P L D 1982 Quetta 84 (PLP)

Basharatullah for Petitioner. Munawwar Ahmed Mirza A: G. for Respondent. Date of hearing: 9th May, 1982. The facts forming the background of this Revision Petition are that the petitioner was given a Contract for the construction of 100 grain godowns at Hub, District Lasbella. According to the petitioner's own showings such contract was assigned by the fourth respondent, namely the executive Engineer, Hub and an agreement to this effect was also executed by the same Officer at Hub. The petitioner further submits that after he had partially completed the work and had also drawn running payment, the fourth respondent stopped the work by an oral order on the ground that further funds were not available. This fact is, however, seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents whose contention is that the petitioner himself closed down the work. Be that as it may. The dispute arose when on 23rd August, 1981, the respondent issued a notice inviting fresh tenders for the completion of the left‑over work.

2. Feeling aggrieved by such notice the petitioner filed a suit in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Quetta impleading first to third respondents, namely, the Secretary, Communication and Works Department, the Chief Engineer C & W Department and the Superintending Engineer, Highway Circle, Khuzdar at Quetta alongwith the fourth respondent. A written statement was filed in Court on behalf of the respondent who contended that the contract having been executed at Hub as also the subject‑matter of the suit being situate at Hub and finally the notice calling fresh tenders having also been issued by the fourth respondent at Hub, the suit exclusively lay before the Civil Court within Khuzdar Civil Division and not before a Court at Quetta. On such ground the plaint was ordered to be returned to the petitioner under Order VII, rule 10, C. P. C. on 14th December, 1981. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by this order preferred an appeal to the District Judge, Quetta which, too, was dismissed on 3rd February, 1982, hence this revision petition.

3. Mr. Basharatullah, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the fourth respondent acted only on behalf of first to third respondents who were stationed at Quetta, therefore, it would be deemed that cause of action partly accrued at Quetta, hence the order of the return of the plaint for presentation to a Court at Khuzdar was erroneous. Section 20, C. P. C. governs the present case. According to it a suit could be instituted in the Court within whose jurisdiction the defendant or each of the defendants at the time of the commencement of the suit actually and voluntarily resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain or any of the defendants, if there were more than one, actually and voluntarily resided, carried on business, or personally worked for gain; provided that in. such a case leave of the Court obtained to sue him in that Court, or the defendants who do not reside or personally work for gain as aforesaid acquiesce in such institution. The next condition was that the suit could also be filed in the Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action had wholly or in pact accrued to the plaintiff. The scheme of the law for the purposes of territorial jurisdiction of the Court can verily well be explained by the maxim : actor sequitrr forum rei, namely the plaintiff shall follow the court of the defendant. In the instant case it is quite clear that the first two provisos dealing with the "residence" and "working for gain" of the defendant would not ipso facto apply to a Government. The reason being that a Provincial Government resides in the whole of the Province and likewise the Federal Government resides in the whole of the country; as such it is neither incumbent nor feasible to expect a plaintiff to file a suit at the place where the principal seat of the Government is situate. Rather, the condition laid down in clause (i) of section 20, C. P. C. shall not apply to the Provincial and Federal Governments and they can be sued at any place within the Province or the country, as the case may be, and the only criterian to choose the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the suit could be filed would be with reference to the; accrual of the cause of action (wholly or in part) alone. In this view of the matter I am supported by Mian Fazal Muhammad Nizam‑ud‑Din Baig & Company v. The Province of West Pakistan and others (P L D 1969 Lah. 453), wherein it was held that the words "carries on business" in section 20 of the Code have been used in their primary and natural meanings and connote a business carried on for pecuniary profits and gains by the business and trading houses. They have as such no application to the case of the Government engaged in commercial activities as a part of its duties for the welfare of its people. It was further held that applying the provisions contained in clauses (a) and (b) of section 20 of the Code to the Government, it is liable to be sued all over the country within the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in which it has got its offices. There is thus no embargo placed in the way of the petitioner to sue the first three respondents, whether they were necessary or proper parties, in a Court of law within whose jurisdiction cause of action has wholly or in part accrued and in the instant case it is obvious that the cause of action, if any, has accrued at Hub which lies within Khuzdar. Civil Division and not within the limits of a court in Quetta Civil Division. Mr. Munawar Ahmed, learned Advocate‑General further relied upon the cases of Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan v. Messrs Cricket Association, Hyderabad (1980 C L C 683) and Muhammad Saeed v. Federation of Pakistan (P L D 1954 Sind 117). In these cases the words "resides" and "carries on business" as used in section 20, C. P. C. were held to be applicable to natural persons and not to legal entities such as the Government. I am in full agreement with him that this being a case against the Government it should have been instituted in the place where the cause of action accrued wholly or in part, and as pointed out earlier, in the instant case . . . there can be no denial of the fact that the petitioner felt aggrieved only by the notice issued by the fourth respondent at Hub, inviting fresh tenders for the left‑over work. Accordingly the Senior Civil Judge was justified in returning the plaint for presentation to a Court in Khuzdar Civil Division, The impugned order of the District Judge is also free of any error. The revision petition has no merits and is as such dismissed with costs. S. A. H. Petition dismissed.