P L D 2000 Supreme Court 52 (PLP)

(On appeal from the judgment/order, dated 25‑2‑1999, of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi passed in C. Revisions Nos.34 and 35 of 1993). Civil Procedure Code (V of 1998)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑

0. XLI, R.5‑‑‑Stay order‑‑‑When to start operating‑‑‑Stay order operates from the time when such order is made and not from the time same is communicated‑‑‑Ignorance of such order would not permit lower Court to render order of superior Court ineffective or nullity, and such action would not be clothed with legality when legal order to proceed had been stopped or stayed‑‑ Where Trial Court had been restrained from passing the final judgment till further orders by the District Judge, reasoning given by the Appellate Court that since from the record it was not borne out as to whether the order of the District Judge staying the proceedings had been conveyed to the Trial Court and Trial court legally proceeded with the suit was devoid of any legal force. Din Muhammad and 2 others v. Abdul Rehman Khan 1992 SCMR 127 quoted. SH. IJAZ NISAR, J.‑‑‑Leave is sought in the aforementioned petitions against the judgment, dated 25‑2‑1999, of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, remanding the matter to the Appellate Court (District Judge) for a fresh decision.

2. The facts necessary for 'the disposal of these petitions are that Muhammad Anwar petitioner filed two suits against Muhammad Akbar respondent. During the pendency of the suits Muhammad Akbar filed an application for transfer of the suits from the Court of learned Civil Judge, Gujar Khan. .According to the petitioner, although the learned Additional District Judge had stayed the proceedings on 4‑2‑1990, but the Civil Court proceeded to hear the arguments and passed the judgment/decree on 6‑2‑1990. The appeals filed by Muhammad Akbar respondent were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge on the ground that the record did not show that proceedings had been stayed by the Additional District Judge, or that any stay order was conveyed to the trial Court. Another factor, which weighed against the respondent was that his counsel had addressed arguments before the trial Court on 6‑2‑1990, and if the proceedings had been actually stayed, he should not have done so.

3. Feeling aggrieved, Muhammad Akbar respondent filed revision petitions in the High Court, which were accepted by the impugned judgment. Hence, these petitions.

4. It is contended that High Court could not interfere in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. with the concurrent findings of facts by the Courts below and further that there was no legal justification whatsoever in setting aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below passed in favour of the petitioner.

5. To appreciate the circumstances leading to remand of the cases to the Appellate Court, it would be advantageous to reproduce below the operative paragraph of the impugned judgment:‑‑ `After having heard the learned lower Appellate Court must have attended to the serious allegations levelled by the petitioner against the Civil Judge. If an injunctive order was passed by the learned District Judge on the transfer applications submitted by the petitioner, the trial Court was bound to have stayed the proceedings forthwith, which, of course, was not done by it. Adjudication of a lis while an injunctive order stood passed by a superior Court was unlawful and if the First Court had passed the impugned judgment/decree during the susbsistence of an injunctive order, the decree passed by it would be nullity in the eves of law. Learned Additional District Judge could have examined the record of the transfer applications which of course was not done. Therefore, instead of rendering any decision after considering the merits of the cases of either of the parties, I would remit the matter to learned lower Appellate Court where the appeals submitted by Muhammad Akbar would be deemed to be pending. The Appellate Court shall examine the record of lower Court as well as that of transfer applications submitted by Muhammad Akbar and thereafter, ascertain any injunctive order passed by the learned District Judge was in subsistence when the judgment/decrees were passed by the First Court on 6‑2‑1990, and thereafter, decide the Appeals afresh in accordance with law. "

6. The learned Judge in Chambers did not go into the factual controversy but confined himself to the continuation of the proceedings by the trial Court despite the passage of injunctive order by the District Court. There is no denying the fact that the trial Court had been restrained from passing the final judgment till further orders by the District Court on 4‑2‑1990. The reasoning given by the learned Appellate Court that since from the record it was not borne out as to whether the order of the District Court staying the proceedings had been conveyed to the learned trial Court, it could legally proceed with the suit, is devoid of any legal force. It is a settled proposition of law that stay order operates from the time when such order is made and not from the time it is communicated. Din Muhammad and 2 others v. Abdul Rehman Khan 1992 SCMR 127 may be cited, wherein it was observed that ignorance would not permit lower Court to render order of superior Court ineffective or nullity, and such action would not be clothed with legality when legal order to proceed had been stopped or stayed.

7. In the circumstances discussed above, the learned High Court was justified to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and to remand the case to the District Judge to decide the appeals afresh in accordance with law. These petitions are, therefore, devoid of any force, which are hereby dismissed. M.B.A./M‑395/S Petitions dismissed.