1987 PLP 1174 (SCMR)

A.R. Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and M. Aslam Ch. Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners. Sh. Abdul Aziz, Advocate Supreme Court and Tanvir Ahmad, Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 18th April, 1987. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.‑‑ The facts, which form the background of this case, are that Muhammad Shafi respondent filed an ejectment application in the Court of the Rent Controller against the petitioners on the ground that he required the property in dispute in good faith for his sons' use. The respondent has five sons and his case was that neither he nor his sons were occupying any property suitable to their needs. The petitioners challenged these assertions and on the pleading of the parties the following issue was framed by the Rent Controller:‑

(1) Whether the petitioner (respondent No.3 herein) requires the disputed property in good faith for the use of his sons? The Rent Controller, by his order dated 12‑6‑1984, allowed the application filed by respondent No.3 and ordered the ejectment of the petitioners. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority which was heard by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore. The learned Additional District Judge was of the opinion that the Rent Controller had overlooked that three of the sons of respondent No.3 were already doing their own business in some other shops and that the Rent Controller had not discussed the need of all the sons of the landlord but based his decision only on the need of the remaining two sons. Hence, his order required interference. These submissions were accepted and the order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller was reversed and the Additional District Judge vide order dated 20‑12‑1984, who allowed the appeal. Feeling aggrieved, the landlord‑respondent invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court. His writ petition was heard by a learned Single Judge of the said Court and before him the respondent challenged the findings of the learned Additional District Judge but the stand of the petitioner was that the findings of fact arrived at by the Additional District Judge were not liable to interference in writ jurisdiction. In his order (now impugned before us) the learned Judge observed that "I am fully alive and conscious of the scope for interference available to this Court in constitutional jurisdiction" but went on to add that if the lower Court fails to follow the enunciation of law made by the superior Courts its decision is rendered without lawful authority After analysing the findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge he came to the conclusion that the evidence had been misread by him and the law also was not correctly applied to the facts of the case. He, therefore, allowed the respondent's writ petition by his order, dated 21‑10‑1986. However, four months' time was granted to the tenant to vacate and hand over the possession of the premises in view of the scarcity and lack of commercial accommodation available in Lahore. The tenant feeling dissatisfied has moved this petition for leave to appeal. This petition earlier came up for hearing on 10‑3‑1987 and notice was issued to respondent‑landlord. The counsel for respondent No.3 is, therefore, present before us today and was also heard. A.R. Sheikh, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the findings of fact recorded by the learned Additional District Judge should not have been upset in writ jurisdiction. And in doing so the learned High Court travelled beyond its jurisdiction. But after hearing him at some length and giving our attention to his criticism of the judgment of the High Court we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge in the High Court that where the Rent Control Authorities fail to act in accordance with the enunciation of law made by the superior Courts such an error can be corrected in exercise of the writ jurisdiction (See also Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc. P L D 1981 S C 246). We are further inclined to agree with the learned Judge in the High Court that this dictum was indeed applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. This petition must, therefore, fail. However, we feel that the petitioners deserve some more time for handing over vacant possession of the shop to the landlord and for making alternative arrangements for his business. It is true that six months have already elapsed since the orders of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller were revived by the High Court but in view of the difficulty in arranging for suitable alternative accommodation some more, time is needed. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 is prepared to give four months more time for this purpose if the tenant gives an undertaking that he will surrender the possession of the shop voluntarily on the expiry of the period of four months from today and that he will continue to pay monthly rent during this period. Learned counsel for the petitioners, after consulting his client (who is present in Court) has given an undertaking before us that the petitioners will voluntarily hand over the possession of the premises to respondent No.3 on the expiry of four months' period from today and that they will continue to pay monthly rent for the said period. The upshot is that this petition is dismissed but the petitioners are allowed four months' time to vacate the premises. M.L/A‑41/S Order accordingly.