1988 PLP 342 (CLC)
Messrs SHAUKAT AND RAZA (PRIVATE) LTD.‑‑Plaintiff Versus PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION LTD., KARACHI
| Citation | 1988 PLP 342 (CLC) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi |
| Bench Members | Syed Abdur Rehman, J |
| Parties | Messrs SHAUKAT AND RAZA (PRIVATE) LTD.‑‑Plaintiff Versus PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION LTD., KARACHI |
| Primary Law | Arbitration Act (X of 1940)‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1988 PLP 342 (CLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1988 PLP 342 (CLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Syed Abdur Rehman, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1988 PLP 342 (CLC) (Messrs SHAUKAT AND RAZA (PRIVATE) LTD.‑‑Plaintiff Versus PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION LTD., KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Date of hearing: 25th November, 1987.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑S. 20‑‑‑Suit‑‑Condition precedent as mentioned in the arbitration clause in the agreement having not been fulfilled, suit, held, was premature and not maintainable. Central Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Khyber Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 1978 Kar. 908; Intertrade Limited v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan P L D 1976 Kar. 496; B.R. Harman and Mohatta v. Ghee Corporation of Pakistan 1980 C L C 1226 and Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. Thev Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi P L D 1965 SC 698 ref. Kamal Azfer fo Plaintiff. S.A. Shamsi for Defendants.
Judgment & Decree
(9)Letter from defendant to plaintiff dated 23‑9‑1985 at page 63. (10) Letter from plaintiff to defendant dated 30‑10‑1985 at. Page 157. (11) Letter from defendant to plaintiff dated 30‑1‑1986 at page 158. (12) Letter from plaintiff to defendant dated 6‑2‑1986 at page 114. (13) Letter from plaintiff to defendant regarding final bill dated 11‑12‑1986 at page 115. (14) Letter from defendant to plaintiff regarding final bill dated 20‑2‑1986 at page 67. (15) Letter from plaintiff to defendant dated 12‑3‑1986 at page 116. (16) Letter from defendant to plaintiff regarding maintenance certificate dated 27‑3‑1986 at page 19. (17) Letter from plaintiff to defendant regarding final measurements dated 6‑4‑1986 at page 118. (18) Telex from plaintiff to defendant regarding final bill dated 20‑4‑1986 at page 121. (19) Letter from defendant to plaintiff regarding final bill dated 13‑5‑1986 at page 65. (20) Letter from defendant to plaintiff dated 18‑6‑1986 at page 59. (21) Telex from plaintiff to defendant regarding final bill dated 19‑6‑1986 at page 125. (22) Letter from plaintiff to defendant regarding final bill dated 23‑6‑1986 at page 122. (23) Letter from plaintiff to defendant regarding final bill dated 24‑6‑1986 at page 126. (24) Store Return Form of defendant. dated 2‑7‑1986 at pages 132, 133 and 134. (25) Letter from plaintiff to defendant dated 10‑7‑1986 at page 128. (26) Letter from defendant to plaintiff regarding return of surplus material dated 24‑7‑1986 at page 60. (27) Letter from plaintiff to defendant dated 9‑10‑1986 at page 130.
5. I have perused all these letters. These letters contained certain directions made by the defendant from time to time calling upon the plaintiff to make certain compliances and the intimation of the compliances thereof or the explanations for non‑compliance for the same offered by the plaintiff. At least none of the letters or documents referred to above can be treated as a reference to the "Engineer" which was the condition precedent to the filing of this suit.
6. The second limb of the contention of Mr.Kama1 Azfer was that in case these letters which were written by the parties to each other before the filing of this suit were not considered as reference, at least the letter from the plaintiff sent after the filing of the suit to the defendant dated 8‑1‑1987 which is at page No.163 should be treated as a reference to the "Engineer" as it fulfilled all the requirements of the reference which was a condition precedent. Mr. Kamal Azfer then relied upon the case of Central Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Khyber Textile Mills Ltd. reported in P L D 1978 Kar. 908; where it was held as follows:‑ "We are, therefore, of the humble opinion that though the two applications for reference to arbitration were premature when they were filed, they had ceased to be so during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Single Judge, and hence it was open to him, in the absence of any other legal impediment, and we say with due respect to the learned Judge, to allow the two applications. In any case, in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the above reported case, we have the power to allow the applications for reference as they are no longer premature." and submitted that even a reference made to the Engineer after the filing of the suit can be treated by the Court as valid compliance of I the condition precedent. I do not agree with this contention.
7. In that case certain applications under section 20 of the Arbitration Act were made by the plaintiff against the Insurance Company praying for reference of the disputes to the Arbitrator in consequence of a loss suffered by the plaintiff due to fire. The Insurance Company resisted the references on the ground that the dispute as to existence of the loss was not referable to arbitration but it was the dispute as to the amount of the claim which could be referred to the arbitration. Since the Insurance Company had disputed the very existence of the loss and had not yet disputed the amount of claim therefore the condition precedent to the reference had not arisen as yet. A meeting had taken place between the plaintiff and the Insurance Company two months after the filing of the applications wherein Insurance Company had put forward their estimate of loss at a certain amount and offered to settle the claim of the plaintiff at that amount. The plaintiff rejected the offer. It was held by the D.B. that such offer by the Insurance Company and rejection by the plaintiff created a dispute as to the amount of loss sustained by the plaintiff and thus the condition precedent for referring the dispute to the Arbitrator had been fulfilled though after the filing of the suit. It was therefore held that in the absence of any other impediment the Court should allow such applications for reference.
8. In the case of this ruling the meeting had taken place in the ordinary course of events before the filing of the objections by the defendant and was not a contrivance to defeat the agreement, whereas in the present case it is not so. It is quite clear that no reference was made to the "Engineer" as provided under Article 20 before the filing of this suit which was a condition precedent. The reference that was made after the filing of the suit was also not an event which had taken place in natural course of things but it was an act deliberately done by the plaintiff to circumstances the provisions of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. It must be remembered that the agreement entered into by the parties voluntarily has a sanctity which should not be allowed to be violated easily. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Intertrade Limited v . Trading Corporation of Pakistan reported in P L D 1976 Kar.
496. It was held by Zaffar Hussain Mirza (as he then was) as follows:‑ "The only remaining contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff relates to the incapacity of an arbitrator of the class mentioned in the agreement to decide what he termed to be intricate questions of law involved in the dispute. I have not been shown any authority for the proposition that this could be a ground for removal or substitution of an arbitrator. In the preceding part of this order I have referred to the provisions of Arbitration Act that the agreement of parties has a sanctity which cannot easily be allowed to be violated. The power of the Court under Section 8 of the Act does not confer the authority on the Court substitute the original agreement of the parties by entirely new agreement of its own choice and in my view, to allow at this stage, on merely conjectural grounds to substitute an arbitrator appointed by the parties is not warranted. The parties at the time of agreement, had obviously contemplated the disputes to arise in the future for which provision was made for reference to the arbitration of a person from the class of Government servants of the status stipulated. It, therefore, does not lie in the mouth of the plaintiff before the submission to complain that such a person would be incompetent to decide the question arising for adjudication of disputes."
9. The plaintiff having realized that he had rushed to the Court before making a reference to the "Engineer" and before enabling him to settle the matter between the parties, gave this notice, after filing suit when such objection was raised. The "engineer" was justified in refusing to take parallel proceedings to the suit fully realizing that this reference was only to fulfil the lacuna left by the plaintiff and was not an earnest endeavour to reconcile the dispute or the differences that had arisen between the parties. In 1980 CLC 1226 B.R. Harman & Mohatta v. Ghee Corporation of Pakistan Naimuddin, J. (the present Chief Justice) in a case where the parties to the agreement contemplated that the party dissatisfied should first approach Board of Directors of defendants before going to the arbitration held that when such condition precedent was not fulfilled before approaching the Court, the suit under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act was premature and was not maintainable in the circumstances.
10. Reliance was also placed in the well‑known case of Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. The Imrovement Trust, Rawalpindi reported in PLD 1965 SC 698 where it was held as follows:‑ "It may also be pointed out that a Court is not bound to take: notice of events subsequent to the institution of the suit though it has discretion to do so. It can adjudicate upon rights of parties as they existed at the date of the institution of the suit leaving the question arising out of subsequent events to be decided in fresh proceedings."
11. A perusal of Article 20 of the agreement clearly shows that the parties contemplated that before filing a suit under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act the party dissatisfied should first approach the "engineer" for redregs of his grievance for it is possible that it may be redressed by him thus obviating even the necessity of going to arbitration or to Court. By doing so he was likely to gain some thing and to lose nothing because if the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the decision of the "engineer" he could still come to this Court for a reference to arbirtation.
12. Since the condition precedent mentioned in the arbitration clause has not been fulfilled, I am, therefore, of the view that the suit is premature and not maintainable. I, therefore, dismiss the suit leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Before parting with the R&P of the case I would like to observe that the defendant shall see that their "engineer" likes earnest efforts to redress the grievances of, the plaintiff and to settle the dispute and differences between the, parties and make bona fide use of this provision, instead of using it'', as a contrivance for delaying the suit and thus harassing the plaintiff., A . A . /S‑135/ K Order accordingly.