2000 PLP 323 (CLC)

5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the relevant provisions of law referred to by them.

6. Section 30 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1991 reads as under:‑‑ "The period of limitation for a suit to enforce a right of pre=emption under this Act shall be four months from the date‑‑ (a) of the registration of the sale‑deed; (b) ................................................................................... (c)

(d)

It is thus clear that a pre‑emption suit shall be filed within four months from the date of registration of the sale‑deed. Admittedly the transaction was made through registered sale‑deed on 22‑10‑1997 and the suit was filed by the petitioners on 20‑2‑1998. Now the pivotal point involved in this case is whether a month would mean 30 days or otherwise for computation of period of limitation prescribed under section 30 of the Act. In the absence of any specific method for calculation of period of four months provided in the Act for enforcement of right of pre‑emption, we should go by the obvious intention'bf the legislation. Peshawar High Court in Sher Muhammad's case 1989 CLC 1344 while examining the relevant section of General Clauses Act held that:‑‑ "the expression 'month' was taken to mean the month reckoned according to British calendar. " In so doing‑ also an earlier case viz, Dadu v. Balgounda, 5 Bom. HCR (A.C.J.) 39, was followed in which it was observed that: "From the practice which prevailed previous to 1860 when the Civil Procedure Code came into operation, and from the subsequent Acts of the Legislature, I think it may be rightly inferred that their intention was to express by the term ' month' a British calendar month, and so far as I am aware, all civil Courts on this side of India have adopted this interpretation since the Code became law." In para. No. 10 of the aforesaid judgment it was further held that:‑‑ "In resolving the question as to how many days would constitute a month where the commencing day was not the first day of the month, as is the case here, reliance was placed on the following passage occurring in Iyer's Law Lexicon" "The term 'month' whether employed in modern statutes or contracts, and not appearing to have been used in a different sense, denotes a period terminating with the day of the succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning, less one. If there be no corresponding day of the succeeding month, it terminates with the last day thereof." 7. 1 am, therefore, of the view that the expression of a month used in section 30 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1991, would be taken to mean the month reckoned according to British calendar, and thus, would denote a period terminating with the day of succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning, less one. The sale‑deed as A registered on 22‑10‑1997 as such time would start to run against the pre emptors from 23rd of October, 1997. The petitioners filed their suit on 20‑2‑1998, therefore, they were well within time, prescribed under section 30 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, as they could file the suit till 22‑2‑1999. The judgment‑of the Lahore High Court in Muhammad Zubair's Case 1993 CLC 1047 referred to by the Courts below also supports the view that time will start running from next day of the registration of the sale‑deed. The Courts below have fallen in error in calculating the period of limitation on the basis of days instead of months. The Act provides 4 months limitation and not 120 days as construed by lower Courts.

8. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents that General Clauses Act, 1898 is not applicable to the present case and that the period of four months is to be reckoned as lunar months, is devoid of any force. The period of limitation provided in the Act is simply "four months". If the intention of the legislation was Islamic four months or 120 days, it would have specifically mentioned as "four lunar/Islamic months. "That having not been so incorporated, I am unable to accept his contention that said four months would mean four lunar/Islamic months. Even otherwise, this plea was not raised by the respondents before the lower Courts and it is settled B law that if such an objections is not raised by a party in lower Courts, he cannot be permitted to agitate it in the higher Court. The provisions of sections 4 and 32 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. 1991 are intended for the purpose of overriding old pre‑emption law. Learned counsel for the respondents has failed to show that the express provision of limitation of four months under section 30 is capable of any other interpretation under aforesaid two sections. In common parlance as well, a month is to be reckoned according to British Calendar and acted upon by the Courts of the country. I am therefore, not convinced to accept the contention that the period of four months prescribed in section 30 of the Act mean in accordance with lunar months. For the aforesaid reasons, this revision petition is accepted, the impugned judgment and decrees are set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court for its decision on merit. There is, however, no order as to cost. H.B.T./T‑82/L Revision accepted.