P L D 1972 Karachi 210 (PLP)

the meaning of the word to any highly complicated process or the use of machinery or to insist that the original material be so changed as not to make it recognisable in the finished product. Suppose for instance; a person purchased a carved piece of wood through which a hole has already been drilled, such as are commonly sold in Gift & Curio shops as also a length of electric wire, a plug and electric bulb and a socket and assembles the whole together into an electric lamp, I do not think it can be doubted that he has manufactured an electric lamp out of the various goods that he purchased readymade. Even though the manufacture is of the simplest kind, the finished article is. an electric lamp and not merely a bulb or a .wood carving or a piece of electric wire. The present case is in essence the same, even if one ignores the fact that the flasks are subjected to oxidisation. This contention must, therefore, I think . re manufactured goods and come within fail. Vacuum Flasks a the purview of section 3 of the Act.

3. The main argument in this case, however, turns upon the interpretation of section 3‑B of the Act which reads as follows:‑ "(3‑B) Goods where or any article liable to duty under this Act forms a part or ingredient shall be chargeable with the full duty which would be payable on such goods if composed of more than one article liable to duty, then with the full duty which would be payable on such goods if they were entirely composed of the article on which the highest amount of duty would be payable." Mr. Khalid Ishaque argued that section 3 of the Act is a charging section and that consequently it was not permissible to justify the levy of duty from the language of any. other provision. Now the word 'charging section' is not a term of art nor is it anywhere laid down that only one such section must be found in a fiscal statute and that it alone then would be the source of power for levying a tax. It is merely a convenient phrase by which the provisions of fiscal statute which impose a tax are referred to. I have no doubt in my mind that if the language of any provision of statute clearly imposes a tax or B confers the power of imposing a tax that provision must be given its proper effect. Section 3‑B clearly says that goods of a particular description "shall be chargeable with the full duty" and I cannot see in what cleaner language the Legislature could have authorised the levy.

4. It was then argued that the word "goods" which is the first word of the section does not refer to any goods but nly to such goods which are themselves excisable or, to put it more plainly, which are mentioned in the Schedule as being chargeable to excise duty. It was argued that the purpose of section 3‑B was not to impose a duty but to ascertain the proper rate of duty applicable where there are two or more excisable components in the goods in question, themselves liable to different rates of duty. But this argument ignores the fact that the section refers also to such goods as are composed of only one such article; in such a case surely there would be no need to ascertain any rate of duty since, on the basis of this argument, the goods in question would have been mentioned in the schedule where the appropriate rate of duty would also be prescribed. The argument indeed invites us to interpret the section as if after the word "goods" were also inserted the words "which are themselves liable to duty and". I can see no warrant for importing into the language of a statute words which the legislature never used. On this part of the case it was finally urged that where two possible meanings could be given to the provisions of a statute that which is more favourable to the subject ought to be accepted. This is of course true but C the duty of choosing between various interpretations arises only where the language is ambiguous and capable of more than one meaning. Whereas fn this case, the language is clear and unambiguous it must be given full effect even in a fiscal statute.[ I am, therefore, of the opinion that section 3‑B is clearly attracted in this case and that vacuum flasks are chargeable to the higbest rates of duty applicable to any of the components used thereunder. In fact, however, each of these items is chargeable at the rate of 10 % ad valorem and the authorities are claiming no more than a rate of 10 % on the vacuum flasks themselves.

5. It was then argued that upon this interpretation the component parts would be charged with excise duty as also the vacuum flasks themselves separately. This, it was claimed would amount to double taxation and is on that account illegal. I do not think in point of fact that is so. The petitioners themselves have produced a letter signed on behalf of the Central Board of Revenue dated the 26th of November 1969 which shows that the duty is levied only at one stage. The letter is in the following terms:‑ "Please refer to your letter No. Ster‑69/1127, dated the 15th August 1969 and subsequent communications on the above subject. Necessary instructions have been issued to the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Karachi, to allow removal in bond, without payment of duty, of articles of plastic, resins, glassware and metal containers used for the manufacture of vacuum flasks so that duty is levied at only one stage, when the vacuum flasks are cleared for home consump tion." But even if, in fact duty was being levied twice in the sense that the component was separately taxed as also the finished product I can see no reason for refusing to uphold the levy when the Act clearly makes the finished goods themselves leviable to excise duty. The schedule itself gives examples of a similar kind; for instance item 44 refers to woollen yarn including knitting woc 1 and yet item 45 subjects woollen fabrics again to tax. This contention of the petitioners also, therefore, I am unable to accept. 6. 1t was then argued that the rate at which the tax would be levied was uncertain and the levy of tax, therefore, itself void. I do not see how this is made out. Section 3‑B clearly says that the rates which would be leviable would be the rates which would be payable on the goods if they were entirely composed of the article on which the highest rate of duty would be payable. In fact in the case of vacuum flasks the component items are all liable to a duty of 10 Y. which is the duty claimed in respect of vacuum flasks. The related argument that the most valuable component in a vacuum is plastic and on the principle applied by the respondents themselves, vacuum flasks would come within the category of plastic products which are exempt from payment of excise duty is not, I think, sound. The respondents are not proceeding upon any principle of the most valuable component or claiming tax on vacuum flasks as being a plastic product but only claiming the rate of duty made applicable by section 3‑B that is the highest rate applicable to any of the components in question. No exemption on that basis can be claimed for the vacuum flasks as a plastic product.

7. In the result, therefore, I would dismiss this petition with costs. ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.‑I agree. Petition dismissed.