P L D Supreme Court 724 (PLP)

NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.‑‑‑This appeal, by leave of this Court is directed against the judgment dated 18‑11‑1979 passed by the High Court whereby the appellants' Regular Second Appeal arising out of an inheritance case was dismissed. Mahia appellant was convicted under section 302, P.P.C. for the murder of his father Ranizan. His appeal partly succeeded. The conviction was altered to 304 Part‑ll,.P.P.C. and sentence was, accordingly, reduced. As for the facts, which form the background to the present litigation, it is sufficient to state that the case of inheritance of Ramzan deceased was ultimately decided against the appellants on the ground that the appellant No.1 (Mahia) being himself the murderer of his father would be excluded from inheriting as a heir on the basis of the rule of Muslim Law of Inheritance that a murderer cannot inherit the property of his victim. So far as appellants Nos.2 to 6, who are the sons and daughters of appellant No.1, concerned they have also been deprived of the inheritance on the ground that although under the Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, after the exclusion of their father from inheritance, they as grandsons, and daughters of Ranizan would have ordinarily obtained their father's share, they could not avail of this benefit as the Muslim Law of Inheritance also deprives the progeny of a murderer in so far as inheritance of the victim is concerned. The High Court in coming to this conclusion relied upon Mst. Beguman and 2 others v. Saroo and another PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lah. 451 and Kenshava Kom Sanyellappa Hosmani and another v. Girimalla pa Somasagar AIR 1924 Privy Council 209 which enunciate the principle that‑a slayer is deprived of the inheritance of his victim and so also are his lineal descendants deprived. The relevant observations, in this connection, appearing in the case of Mst. Beguman and others v. Saroo and another PLD 1964 Lahore 451) are as follows:‑‑ "Under the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, a murderer or his progeny cannot be allowed to benefit by his crime of murder. The murderer may be the father alone but if the descendants claim through him even though not merely from him their title becomes tainted as the source or the channel through which the inheritance has to flow to them becomes blocked and extirpated by reason of the crime committed by that source." Leave was granted by this Court as it was contended that there was a difference of opinion amongst the Muslim Jurists and Aima on the question whether the heirs of the murderer would also be excluded from inheritance and that this was a case of first impression so far as this Court was concerned. Today when the case has come up for hearing, the situation is altogetherl different. Even if there was some difference of opinion amongst the Muslim? Jurists on this question but now this question is only of academic interest in Pakistan. The reason being that Ordinance I of 1991 (commonly referred to as the Oisas and Diyat Ordinance), which is now in force in Pakistan., has settled this controversy, if there was any, by a specific provision.. By Ordinance I of 1991, section 299 to section 388 in Chapter XVI of the Code on the subject of "Offences affecting the Human Body' have been substituted by new provisions based on Islamic Injunctions and section 317 of the Code (as amended) has made a provision on the question of succession to persons committing Qatl and it is as follows:‑‑ "

317. Person committing Oatl debarred from succession.‑‑‑Where a person committing Qatl‑i‑amd or Qatl shibh‑i‑amd is an heir or a beneficiary under a will, he shall be debarred from succeeding to the estate of victim as an heir or a beneficiary." In this case under the final judgment of the High Court even if Ranizan cannot be treated as having committed Qatl‑i‑amd, the offence found by the High Court to have been committed by him is a graver offence than the offence of Qatl‑i‑shibh‑i‑amd. This is defined in section 315 of the Code (as amended)'‑ to mean:‑‑ "

315. Oatl‑shibh‑i‑amd.‑‑‑Whoever, with intent to cause harm to the body or mind of any person causes the death of that or of any other person by means of a weapon or an act which in the ordinary course of nature is not likely to cause death is said to commit Qati‑shibh‑i‑amd." In view of these statutory provisions, the question no longer remains res integra. The result is that this appeal must fail and it is, accordingly, dismissed hereby. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. M.B.A./M‑1505/S ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.