1982 PLP 795 (PLC(CS))

Akram Zu6airy for Respondent. Date of hearing: 7th October, 1981. Those are ten appeals against separate but subsequently similar decisions given by the learned Second Labour Court on 30th May, 1981 dismissing the grievance petitions of the appellants on the ground that the said grievance petitions were not signed by the appellants themselves. In corning to this decision, the learned L4bour Court compared the signatures of the appellants taken in Court with the corresponding signatures on the grievance petitions allegedly 'filed by the appellants and came to the conclusion that they differ to such an extent as to convince him that the signatures on the grievance petitions were not of the appellants. The learned Labour Court was competent to take such action and come up to such finding under the provisions of section 73 of the‑Evidence Act.

2. I have heard Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Akram Zubairy, who appeared for the respondent company.

3. It may be mentioned that section 25‑A, I. R. O., does not provide that the grievance petition must be signed by the worker concerned. The language used in subsection (4) of the aforesaid section is that the worker or shop steward may take the matter to the Labour Court, The language .a employed in subsection (4) is in sharp contrast with that used in sub section (I) which provides that the worker himself shall bring the grievance to the notice of the employer. A similar issue as the one that has been arisen in the instant case came up for decision before this Tribunal in the case of Muhammad Humayoon and another v. Messrs M. F. Corporation Limited, decided on 15th December, 1980. In that case also objection was raised against the maintainability of the appeals on the ground that the Memos. of appeals had not been signed by the appellants. Repelling the contention, this Tribunal held as follows:‑‑ "Malik Sher Muhammad, the learned representative of the respondents, submitted as a preliminary, objection that the two appeals are not maintainable as the Memos. of appeal had not been signed by the appellants. The appellants, to their affida vits, have admitted this position but explained that the Memos. of appeals were drafted by their counsel under their instructions but on the date that the Memos. of appeals were typed out by the clerk of their counsel they were not available and accordingly the Memos. of appeals were signed with their names, on their behalf, by Sher Jan, whom they had authorised to do so. Mirza Muhammad Kazim the learned counsel for the appellants, also has filed his personal affidavit to the effect that the two Memos. of appeals were drafted by him under instructions of the two appellants themselves. In the case of Mst. Karam Nishan v. Mehrban .91i Shah (P L D 1959 (W. P.) Lah. 946), Kaikaus, J. observed:‑ "A plaint has to be signed and verified. Yet it has never been held that the failure to sign or verify a plaint is fatal as long as the suit was in fact instituted according to the instructions of the plaintiff." ' In the recent case of Muhammad Sarwar v. Abdul Ghani (1980 C L C 946), it was held that a careful examination of the language used in O. 111, rr. I and 4, and O. XII, r. 1, would show that the aim is to provide that an appeal or suit should be presented by a person who is duly authorised in that behalf and that an appeal or suit which has been filed has been actually filed on behalf of the party concerned and not otherwise. It was further held that the filing of an appeal without the appellant's signature on the Memo. of appeal and on the vakalatnama' of his counsel amounts to an irregularity which can be cured by law. Since it has been established on the basis of the affidavits of the two appellants and their learned counsel, Mirza Muhammad Kazim, that not only the appeals had been drafted upon the instructions of the two appellants but further they were mistakenly signed on their behalf by a person whoa; they had duly authorised, there would merely appear to be an irregularity in the proceedings, which has been allowed to be cured by permitting the appellants to sign the Memos. of appeal. I would, accordingly, dismiss Mr. Malik Sher Muhammad's objec tion to the Memos. of appeals"

4. Although the above decision is in respect of appeals under sec tion 37,

1. R. O., it will also apply with equal force to grievance petitions filed before the Labour Courts. I am fortified in my view by a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ismail and another v. Razia Begum and 3 others (1981 S C M R 687), which has been cited by Mr. Ali Amjad. In that case, one of the objections raised as to the maintainability of the plaints and the suit was that the signature of the respondents had been obtained on the plaints after the expiry of one year and hence the suits were evidently barred by time. Repelling this contention, the Supreme Court held as follows:‑‑ "In so far as the first contention is concerned it has no force in it. The learned counsel conceded before us that the respondent had all along prosecuted their suits with diligence and had appeared as their own witnesses. In these circumstances, the non‑signing of the plaints by them at the proper stage was a mere irregularity and consequently the learned District Judge was entirely justified to direct that the said irregularity may be rectified. Furthermore, the learned counsel has not been able to show as to how he has been prejudiced, therefore the objection raised by him is only technical ‑ the more so when substantial justice has been done between the parties."

5. The real point, thus, which should have engaged the attention of the learned Labour Court was not whether the signatures on the grievance petitions were of the appellants but whether the grievance petitions has been filed by person authorised in this behalf by the appellants. Unfortunately on this issue there is no evidence on record. It, thus, cannot be said whether the persons who have signed the grievance petitions were or were not duly authorised by the appellants. If they were duly authorised then on the basis of the above decisions the grievance petitions would clearly be maintainable. On the other hand if the appellants fail to adduce tangible evidence to this effect the grievance petitions would be liable to dismiss. It was contended by Mr. Akram Zubairy that the person who had allegedly signed the grievance petitions had admitted in other proceedings that he had not been authorised by the worker to file a ‑ grievance petitions on his behalf. However that admission would be of no value in the present proceedings because it was made in other proceedings. At best, if the person who made that admission is summoned as a witness and if he denies the statement, which he had earlier made in different proceedings he can be confronted with the same to show his conduct. Of course even in that case it will be for the trial Court to decide what value should be attached to such evidence.

6. For the reasons discussed by me above I would set `aside the impugned decision of the Labour Court and would remand all ten cases/ matters back to him for giving a fresh decision after affording a reasonable opportunity to both the parties of leading evidence or rebutting the same on the point whether the grievance petitions were made by the appellants through persons authorised by them in this behalf. Of course if the learned Labour Court does come to the conclusion that the grievance petitions have been filed by the appellants he would also be required to decide the grievance petitions on merits.