SCMR 1992

1992 PLP 1109 (SCMR)

ASHFAQ ZAI and others ‑‑‑Appellants Versus M. ABDUL QUDDUS BIHARI and others‑‑‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Supreme Court of Pakistan
Decided Date
Civil Appeal No.19/K of 1985, decided on 16th June, 1991.
Honorable Judges
Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, Ajmal Mian
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1992 PLP 1109 (SCMR)
Forum / Court Supreme Court of Pakistan
Bench Members Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, Ajmal Mian
Parties ASHFAQ ZAI and others ‑‑‑Appellants Versus M. ABDUL QUDDUS BIHARI and others‑‑‑Respondents
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1992 PLP 1109 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1992 PLP 1109 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, Ajmal Mian.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1992 PLP 1109 (SCMR) (ASHFAQ ZAI and others ‑‑‑Appellants Versus M. ABDUL QUDDUS BIHARI and others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Khurshid Anwar Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court, M. Shabbir Ghaury, Advocate‑on‑Record for Appellants.
  • Muzaffar Hassan, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents Nos.3 and 4.
  • Moinuddin Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court, Faizanul Haq, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent No. 1
  • Date of hearing: 11th June, 1991.

Headnotes / Summary

(Against the judgment and order of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, dated 9‑5‑1984 in Appeal No.9 of 1984). (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑O. XXII1, R. 3‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)‑‑‑Leave to appeal was granted to consider, whether the decree passed on compromise between the plaintiffs and one of the defendants, in respect of portion of plot in such defendant's possession, could be set aside by the High Court on the ground that no notice was given to specified defendant. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑O. XXIII, R. 3‑‑‑Consent decree on basis of compromise between plaintiffs and one of the defendants was granted by Trial Court‑‑‑Defendant not a party to such compromise was in occupation of property in question as per admission of parties to compromise, and he had in his written statement, denied title of plaintiffs‑‑‑Notice was, therefore, required to be served on the defendant being in occupation of the property‑‑Possession of entire property in question, was claimed through compromise application‑‑‑Plaintiffs, in compromise application, were declared to be absolute owners of property which had been disputed by the defendant who was not a party to compromise‑‑‑Order of High Court setting aside compromise decree and directing service of notice on the defendant who was not a party to such compromise, was just and proper, not calling for interference.

Judgment & Decree

Muzaffar Hassan, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents Nos.3 and

4. Moinuddin Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court, Faizanul Haq, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent No. 1 Date of hearing: 11th June, 1991. ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J.‑‑‑This appeal by leave of ‑the Court is directed against the order of the Division Bench of the High Court, dated 9‑5‑1984.

2. The facts, in brief, are that Messrs Noor Sons, plaintiffs, filed a suit on 25‑10‑1970 against respondent No.1 seeking possession of plot measuring 352 sq. yds. and mesne profits on the averments that the plot in question was transferred to them and respondent No.1 Abdul Quddus Bihari trespassed the said plot of the plaintiffs. The suit was contested by respondent No.l. It was stated that the transfer in favour of Messrs Noor Sons was illegal. 1t was further stated that the claim of possession was not maintainable because the plaintiffs had no right or title. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs Noor Sons sold the property to the present appellants and their names were substituted in place of the original plaintiffs on 20‑12‑1976. Issues were framed and the evidence of the parties was recorded partly when in 1982 an application under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. was filed by the plaintiffs for impleading respondents 2 to 5 as defendants. This application was allowed by the Court and the plaint was amended and respondents 2 to 5 were joined. On 3‑12‑1983 the appellants and Muhammad Hussain, respondent No.2 filed an application under Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. requesting for a consent decree against defendant No.2 in terms of a compromise. This application was allowed by the learned Single Judge and the suit was decreed against the defendant No.2 on the aforesaid compromise. It was done without any notice to respondent No.l. According to him, he came to know about this order when execution proceedings were in progress. The respondent No.l, therefore, submitted an application in the High Court that the order of compromise may be recalled and he should be heard. A learned Single Judge accepted‑this application and directed that the compromise application filed by the plaintiffs and respondent No.2 may be fixed for consideration after notice to defendant No.1 and to any other party affected thereby. This order was challenged in appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court by the appellants but their appeal was dismissed. The reasons which weighed with the High Court in dismissing the appeal of the appellants are as hereunder:‑‑‑ "On the other hand, we are of the view that the manner in which respondents 2 to 5 were joined after thirteen years of the filing of the original suit, and the ex parte nature of compromise application, by itself, is sufficient to uphold the order of the learned Single Judge, because these are circumstances, which have to be examined a little deeper in order to infuse confidence in the minds of all the litigating parties. In these circumstances, we take the view that the order of the learned Single Judge is eminently justified and calls for no interference. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine." Leave was granted to the appellants to consider `whether the decree passed on compromise between the plaintiffs and one of the defendants, in respect of portion of the plot in such defendant's possession, could be set aside by the learned Single Judge on the ground that no notice was given to the respondent No. l'.

4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that a compromise had been arrived at between the plaintiffs and defendant No.2 and a partial decree was passed in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of a part of the property, therefore, it was not necessary to issue notice to the respondent No.l. The facts of the case would show that the plaintiffs in paras. 12 and 13 of the amended plaint have stated as follows:‑ "

12. The defendant No.1 had been from time to time, letting out the parts of the land of the aforesaid sub‑plot of the plaintiffs to various persons for storing goods and for parking motor rikshaws and had been receiving handsome amounts from them as compensation/charges. The persons to whom the Defendant No.l used to let out the parts of the said land were changing from time to time.

13. Since about 1979 the defendants Nos.2 to 4 are in continuous occupation of the said land of the plaintiffs, apparently through' Defendant No.l or with his connivance, and/or, in any case, illegally and wrongfully."

5. Thus, according to the plaintiffs themselves, the defendants 2 to 4 are in occupation of the plot through defendant No.l. The possession of the entire plot was claimed as a relief in the suit. The defendant No.l has denied the title of the plaintiffs to the plot in' question. It, therefore, cannot be said that no notice was required to be issued to defendant No.l before disposal of the compromise application. In the compromise application, it has been stated that defendant No.2 admits that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the plot of land and the defendant No.2 shall deliver the vacant and physical possession of the entire aforesaid portion of the suit land to the plaintiffs. In view of above facts, the contention of the learned counsel that a decree about a piece of plot of land was passed is contrary to what has been stated in the compromise application. The possession of the entire plot was claimed through compromise application. In this compromise application, the plaintiffs were declared to be the absolute owners of the plot which has been disputed by the defendant No.l. On account of the above stated facts, the impugned order is just, fair and legal.

6. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal has no force. The same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. AA./A‑919/S Appeal dismissed