2011 PLP 1606 (CLC)

MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, J.

This appeal is directed against the order dated 10th October, 2009, passed by learned Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller, Pishin, whereby he accepted the eviction application of respondent No.1 And directed the appellant to vacate and hand over the possession/of the premises in his occupation within a period of three months, from the date of the order.

2. The concise facts, arising out of instant appeal, are that the respondent/landlord filed an eviction application against the appellant in respect of shop under Khasra No.67, situated at Band Road, Pishin, on the grounds of default in payment of monthly rent, personal bona fide use and occupation. It was averred in the eviction application that the said premises, in occupation of the appellant, were reasonably and bonafidely required by the respondent in good faith. It was the case of the respondent that, after retirement from government service, he is jobless and intends to start his own business. It was also alleged in the eviction application that the appellant is bad paymaster and troublesome tenant.

3. The eviction application was vehemently opposed by the appellant, who, inter alia, pleaded that demised premises were not required by the respondents for his personal use and occupation. It was denied that the appellant is a bad paymaster. It was averred that the respondent is an old man of about 75 years, having four sons, who are government servants. The respondent, actually, wanted to evict the appellant in order to sale out the same on higher rates.

4. The Rent Controller-cum-Civil Judge, Pishin, out of the pleading of the parties, has framed five issues. To prove the same, respondent/applicant has produced two witnesses, namely, AWs Muhammad Hanif and Jaffar Khan, and also recorded his statement on oath. In rebuttal, appellant has produced two witnesses, namely, Abdullah, Habibullah, and recorded his statement on oath.

5. The Rent Controller, after examining the evidence and hearing the arguments of the respective parties, allowed the eviction application vide impugned order dated 10th October, 2009, and directed the appellant to hand over the vacant possession of the disputed premises to the respondent within a period of three months from the date of impugned order.

6. The appellant being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 10th October, 2009 of the learned Rent Controller has preferred this appeal on the grounds mentioned in the memo. of appeal.

7. Mr. W.N. Kohli, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the Rent Controller has misread and misappreciated the evidence and drawn conclusions contrary to the record. The respondent could not prove his personal bona fide, as the respondent has attained the age almost 75 years and is not capable to run any business. He further submitted that the mala fides of the respondent is also evident from the fact that he has not disclosed the nature of business. He argued that the respondent, besides the disputed shop, also owned other properties. He also submitted that the only aim of the respondent dispossess the appellant from the shop in question and to sale out the same on high rate.

8. On the other hand, Mr. Saleem Lashari, learned counsel for the respondent, has vehemently opposed the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant and supported the impugned order. He also contended that the respondent has proved his case through reliable and trustworthy evidence and the eviction order has been passed by the Rent Controller in accordance with law.

9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The main contention, raised by Mr. W.N Kohli, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the Rent Controller was required to dismiss the eviction application filed by the respondent, as it does not purport specifically the business intended to be started by the respondent. It is a well-established principle of law that eviction application cannot be dismissed on the ground that specific business, intended to be started and carried on in premises in question, is not specifically given in the memorandum of eviction application. Landlord is not required to mention in his application the nature/sort of business, nor is required to give source of capital.

10. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent being an old man of about 75 years, is not capable to start or run a business, is also devoid of force, because there is nothing on record to show that the respondent has become too old and that it would be difficult for him to do any business. Admittedly, the respondent has four sons and his bona fides cannot be doubted on the grounds that he has grown old and he would be assisted by his son in conjunction of whom he would start business in the disputed shop.

11. As far as owning of other properties by the respondent is concerned, admittedly, the landlord is entitled to choose or pick anyone of his shops for his personal use and occupation. The suitability or sufficiency of an accommodation for a landlord cannot be determined by a tenant or the Rent Controller. Landlord's desire to retain a specific property for his use and occupation could do so without any legal difficulty in his way and it is none of tenant's business to tell landlord to keep particular property for his use and let out the other one. The landlord is entitled to choose or pick anyone of his shops for his, personal use and the contention that landlord should have got vacated some other shop is not valid.

12. Similarly, the last contention of Mr. W.N. Kohli, learned counsel for the appellant, that the aim, behind institution of the eviction application, is to dispossess the appellant from the said shop and sale out the same on higher rate is also devoid of any force. I am inclined to hold the view that even if the respondent has expressed his desire to sell out the disputed shop that should not be permitted to come in his way in getting his tenant ejected, if he has succeeded, otherwise, in establishing his case on the ground of personal requirement.

13. The upshot of the above discussion is that from the evidence on record, it is proved that respondents' demand for vacation of the disputed premises has been made in good faith. Accordingly, the appeal has no merit which is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. The appellant will deliver the vacant possession of the shop in his occupation to the respondent within six months of this order. Appeal dismissed. M.H./42/Q Appeal dismissed.