P L D 1964 (W (PLP)

Dates of hearing : 26th February and 2nd April 1964. Mst. Gulab Khatoon appellant filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Chakwal, for a declaration that the orders of the Collector, Jhelum, dated the 16th of September 1958 and the Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, dated 7th of January 1959, passed as Revenue Officers, about the possession of Agricultural Land mentioned in the plaint were without jurisdiction, and against law and procedure and against facts in relations to the plaintiff's possession and that they were void and ineffective as against the plaintiff. It was further prayed that as a consequential relief the entries made in the revenue papers in accordance with their orders be declared as void and in effective, and that the plaintiff was not bound by those entries. In the plaint it was claimed that she was in possession of the whole of the land as a co‑sharer but that entry in the Khasra Girdawari was changed under the above‑mentioned orders of the Collector and the Commissioner showing the two defendants different in joint possession of the Land in dispute. That the plaintiff had asked the defendants to admit her posses sion over the whole of the land and treat the entries in the Khasra Girdawari made in pursuance of those two orders as void but they had refused to agree to that. The suit was contested and the trial Court framed seven issued. The trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. On an appeal by the defendant‑respondents, the suit has been dismissed on the basis of an adverse finding against the plaintiff on issue No.

4. The rest of the issues had not been dealt with by the learned District Judge. Issue No. 4 is as follows :‑ Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit? The learned District Judge relied on Dasondhi v. Badar Bakhsh and others (A I R 1923 Lah. 405) and also on section 158 (2) (vi) of the Land Revenue Act in deciding issue No. 4 against the plaintiff. At the time of arguments the learned counsel for the defendant respondents frankly conceded that A I R 1923 Lah. 405 was not applicable in the present case. The learned counsel also con ceded that the suit was not barred under section 158 (2) (vi) of the Land Revenue Act, section 158 (2) (vi) bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as regards the correction of any entry in a record of‑rights, annual record or register of mutations. The learned counsel urged on the last date of hearing that Khasra Girdawari formed part of the annual record. The case was adjourned but on 2nd of April 1964 when the arguments were resumed the learned counsel conceded that Khasra Girdawari did not form part of the annual record or the record‑of‑rights. Consequently the suit was not barred under section 158(2) (vi). However, the learned counsel supported the dismissal of the suit on the ground that it was barred under section 158 (1) which provides: "A civil Court shall not have jurisdiction is any matter which the Government or a Revenue Officer is empowered by this Act to dispose of, or take cognizance of the matter in which the Government or any Revenue Officer exercises any powers vested in it or him by or under this Act." It is contended by the learned counsel that under section 33 (3) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, Khasra Girdawari is a register prescribed by the Financial Commissioner and is to be maintained under the supervision of the Collector. Section 33 (3) is as follows:‑ "For the purposes of the preparation of the annual record the Collector shall cause to be kept up by the Patwari of each Estate a register of‑mutations and such other registers as the Financial Commissioner may prescribe." It is argued that Khasra Girdawari is one of the registers main tained under the supervision of the Collector. That the mode in which Khasra Girdawari register is to be maintained is con tained in Chapter IX of the Land Record Manual and that if there is any written entry in Khasra Girdawari the Collector would be the proper person to dispose of this matter and his order would be liable to appeal and revision as provided under the Land Revenue Act. Thus, the Revenue Officers, have juris diction to dispose of such matters if there is any dispute between the parties and also that under the Land Revenue Act, the Collector exercises the powers of maintaining the Khasra Girdawari; and consequently under section 158 (1) the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to interfere in the orders passed by the Collector and the Commissioner. In reply, the learned counsel for the plaintiff‑appellant urged that the mere fact that the entry made by the Patwari was challenged before the Collector and the Commis sioner who had passed orders in relation to those entries would not make the entries in the Khasra Girdawari immune from interference by a Civil Court. In the present case undoubtedly the entries in the Khasra Girdawari were challenged before the Collector and the Commissioner and it is not denied that they had jurisdiction to deal with that matter, and after their orders, the entries in the Khasra Girdawari are not liable to be interfered with by a Civil Court. The argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff‑appellant that if the Collector and the Commissioner were not approached and the plaintiff appellant had filed a civil suit against the entries made the Patwari this suit could not be barred on the argument of the learned counsel for the defendant‑respondents, has also no force. Firstly this is not the case in the matter before me. Secondly, the Khasra Girdawari being kept under the control of the Collector. He is empowered under the Land Revenue Act to deal with that matter, therefore, a civil suit will not lie for any corrections in the Khasra Girdawari. The only course open would be to challenge those entries before the Revenue Officer. In any case so far as the entries in the Revenue Record including the Khasra Girdawari are concerned, they do not confer any title and the aggrieved person can always move the Civil Court for establishment of his title and in case he is in exclusive possession of the property he can ignore the entries in the Revenue Record even if they exist for any length of time.

2. In view of what has been stated above, although I am not maintaining the order of the learned District Judge on the grounds on which it was passed but I maintain the final order of the dismissal of this suit on the ground that the suit was not maintainable in a Civil Court. Thus deciding issue No. 4 against the plaintiff‑appellant I dismiss this appeal, but there will be no order as to costs. K.B.A. Appeal dismissed.