1969 PLP 247 (SCMR)

(On review from the order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, dated the 10th October 1968, and the 14th December 1967, in Civil Review Petition No. 10 of 1968 and Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 60 of 1967, respectively). --Art. 62 and Supreme Court Rules, 1956,

0. XXVI‑Review‑Cannot be granted merely for a re‑hearing of matter‑Second review petition not entertainable after amendment of Supreme Court Rules, 1956‑Review petition now entertained only on grounds akin to those mentioned in

0. XLVII, C. P. C.‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XLVIL JUDGMENT HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.‑This is a review petition for the review of an order of this Court, passed on the 10th of October, 1968, dismissing a first review petition filed for the review of a judgment delivered by the Full Court on the 14th of December 1967. The last review petition was dismissed on the ground that "a review cannot be gt anted merely because one party of the other to the litigation is not satisfied with the decision of this Court and considers that the matter should be re‑heard or re‑argued. A review is not a substitute for an appeal." Learned counsel contends that this view offends against the provisions of Article e2 which do not place any limitation on the powers of this Court. Article 62 of the Constitution, however, is itself "subject to the provisions of any Act of the Central Legis lature and of any Rules made by the Supreme Court." Rules have already been made in that behalf and it has repeatedly been held by this Court that a review cannot be granted merely for a re‑hearing of a matter. In the of case Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. Con troller of Estate Duty (PLD1962SC335) the majority view clearly was to the effect that "a decision of this Court should be re‑opened with very great hesitation and only in very exceptional circumstances." Fazale‑Akbar, J. opened that "the power of review should be exercised within the limits laid down in the case of Akber Ali v. Iftikhar Ali (P L D 1956 F C 5J) Kaikaus, J. observed that "the mere incorrectness of a conclusion reached can never be a ground for review." I myself in that case enunciated the principle that the power of review should only be exercised "consistently with the nature of review jurisdiction and with due regard to the principle that there must be an end to litigation . review is by its very nature not an appeal or a re‑hearing merely on the ground that one party or another conceives himself to be dis‑satisfied with the decision of this Court, but that it should only be granted for some sufficient cause akin to those mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions whereof incorporate the principles upon which a review was usually granted by Courts of law in England." Even Cornelius, C. J., who took a Wider view of the power of review, conceded that "it must, of course, be borne in mind that by assumption, every judgment pronounced by the Court is a considered and solesmn decision on all points arising out of the case, and further that every reason compels towards the grant of finality in favour of such judgments delivered by a Court which sits at the apex of the judicial system." Keeping these principles, which had not been departed iron‑, in any oilier case in view, we have again re‑examined the conten tion of the learned counsel appearing g in suport of this petition for the review of the judgment of the Full Court. His main grievance appears to b;, that this Court held "overlooked the patent fact that by virtue of the amendments of section 10 of the Act with effect from 13th January ;1962, tile two press notes. dated the 7th April, 1960 and the 28th of July, 1960 had ceased to be operative, nor was the final order of the Settlement Commissioner based upon them." further that the important statutory provisions of the amendment of section 10 (b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and of the two press notes referred to earlier had escaped the notice of this Court, for, if they had been noticed, the judgment of his Court might well have been different. Both the assumptions are, however, incorrect, for, this Court, as will be evident from a reference to its judgment, was fully aware of the fact that that section 10 of the above‑mentioned Act was amended in 1962 by an Ordinance. the amended provisions are actually quoted in the judgment. This Court, however, took the view that since the right which the petitioner was seeking in respect of the transference of a house arose upon the failure of the Settelement Authorities to give her that right, after she had successfully drawn under an ear‑marking scheme on the 3rd of December, 1959 "at which time section 10 in its original form was in operation, she must be held to have gained a vested right to be satisfied out of any subsequent ear‑marking list of houses available for transfer, by the method laid down in the press note." Then this Court went on to construe the said press notes and came to the conclusion that the press notes could only be taken advantage of if "the value of the house was not more than double of the verified claim", and since the petitioner's claim did not satisfy this condition she was not enti tled to the house in dispute even under the press notes or under the later instructions in that behalf. It is manifest, therefore, that all the points now sought to be raised by learned counsel were taken into consideration. If the petitioner is now dis‑satisfied with that decision, that cannot be a ground for review. Finally we may also point out that this petition is barred by 59 days and no satisfactory explanation has been furnished for this delay. Since the filing of this petition for review the A review rules of this Court have been further amended and second review petitions are no longer entertainable. However, we have heard this petition, as it was filed before the new rules came into operation. In the new rules it has also been clarified that a review petition will only be entertained on grounds akin to those mentioned in Order XLVII, C. P. C. For all these reasons we are of the opinion that this petition for a second review must fail and is, accordingly, dismissed. But while doing so we would like to observe that if the Settlement Authorities are still minded to give some other property to the petitioner or to any other person who, though successful in the drawing of lots under the ear‑marking scheme, has been unsuccess ful in getting a property, they can do so if it is possible under some other provision of the Settlement law. The judgment of this Court should not stand in their way.