2001 PLP 1689 (CLC)

CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J.‑‑‑ We intend to decide the R.F.A. No.471 of 1998 and R.F.A. No.472 of 1998 by one consolidated judgment having similar facts and law. 2_ Brief facts out of which these appeals arise are that respondent‑Bank filed suits for recoveries against the appellants and remaining respondents in the present appeals before the learned Banking Court. The appellants filed applications to both the suits for leave to defend before the learned Banking Court. Learned Banking Court vide order, dated 18‑9‑1998 granted leave to defend the suit to the appellants subject to furnishing security to the satisfaction of Deputy Registrar (Judl.) within one month in the sum of the suit amount. The appellants filed civil miscellaneous applications before the learned Banking Court for extension of time on 17‑10‑1998. Office did not fix the same before the learned Banking Court on 17‑10‑1998 or 18‑10‑1998. The same were placed alongwith the main case which was already fixed for 23‑10‑1998. Learned Banking Court dismissed the applications of the appellants for extension in time on the ground that appellants wanted extension of time on vague ground and consequently the suits filed by the respondent‑Bank were decreed against the appellants vide impugned judgments and decrees, dated 23‑10‑1998. Hence these appeals.

3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that appellants did not furnish the security well in time on the ground that WAPDA Authorities have abolished certain posts including the post of Deputy General Manager (Purchase) who had executed two agreements between the parties. He further submits that appellants failed to furnish the security on account of the circumstances beyond their control.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that appellants did not furnish the security within time as directed by the learned Banking Court. He further submits that appellants failed to furnish sufficient cause for extension of time. He summed up his arguments that learned Banking Court was justified to decree the suits in favour of the respondent‑Bank:

5. Learned counsel for the appellants in rebuttal submits that appeals were admitted for regular hearing vide order, dated 1‑7‑1999 and appellants were directed to furnish bank guarantee of the decretal amount to the satisfaction of executing Court within one month. He further submits that appellants furnished the bank guarantee as directed by this Court vide order, dated 1‑7‑1999 and finally the same was confirmed by this Court vide order, dated 9‑3‑2000. He further submits that appellants are ready to furnish fresh guarantee to the satisfaction of the learned Banking Court.

6. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record ourselves. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the applications of the appellants in which the circumstances for extension of time are made out are paragraphs Nos.4, 5 and 6 of the applications which are as follows:‑‑ "(4) That WAPDA Authorities have abolished certain posts including the post of Deputy General Manager (Purchasing) WAPDA who had executed two contract agreements between WAPDA and Messrs Ch. Cables. (5)That presently the staff under the abolished posts of Deputy General Manager (Purchasing) WAPDA has been given under the control of Chief Engineer (Purchase and Disposal) who has apprised the WAPDA Authority about providing the security and he has requested for grant of extension in time for submission of the security bond as well as the written statement, as the period granted under the order, dated 18‑9‑1998 is expiring on 18‑10‑1998. (6) That WAPDA Authority under the Chairmanship of present Chairman who has recently been posted is making Administrative as well as economical arrangements to reduce the loss being suffered by WAPDA." It is for us to determine whether the aforesaid paragraphs provide sufficient cause or ground for extension of time or not. The word "sufficient" means adequate, effective according to Chamber's 20th Century Dictionary. According to the Oxford Universal Dictionary it means of a quantity, extent or scope, adequate to a certain purpose or object. In Black's Law Dictionary words "sufficient" means adequate, enough, as much as may be necessary, equal or fit for end proposed. A sufficient cause can properly be said to be a cause which is beyond control of the party invoking aid of section 151, ~.P.C. Sufficient cause should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Yet it must be determined by a reference to the circumstances of the particular cause. In arriving to this conclusion we are fortified by the view taken in Krishna's case ILR 13 Mad. 269 and Girdhari Lal's case AIR 1937 Oudh

436. The Court has inherent powers under section 151, C.P.C. to secure the ends of justice. In view of what has been discussed above, we find that appellants have shown sufficient ground for extension of time and these appeals are accepted to the extent of appellants. The appellants are directed to furnish fresh security/guarantee before the learned Banking Court within one month as directed vide order, dated 18‑9‑1998 by the learned Court. H.B.T./W‑23/L Appeals accepted.