1971 PLP 97 (PLC)

(3) Is the petitioner entitled to the permission for dismissal sought for ? (4) What relief, if any, the , petitioner is entitled to. in the present application ? Points 1 to 4 -For convenience of discussion I propose' to deal with all the points together. As to the question of jurisdiction, it is said that the. Standing Orders Act, 1965 refers to a Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. Subsection (3) of section 44 of the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965 reads as follows: "Any reference to the Industrial -Disputes Ordinance shill be construed to have a reference to this Act " This means that section 2 (k) of the Standing Orders Act, 1965 will mean a Labour. Court constituted under the East Pakis tan Labour Disputes Act, 1965. Section 44 of the Labour Disputes Act has, of course, bean repealed by the East Pakistan Repealing and Amending, Ordinance, 1966. 'This Ordinance has. .got also a saving clause. What, has been incorporated by the saving section 44 bf. the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act has not been obliterated from the acts and enactments in .which they have been incorporated. That is one of the purpose of the saving clause in the Repealing and Amending Ordinance.' That, being so, the repeal of section 44 of the East Pakistan -Labour Disputes Act does not mean the annulling of the consequences of the saving clause in section 44 of the Act. Even in spite of the repeal of section 44 of the Labour Disputes Act, ^ Labour Court under the Standing Orders Act remained to be a Labour Court under the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act. Then again, it has been sought to be said that Labour disputes Act has been repealed by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Industrial Relations Ordinance has again a saving section. I mean, clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 67, which says, inter alia, that Court constituted under any law shall be deemed to have been constituted under the provisions of this Ordinance, to the extent of consistency therewith. This means that the Court constituted under the Labour Disputes Act shall be deemed to have been constituted under this Ordinance. In other words, the reference to Labour Court in the Standing Order Act means the Labour. Court under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. It would have been happy had there been corresponding section like section 44(3) of the East Pakistan Labour Disputes, Act, 1965 in the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969. Even then, on a consideration of provisions of law in the matter I have no doubt that Labour Court is there and the Chitta gong Labour Court has got every jurisdiction to try matters within its territorial limit under the provisions of the Standing Order Act, as admissible and, available from this Labour Court. Sub section (5), of section 35, of the Industrial Relations ordinance, 1969 details the functions of the Labour Court under the ordinance. This does not, however, mean that the Labour Court has got no function under the Standing. Orders Act, 1965. Function Lions of the Labour Court under the Standing Orders Act remain as they are. This disposes of the question of jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present application. In my considered judgment, the Chittagong Labour Court is competent, to entertain the present application. As to the question-whether the tactics of stoppage of work in one loom amounts to go slow, admittedly the respondents are double loom weavers and they are working in double looms for long. "Go slow means an organised, deliberate and purposeful slowing down of normal output of work by a body of workers in a concerted manner". A fine distinction has been sought to be made out that stoppage of work in one of the looms does not mean slowing down of output. The normal duty of double loom weavers is to work on both the looms. There is no denying the fact that the respondents are double loom weavers and their duty is to attend in both the looms. When they refrain from attending one of them they refrain from their normal duty and consequently they slow down their normal output. From the written objections it is clear that as a counterblast to their claim for, what they say, their equitable wages in working both the looms they have resorted to tactics of stopping work in one of the looms. This stoppage of work is, 'therefore, purposeful deliberate and it has been resorted to in an organised manner. The respondents' action in working in one loom and avoiding work in another loom while they are double loom weavers definitely comes under the definition of "Go-slow". Section 18(7) provides that in case of go slow, the employer may discharge, or dismiss. or inflict such other punishment on the workers after obtaining permission from the Labour Court. In this case the petitioner is entitled to permission as may be considered suitable. A question has been raised as to whether the petitioner has been properly described. Let me say that it is too technical for engaging out attention. For all intends and purposes Amin Jute Mills Limited is the petitioner before us and the Project Manager has signed the application for Amin Jute Mills Limited. The introductory expressions in the description of the petitioner reading, in the matter of `Project Manager' is simply a redundant expression. I think there is no material defect in the description of the petitioner. There is no doubt that there is decrease in output as a result of the go slow, tactics adopted by the respondents. A chart showing the decrease has been submitted by the petitioner, It shows that the decrease is by about half the production But there is no corresponding decrease in wages. By working on two looms what a worker is to get is not double the amount, which he gets by working in one loom, although, tile production is double. Let us take one instance, the chart shows that Md. Ismail produced 13 cuts when he worked in two looms and got Rs. 30.00 per week, but when he worked iii one loom he produced 5 cuts and he got Rs. 23.00: This shows that wages for working in two looms is not proportionately equitable to the wages when one works in one loom. This may be a grievance of the workers and. they term this grievance as an equitable demand and want increase in wages for working in double looms. They could very well raise an industrial dispute, on their demand in the increase of wages in working in two looms and refer the matter for adjudication of the Court. But instead of doing that they are bent upon putting pressure upon the administration by resorting to go slow tactics. The case creates an extenuating circumstance and in my view, I should not accord the permission outright for the dismissal of the respondents. I propose, therefore, to make a conditional order in the exigencies of the situation to meet the ends of justice and the order I propose to pass will set out the reliefs available to the petitioner. The respondents are directed to resume their works in double looms within 5 (five) days. They may, if advised, raise an industrial dispute as provided by law for their demand, which they claim to be equitable for working in two looms and refer the matter to this Court for adjudication within one month from today. In the event of their disobedience to the direction resume works in double looms and their failure to come before C this Court for adjudication as referred to above, necessary permission for their dismissal, or discharge, or any other suitable action will be accorded to the petitioner. In passing, further order, if necessary, in this case I shall however, consider the case of the workers who alleged to have stopped work in one loom under duress. In, passing the above judgment and order I have seriously considered the opinion of the learned Members and have accepted or refused to accept the same as are consistent, or inconsistent with my views expressed hereinbefore.