the respondent No. 2 can be saddled with the obligations under Standing Order 20 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, which reads as under : -

20. Liability of employer.-The employer of the industrial and commercial establishment shall personally be held responsible for the proper and faithful observance of the Standing Orders, whether or not the workmen of such establishment are employed through contractors.

7. The matter came up for consideration in the case of Shahab Industries Ltd., Karachi v. Shah Nimroze (I) before Mr. Justice Inamullah Khan of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The tests to find out, whether a person was in the employment of a certain industry, or not, were enumerated there as under: (1) Whether the Industry has administrative control over the worker; (2) Whether the industry pays for the work done by the worker; and (3) Whether the industry has power to re-instate and dismiss the worker. It was further observed, that a distinction has to be made between two situations, "the one where a worker is employed through a contractor and the other where the contractor himself employs workers for carrying on the contract, which he has taken." In the latter case, the industry would be paying only for the finished goods end could not be said to have any control or supervision over the workers, and, as a logical corollary, the employees will be the employees of the contractor alone. This principle is also available from Messrs British India Engineering Works v. Mr. Akhtar Hussain Khan and others (2), which was a case dealing with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. It was observed that "the prima facie test for the determination of relationship between master and servant is the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work done by the servant, not only in the matter of direction what work the servant is to do, (1) 1974 P L C Note 60 at p. 33 (2) P L D 1959 Kar. 403 but also the manner in which lee shall do his work. Reference was made also to the case of Dharangandhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra and others ([), which referred to the case of Harbour Board v. Coggins Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd. (2), in which the following observation was made : "The proper test is whether or not the hirer hart authority to co trol the manner of execution of the act in question"

8. As the matters stand, the conclusion reached by the learned Presiding Officer cannot be open to any exception. Otherwise too, the fact, whether tire said petitioners were tire employees of the contractor, or, of the respondent No. 2, will be a question of fact, and findings of fact, as held in the Karachi case referred to earlier, cannot be disturbed in a Constitutional Petition.

9. As regards the petitioners Nos. 1, 3 and 4, the applications in very clear terms mentioned that they had been removed from service as a result of the closure of the Dobbling Section on 22-12-1972. Nazar Mohammad, the petitioner No. I in his deposition had mentioned his retrenchment on 15-9-1972, while the other two put it at 21-11-1972, and for totally different reasons. The petitioners are themselves to blame for the consequences, which have ensued. Under the circumstances disclosed, the order in regard to them also, will be in the exercise of lawful authority. It is, therefore, not necessary to examine the further contention of Mr. A. A. Fazeel, that the application of Munna Khan, petitioner Nil. 2, would lie barred under sub section (6) of section 25-A of the I. R.O.

10. In the result, the petition is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. (1) AIR 1957 S C 264 (2) (1947) 1 A C 1