P L D 1985 Lahore 610 (PLP)

S. 4-Scope and application. Section 4, Limitation Act 1908, has nothing to do with computing prescribed period but provides merely that when period prescribed for a suit etc. expires on a date when the Court is close, then notwithstanding that fact, suit etc. may be instituted on day when Court re-opens. This section does not alter length of prescribed period nor does it provide that period of vacation shall be excluded from period of limitation prescribed-Such concession, held, confined to institution of suit, appeal or application. Link 2 Mian M. Zafar Yasin for Petitioner. ORDER Land measuring .4 Kanals 15 Marlas was owned by one Noor Muhammad. It was sold to Ghulam Rasool and three others, respondents Nos. 4 to 7 herein, vide sale-deed registered on 15-8-1981 for a sale price of Rs. 1,000. Allah Bakhsh, Muhammad Khan and Ahmad Khan brought a civil suit to pre-empt the aforenoted sale. Adil Khan son of Imam Bakhsh also instituted a civil suit for pre-emption. Plaints in the two suits were presented on 1-9-1982. The suits were consolidated for adjudication. Dispute raised in the pleadings is reflected in the following issues framed by the trial Court :

After the issues were framed, parties produced evidence. Learned Civil Judge, vide judgment and decree, dated 28-10-1984 dismissed the pre emption suits. Vendees (respondents Nos. 4 to 7) had transferred suit land for a sum of Rs. 4,000 through Registered Deed of Sale, dated 31-8-1982 to Lal Khan, subsequent vendee was also owner of the estate, vide Exh. D.

3. Learned Civil Judge under Issue No. 1 found that the rights of the preemptors were at par with the subsequent vendee who had purchased the land vide Sale Deed dated 31-8-19x2 and in the result of the aforesaid finding, dismissed the suits. Under Issue No. 2, it was found that Rs. 1,000 was the sale price. No finding on Issue No. 3 was recorded. Issues Nos. 4, 6 to 8 and 9 were not pressed. Vendees were found entitled to Rs.

260. Allah Bakhsh and two others, pre-emptors before the trial Court, alone preferred civil appeal against the judgment, dated 28-10-1984. Adil Khan, the rival pre-emptor whose suit had also been dismissed, did not agitate the matter in appeal. Learned Additional District Judge, Leiah, vide judgment, dated 10-2-1985, accepted the appeal, set aside trial Court's decree, dated 28-10-1984 and decreed the suit in favour of Allah Bakhsh and others, pre-emptors, on payment of Rs. 1,

000. Judgment passed in Appeal No. 193/13 of 1984 decreeing the pre-emptor's suit, is under challenge in revisional jurisdiction at the instance of Lal Khan, a subsequent vendee. Mian M. War Yasin, counsel for Lal Khan, applicant, has been heard. It was contended for the applicant that the suit land was transferred to Lal Khan, vide Registered ,Deed, dated 31-8-1982 for Rs. 4.000 within a period of one year of the date of sale before institution of the suits for pre-emption. Lal Khan had purchased the property in recognition of his superior right of pre-emption within the period prescribed and was protected from a claim of pre-emption preferred by Allah Bakhsh and others. It was contended that the subsequent purchaser was entitled to avail of the principle of law enacted in section 4 of the Limitation Act which extends the period of limitation to a day when the Court re-opens. In this case it was contended that period of limitation prescribed for enforcing a right of pre-emption per Article 10 of the Limitation Act was one year from the date, the sale-deed was registered. Lal Khan, the subsequent purchaser could on the basis of his own right of pre-emption bring a suit on 1-9-1982 when the Court after summer vacations re-opened. Rival pre-emptors had availed of this concession and had instituted their suits on 1-9-1982. The same benefit should be made available to the subsequent purchaser and since the date of the subsequent purchase was well before 1-9-1982 and his right to pre-empt was at par with the rival pre-emptors, the suit was rightly dismissed by the trial Court. Learned Additional District Judge on a mis-construction of the provisions of the Limitation Act particularly section 4 thereof has deprived the applicant of his right undoubtedly possessed by him under the law of pre-emption. Learned counsel in support of his contentions referred to section 4 of. the 'Limitation Act but did not cite any precedent. . Admittedly, the sale subject-matter of the pre-emption claims was trade on 15-ti-1981. through a Registered Sale-Deed. Under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, period prescribed for bringing a suit for pre- emption is one year from the date of possession under sale or in its absence, when the instrument of sale is registered. In the case on hand, the period of limitation evidently would start when the instrument of sale was registered. This is dated 15-8-1981 and so calculated, the year would expire on 15-8-1982. Subsequent sale was. made on 31-8-1982. Point falling for decision is whether the subsequent purchaser like the pre- emptors could avail of the benefit under section 4 of the Limitation Act and protect his title. In my view, he was not entitled to avail of the concession given under section

4. Section 4 provides that when a period of limitation prescribed for a suit, appeal or application, expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal, or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court re-opens. This evidently applies to the institution of the suit, appeal or application. When the period for filing such suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court was closed, in such eventuality, the party litigant can avail of the benefit and prefer his claim on the day when Court re-opens. This section gives the statutory recognition to the well-known principle of law that "the act of the Court shall prejudice no one". Section 4 has nothing to do with computing the prescribed period but provides merely that when the? period-prescribed for a suit etc. expires on a date when the Court is close, then notwithstanding that fact, the suit etc. may be instituted on the day when the Court re-opens. This section does not alter the length of the prescribed period nor does it provide that the period of vacation shall be excluded from the period of limitation prescribed. Subsequent vendee though owner of the estate, purchased the property on 31-8-1982, obviously after the period of limitation i e. on year from the date of the original sale i.e. 15-8-1981. If he had brought a' suit to enforce his right of pre-emption, he could do so on I-9-198 when the civil Courts re-opened after vacation. In that eventuality the claims of the rival pre-emptors would have to be adjudicated upon in terms of section 17 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. Question her is slightly different. Here the subsequent vendee has not brought a suit. Instead, he chose to purchase the property outside the Court in successful assertion of his right of pre-emption through sale deed dated 31-8-1982 for a sum of Rs. 4,000 much above the original sale price. Sale in his favour was ante litem and was in recognition of the superior right of pre-emption but after the expiry of one year from the date of the original sale. This, therefore, cannot be taken to be a transfer in enforcement of a superior/equal right of pre-emption. This being the position, subsequent sale in favour of Lal Khan could not be successfully pleaded by him to defeat the rights of rival pre-emptors i.e. Allah Bakhsh and others. Learned Additional District Judge, therefore, rightly took notice of this part of the controversy and quite in accordance with law decided it against the subsequent purchaser. Provisions enacted in section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 could not save the subsequent purchaser in the suit for pre-emption brought by Allah Bakhsh and .others. Subsequent transferee if so minded could will have purchased-the land, before the period of one year ran out. Nothing debarred him to do so. Offices to effectuate the aforesaid purpose were all open and available. Decree passed on appeal, therefore, suffers from no error. Civil revision is without force and is dismissed in limine. M. Y. H.????????? Petition dismissed. Mian M. Zafar Yasin for Petitioner. ORDER Land measuring .4 Kanals 15 Marlas was owned by one Noor Muhammad. It was sold to Ghulam Rasool and three others, respondents Nos. 4 to 7 herein, vide sale-deed registered on 15-8-1981 for a sale price of Rs. 1,

000. Allah Bakhsh, Muhammad Khan and Ahmad Khan brought a civil suit to pre-empt the aforenoted sale. Adil Khan son of Imam Bakhsh also instituted a civil suit for pre-emption. Plaints in the two suits were presented on 1-9-1982. The suits were consolidated for adjudication. Dispute raised in the pleadings is reflected in the following issues framed by the trial Court :

After the issues were framed, parties produced evidence. Learned Civil Judge, vide judgment and decree, dated 28-10-1984 dismissed the pre emption suits. Vendees (respondents Nos. 4 to 7) had transferred suit land for a sum of Rs. 4,000 through Registered Deed of Sale, dated 31-8-1982 to Lal Khan, subsequent vendee was also owner of the estate, vide Exh. D.

3. Learned Civil Judge under Issue No. 1 found that the rights of the preemptors were at par with the subsequent vendee who had purchased the land vide Sale Deed dated 31-8-19x2 and in the result of the aforesaid finding, dismissed the suits. Under Issue No. 2, it was found that Rs. 1,000 was the sale price. No finding on Issue No. 3 was recorded. Issues Nos. 4, 6 to 8 and 9 were not pressed. Vendees were found entitled to Rs.

260. Allah Bakhsh and two others, pre-emptors before the trial Court, alone preferred civil appeal against the judgment, dated 28-10-1984. Adil Khan, the rival pre-emptor whose suit had also been dismissed, did not agitate the matter in appeal. Learned Additional District Judge, Leiah, vide judgment, dated 10-2-1985, accepted the appeal, set aside trial Court's decree, dated 28-10-1984 and decreed the suit in favour of Allah Bakhsh and others, pre-emptors, on payment of Rs. 1,

000. Judgment passed in Appeal No. 193/13 of 1984 decreeing the pre-emptor's suit, is under challenge in revisional jurisdiction at the instance of Lal Khan, a subsequent vendee. Mian M. War Yasin, counsel for Lal Khan, applicant, has been heard. It was contended for the applicant that the suit land was transferred to Lal Khan, vide Registered ,Deed, dated 31-8-1982 for Rs. 4.000 within a period of one year of the date of sale before institution of the suits for pre-emption. Lal Khan had purchased the property in recognition of his superior right of pre-emption within the period prescribed and was protected from a claim of pre-emption preferred by Allah Bakhsh and others. It was contended that the subsequent purchaser was entitled to avail of the principle of law enacted in section 4 of the Limitation Act which extends the period of limitation to a day when the Court re-opens. In this case it was contended that period of limitation prescribed for enforcing a right of pre-emption per Article 10 of the Limitation Act was one year from the date, the sale-deed was registered. Lal Khan, the subsequent purchaser could on the basis of his own right of pre-emption bring a suit on 1-9-1982 when the Court after summer vacations re-opened. Rival pre-emptors had availed of this concession and had instituted their suits on 1-9-1982. The same benefit should be made available to the subsequent purchaser and since the date of the subsequent purchase was well before 1-9-1982 and his right to pre-empt was at par with the rival pre-emptors, the suit was rightly dismissed by the trial Court. Learned Additional District Judge on a mis-construction of the provisions of the Limitation Act particularly section 4 thereof has deprived the applicant of his right undoubtedly possessed by him under the law of pre-emption. Learned counsel in support of his contentions referred to section 4 of. the 'Limitation Act but did not cite any precedent. . Admittedly, the sale subject-matter of the pre-emption claims was trade on 15-ti-1981. through a Registered Sale-Deed. Under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, period prescribed for bringing a suit for pre- emption is one year from the date of possession under sale or in its absence, when the instrument of sale is registered. In the case on hand, the period of limitation evidently would start when the instrument of sale was registered. This is dated 15-8-1981 and so calculated, the year would expire on 15-8-1982. Subsequent sale was. made on 31-8-1982. Point falling for decision is whether the subsequent purchaser like the pre- emptors could avail of the benefit under section 4 of the Limitation Act and protect his title. In my view, he was not entitled to avail of the concession given under section

4. Section 4 provides that when a period of limitation prescribed for a suit, appeal or application, expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal, or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court re-opens. This evidently applies to the institution of the suit, appeal or application. When the period for filing such suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court was closed, in such eventuality, the party litigant can avail of the benefit and prefer his claim on the day when Court re-opens. This section gives the statutory recognition to the well-known principle of law that "the act of the Court shall prejudice no one". Section 4 has nothing to do with computing the prescribed period but provides merely that when the? period-prescribed for a suit etc. expires on a date when the Court is close, then notwithstanding that fact, the suit etc. may be instituted on the day when the Court re-opens. This section does not alter the length of the prescribed period nor does it provide that the period of vacation shall be excluded from the period of limitation prescribed. Subsequent vendee though owner of the estate, purchased the property on 31-8-1982, obviously after the period of limitation i e. on year from the date of the original sale i.e. 15-8-1981. If he had brought a' suit to enforce his right of pre-emption, he could do so on I-9-198 when the civil Courts re-opened after vacation. In that eventuality the claims of the rival pre-emptors would have to be adjudicated upon in terms of section 17 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. Question her is slightly different. Here the subsequent vendee has not brought a suit. Instead, he chose to purchase the property outside the Court in successful assertion of his right of pre-emption through sale deed dated 31-8-1982 for a sum of Rs. 4,000 much above the original sale price. Sale in his favour was ante litem and was in recognition of the superior right of pre-emption but after the expiry of one year from the date of the original sale. This, therefore, cannot be taken to be a transfer in enforcement of a superior/equal right of pre-emption. This being the position, subsequent sale in favour of Lal Khan could not be successfully pleaded by him to defeat the rights of rival pre-emptors i.e. Allah Bakhsh and others. Learned Additional District Judge, therefore, rightly took notice of this part of the controversy and quite in accordance with law decided it against the subsequent purchaser. Provisions enacted in section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 could not save the subsequent purchaser in the suit for pre-emption brought by Allah Bakhsh and .others. Subsequent transferee if so minded could will have purchased-the land, before the period of one year ran out. Nothing debarred him to do so. Offices to effectuate the aforesaid purpose were all open and available. Decree passed on appeal, therefore, suffers from no error. Civil revision is without force and is dismissed in limine. M. Y. H.????????? Petition dismissed. Mian M. Zafar Yasin for Petitioner. Land measuring .4 Kanals 15 Marlas was owned by one Noor Muhammad. It was sold to Ghulam Rasool and three others, respondents Nos. 4 to 7 herein, vide sale-deed registered on 15-8-1981 for a sale price of Rs. 1,

000. Allah Bakhsh, Muhammad Khan and Ahmad Khan brought a civil suit to pre-empt the aforenoted sale. Adil Khan son of Imam Bakhsh also instituted a civil suit for pre-emption. Plaints in the two suits were presented on 1-9-1982. The suits were consolidated for adjudication. Dispute raised in the pleadings is reflected in the following issues framed by the trial Court :

After the issues were framed, parties produced evidence. Learned Civil Judge, vide judgment and decree, dated 28-10-1984 dismissed the pre emption suits. Vendees (respondents Nos. 4 to 7) had transferred suit land for a sum of Rs. 4,000 through Registered Deed of Sale, dated 31-8-1982 to Lal Khan, subsequent vendee was also owner of the estate, vide Exh. D.

3. Learned Civil Judge under Issue No. 1 found that the rights of the preemptors were at par with the subsequent vendee who had purchased the land vide Sale Deed dated 31-8-19x2 and in the result of the aforesaid finding, dismissed the suits. Under Issue No. 2, it was found that Rs. 1,000 was the sale price. No finding on Issue No. 3 was recorded. Issues Nos. 4, 6 to 8 and 9 were not pressed. Vendees were found entitled to Rs.

260. Allah Bakhsh and two others, pre-emptors before the trial Court, alone preferred civil appeal against the judgment, dated 28-10-1984. Adil Khan, the rival pre-emptor whose suit had also been dismissed, did not agitate the matter in appeal. Learned Additional District Judge, Leiah, vide judgment, dated 10-2-1985, accepted the appeal, set aside trial Court's decree, dated 28-10-1984 and decreed the suit in favour of Allah Bakhsh and others, pre-emptors, on payment of Rs. 1,

000. Judgment passed in Appeal No. 193/13 of 1984 decreeing the pre-emptor's suit, is under challenge in revisional jurisdiction at the instance of Lal Khan, a subsequent vendee. Mian M. War Yasin, counsel for Lal Khan, applicant, has been heard. It was contended for the applicant that the suit land was transferred to Lal Khan, vide Registered ,Deed, dated 31-8-1982 for Rs. 4.000 within a period of one year of the date of sale before institution of the suits for pre-emption. Lal Khan had purchased the property in recognition of his superior right of pre-emption within the period prescribed and was protected from a claim of pre-emption preferred by Allah Bakhsh and others. It was contended that the subsequent purchaser was entitled to avail of the principle of law enacted in section 4 of the Limitation Act which extends the period of limitation to a day when the Court re-opens. In this case it was contended that period of limitation prescribed for enforcing a right of pre-emption per Article 10 of the Limitation Act was one year from the date, the sale-deed was registered. Lal Khan, the subsequent purchaser could on the basis of his own right of pre-emption bring a suit on 1-9-1982 when the Court after summer vacations re-opened. Rival pre-emptors had availed of this concession and had instituted their suits on 1-9-1982. The same benefit should be made available to the subsequent purchaser and since the date of the subsequent purchase was well before 1-9-1982 and his right to pre-empt was at par with the rival pre-emptors, the suit was rightly dismissed by the trial Court. Learned Additional District Judge on a mis-construction of the provisions of the Limitation Act particularly section 4 thereof has deprived the applicant of his right undoubtedly possessed by him under the law of pre-emption. Learned counsel in support of his contentions referred to section 4 of. the 'Limitation Act but did not cite any precedent. . Admittedly, the sale subject-matter of the pre-emption claims was trade on 15-ti-1981. through a Registered Sale-Deed. Under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, period prescribed for bringing a suit for pre- emption is one year from the date of possession under sale or in its absence, when the instrument of sale is registered. In the case on hand, the period of limitation evidently would start when the instrument of sale was registered. This is dated 15-8-1981 and so calculated, the year would expire on 15-8-1982. Subsequent sale was. made on 31-8-1982. Point falling for decision is whether the subsequent purchaser like the pre- emptors could avail of the benefit under section 4 of the Limitation Act and protect his title. In my view, he was not entitled to avail of the concession given under section

4. Section 4 provides that when a period of limitation prescribed for a suit, appeal or application, expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal, or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court re-opens. This evidently applies to the institution of the suit, appeal or application. When the period for filing such suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court was closed, in such eventuality, the party litigant can avail of the benefit and prefer his claim on the day when Court re-opens. This section gives the statutory recognition to the well-known principle of law that "the act of the Court shall prejudice no one". Section 4 has nothing to do with computing the prescribed period but provides merely that when the? period-prescribed for a suit etc. expires on a date when the Court is close, then notwithstanding that fact, the suit etc. may be instituted on the day when the Court re-opens. This section does not alter the length of the prescribed period nor does it provide that the period of vacation shall be excluded from the period of limitation prescribed. Subsequent vendee though owner of the estate, purchased the property on 31-8-1982, obviously after the period of limitation i e. on year from the date of the original sale i.e. 15-8-1981. If he had brought a' suit to enforce his right of pre-emption, he could do so on I-9-198 when the civil Courts re-opened after vacation. In that eventuality the claims of the rival pre-emptors would have to be adjudicated upon in terms of section 17 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. Question her is slightly different. Here the subsequent vendee has not brought a suit. Instead, he chose to purchase the property outside the Court in successful assertion of his right of pre-emption through sale deed dated 31-8-1982 for a sum of Rs. 4,000 much above the original sale price. Sale in his favour was ante litem and was in recognition of the superior right of pre-emption but after the expiry of one year from the date of the original sale. This, therefore, cannot be taken to be a transfer in enforcement of a superior/equal right of pre-emption. This being the position, subsequent sale in favour of Lal Khan could not be successfully pleaded by him to defeat the rights of rival pre-emptors i.e. Allah Bakhsh and others. Learned Additional District Judge, therefore, rightly took notice of this part of the controversy and quite in accordance with law decided it against the subsequent purchaser. Provisions enacted in section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 could not save the subsequent purchaser in the suit for pre-emption brought by Allah Bakhsh and .others. Subsequent transferee if so minded could will have purchased-the land, before the period of one year ran out. Nothing debarred him to do so. Offices to effectuate the aforesaid purpose were all open and available. Decree passed on appeal, therefore, suffers from no error. Civil revision is without force and is dismissed in limine. M. Y. H.????????? Petition dismissed.