SCMR 1990

1990 PLP 768 (SCMR)

ISLAM DIN‑‑Petitioner Versus ALLAH NAWAZ and others‑‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.630 of 1986, decided on 29th July, 1987,
Honorable Judges
Shafiur Rahman, Javid Iqbal and Saad Saood Jail, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1990 PLP 768 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Shafiur Rahman, Javid Iqbal and Saad Saood Jail, JJ
Parties ISLAM DIN‑‑Petitioner Versus ALLAH NAWAZ and others‑‑Respondents
Primary Law Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 768 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 768 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Shafiur Rahman, Javid Iqbal and Saad Saood Jail, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 768 (SCMR) (ISLAM DIN‑‑Petitioner Versus ALLAH NAWAZ and others‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑

Representation

  • Hafiz Muhammad Yousaf, Advocate Supreme Court and S. Inayat Hussain Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
  • Saeed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Abul Aasim Jafri, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 29th July, 1987.
  • .Section 14 permits the exclusion of time only for proceedings `prosecuted in good faith', therefore, in order to make out sufficient cause under section 5 an appellant must prove that he had acted in good faith in presenting his appeal in the wrong Court. Good faith has been defined in clause (7) of section 2 of the Limitation Act as: `good faith nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention.' Now if an appellant proves that he filed his appeal in the wrong Court despite due care and attention it means that the presentation of the appeal in the wrong Court was on account of circumstances beyond his control. No doubt, what such circumstances are, must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and in Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur Singh's case, Sir George Rankin set aside the finding of the Chief Court that the appellant's Advocate had been very negligent in filing the appeal in the wrong Court because the facts relevant to the question of the Court in which the appeal was to be filed were very complicated. Similarly, an appellant can bring his case under section 5, if he can show that there is some ambiguity in the law governing the forum in which the appeal is to be filed. Or, to take another example, an appellant can rely on section 5, if he can show that he was misguided by the practice of the Court or by an erroneous judgment of the Court. But, in the instant case, the provisions of section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance are plain beyond any doubt and as there is also no complication whatsoever about the facts relevant to the question of the proper forum for filing the appeal, it is clear that the presentation of the appeal in the District Court was an act of gross negligence."

Headnotes / Summary

(From the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 26‑5‑1986 passed in Civil Revision No.2351‑D of 1986). ‑‑‑Ss. 5, 14 & Art.152‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)‑‑‑Leave to appeal‑‑‑Appeal filed before High Court against order of Trial Court was returned as incompetent after more than two years of its filing‑‑‑Appeal so returned was re‑filed before proper Appellate Court which was admitted by Court after condoning delay of more than two years‑‑‑High Court, however, reversed order of Appellate Court condoning delay, holding, that time taken beyond thirty days of passing of decree subject, of course, to the exclusion of time taken in obtaining copies of judgment and decree, was wrongly condoned‑‑‑Reasoning of High Court in reversing order of Appellate Court being neither illegal nor perverse interference declined by Supreme Court. Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar P L D 1977 S C 102 ref.

Judgment & Decree

Saeed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Abul Aasim Jafri, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents. Date of hearing: 29th July, 1987. SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.‑‑‑The petitioner, a defendant vendee in a pre emption suit, seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 26‑5‑1986 whereby his civil revision was dismissed on the ground that the appeal from which it had arisen merited dismissal on the ground of being time‑barred.

2. The pre‑emption suit was filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 on 16‑11‑1980. The suit was decreed on 20‑12‑1982. Rs.70,000 was held to be the sale consideration of the price and Rs.42,000 the cost of improvement. First appeal was filed in the High Court on 5‑2‑1983 which was returned as incompetent on 11‑5‑1985 and was re‑filed before the District Judge on 1‑6‑1985. This delay in presenting appeal in the proper forum was condoned by the District Judge, but the High Court took the view that "time taken beyond thirty days of the passing of decree subject, of course, to the exclusion of time taken in obtaining copies etc. was wrongly condoned by the learned lower appellate Court. Although it cited those authorities in its judgment yet missed to note the rule laid down therein. It regarded that choosing of wrong forum was by reason of a genuine mistake. The dictum of the Supreme Court negates any such hypothesis and outright lays down that the remedy, if at all, is to sue the lawyer but in no case the delay could be condoned."

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it was a case of bona fide mistake on the part of the counsel for which the party should not have been penalised. In any case the District Judge before whom the appeal was competent, had condoned the delay and the High Court was not justified in reversing that finding.

4. Keeping in view the decisions of this Court it cannot be said that the reasoning of the High Court in reversing the condonation of delay by the District Judge is against law or perverse. In the case of Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar P L D 1977 S C 102, this Court held as follows:‑ .Section 14 permits the exclusion of time only for proceedings `prosecuted in good faith', therefore, in order to make out sufficient cause under section 5 an appellant must prove that he had acted in good faith in presenting his appeal in the wrong Court. Good faith has been defined in clause (7) of section 2 of the Limitation Act as: `good faith nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention.' Now if an appellant proves that he filed his appeal in the wrong Court despite due care and attention it means that the presentation of the appeal in the wrong Court was on account of circumstances beyond his control. No doubt, what such circumstances are, must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and in Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur Singh's case, Sir George Rankin set aside the finding of the Chief Court that the appellant's Advocate had been very negligent in filing the appeal in the wrong Court because the facts relevant to the question of the Court in which the appeal was to be filed were very complicated. Similarly, an appellant can bring his case under section 5, if he can show that there is some ambiguity in the law governing the forum in which the appeal is to be filed. Or, to take another example, an appellant can rely on section 5, if he can show that he was misguided by the practice of the Court or by an erroneous judgment of the Court. But, in the instant case, the provisions of section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance are plain beyond any doubt and as there is also no complication whatsoever about the facts relevant to the question of the proper forum for filing the appeal, it is clear that the presentation of the appeal in the District Court was an act of gross negligence."

5. We find that the view taken by the High Court is not liable to C interference and leave to appeal is refused. H.B.T./1‑111/S Leave refused