1993 PLP 138 (SCMR)

SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.‑‑‑The petitioner‑ removed the respondent from service under section 17(1‑A) of WAPDA Act on 10‑8‑1983. Respondent challenged his removal from service before the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, but his appeal was dismissed as time‑barred on 4‑8‑1986. The petitioner preferred appeal against the order of Service Tribunal before this Court which was allowed and the case was remanded to Service Tribunal, to consider the application of respondent filed before it under section 5 of the Limitation Act and dispose of the case in accordance with the law. It appears that after remand of the case, the respondent's counsel made a statement before the learned Service Tribunal that he was instructed by respondent not to press his appeal and pray only for review of the quantum of punishment awarded by the petitioner. The learned Service Tribunal considering the length of service of appellant and the rigours of litigation, allegedly suffered by respondent modified his removal from service into retirement from the date of removal from service. Leave was granted in the case to consider whether, the Tribunal was justified in converting the removal of respondent from service into retirement without first determining the question of limitation involved in the case for which the case was remanded by this Court to the Tribunal. It was also noticed in the leave granting order that the removal of respondent from service was converted into retirement without a finding that the removal of respondent from service was mala fide. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we are inclined to allow this appeal and remand the case to Service Tribunal, once again, for disposal according to law. We are clearly of the view that the Conversion of the removal of respondent from service into his retirement is a decision on merits which could not be given in the case by the Tribunal without first addressing itself to the question of limitation involved in the case, in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Ahsan Ali and others v. District Judge and others PLD 1969 SC 167 and Muhammad Buta v. Habib Ahmed PLD 1985 SC

153. Secondly, the case having been remanded by this Court to the Tribunal for deciding the question of limitation and then disposing of the same in accordance with the law, the Tribunal was bound to first address itself to the question of limitation, before entering into the merits of the case. It is also open to serious doubts that an order of removal of an employee from service under section 17(1‑A) of the WAPDA Act could be described as a punishment so as to call for interference by the Tribunal in appeal, specially when there Was no finding by the Tribunal that the removal was mala fide and biased. In our view, just because, the respondent had shown his willingness not to press his appeal if the Tribunal was willing to consider his request with regard to reduction in the quantum of punishment, was not enough in this case to vest the Tribunal with the jurisdiction to with deal the case in such a summary manner, unless the appellant (who. was respondent before the Tribunal) also agreed to the course adopted by the learned Tribunal. The Service Tribunals, set up under a Constitutional mandate have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the matters relating to terms and conditions of service of civil servants. These Tribunals are presided over by persons who had been or are members of superior judiciary of the country. The Service Tribunals are, therefore, vested with vast powers to grant full redress and to do complete justice with an aggrieved party by suitably moulding the relief, if the circumstances of a particular case so require. However, at the same time it must also be borne in mind that as these Tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction are presided over by persons belonging to superior judiciary, all norms of propriety applicable to the superior Courts in deciding the cases equally apply to the Service Tribunals in their decision‑making. It will therefore, be not much to expect that every decision rendered by the Tribunal discloses conscious application of mind to the facts and law in the case, supported by the cogent speaking reasons. Examined in the above context, we find that the decision rendered in the above case by Service Tribunal did not decide the question of limitation, which was a substantial point involved in the case. The impugned order of Tribunal also failed to disclose necessary reasons justifying conversion of removal of respondent from service into retirement. We, accordingly, allow the above appeal, set aside the order of Tribunal and remand the case to Service Tribunal for a fresh decision in accordance with law in the light of above observations. AA./C‑114/S Case remanded.