P L D 1964 Dacca 572 (PLP)

The decree‑holder‑appellant obtained a rent decree against the tenants‑respondents for a certain sum of money on 26th July 1954. On 14th April 1956, all rent receiving interests of the rent receivers were acquired by the Government and as such the right of the rent receiver to realise the decretal dues by execution of the rent‑decree obtained by him vested in the Government in view of the provisions of section 3, subsection (4), clause (c) of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. It further appears that neither the decree‑holder before the general acquisition nor the Government after the general acquisition put the decree into execution. The Government by Ordinance No. XIV of 1957 published on 15th August 1957, released their right in favour of the landlords to realise the arrears of rent either by execution of decree or amicably. Section 68‑B of that Ordinance was an indication in that respect and section 68‑B provided how the period of limitation shall have to be excluded for computation of the period of limitation. Then again another Ordinance No. LII of 1959 was published in July 1959. Section 68‑B of the Ordinance No. XIV was re‑numbered as section 68‑C and section 68‑D was re‑numbered as section 68‑E without any alterations in those two sections. By section 68‑E instead of 24 months, 48 months have been provided. There after on 4th July 1959, the landlord‑decree holder put the decree into execution. The judgment‑debtors filed an application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure contending inter alia that the execution petition was barred by limitation having been filed beyond three years. This objection of the judgment‑debtors was accepted by the Courts below. Hence the present appeal by the decree‑holder.

2. The only question that has been argued at length before me is whether the execution petition filed on 4th July 1959, is barred by limitation. The two Courts below were of the opinion that as the execution case was barred before 15th August 1957, when the Ordinance was promulgated and as the Ordinance No. XIV of 1957 did not make that provision retrospective, the execution could not be proceeded with.

3. Mr. Ruhul Islam, the learned Advocate for the appellant, has contended that if sections 68‑C and 68‑E of the Ordinance No. LII of 1959 or section 68‑B and section 68‑D of Ordinance No. XIV of 1957 be read together, it will go to show that the application for execution filed on 4th July 1959, was not barred by limitation; while on the other hand, reliance was placed by the learned Advocate for the respondent on the following observa tions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagina Silk Mill, Lyallpur v. The Income‑tax Ofcer, A‑ Ward, Lyallpur (PLD1963SC322). "It is a well‑recognised principle of the law of limitation that once time begins to run from a specified date it cannot be interrupted or extended unless the Legislature intervenes and makes express provision to the contrary . . . . . . The Courts must lean against giving a statute retrospective operation of the presumption that the Legislature does not intend what is unjust. It is chiefly where the enactment would prejudicially affect vested rights, or the legality of past tran sactions or impair existing contracts, that the rule in question prevails. Reference may be made in this connection to page 206 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition. Even if two interpretations are equally possible, the one that saves vested rights would be adopted in the interest of justice, specially when we are dealing with a taxing statute." The respondent's lawyer has argued that as the Ordinance No. XIV of 1957 was introduced beyond the period of limitation, a, right vested in the judgment‑debtors enabling them to avoid the payment of the decretal dues and as such right cannot be affected by the Ordinance as the same has not been made specifically retrospective in operation.

4. Having in view the principle enunciated by their Lordships of our Supreme Court, I am to see whether the intention of the Legislature was to make the provision of section 68 and 68‑E retrospective or not. It appears from the provision of section 68‑C that in order to enable the rent receiver‑decree- holder to receive arrears of rent, two conditions must be fulfilled, first, that arrears of rent and cesses etc. might remain due to the rent receiver on the date of acquisition of the rent receiving interest which, in my opinion, is in consonance with the provisions of section 3, subsection (4) of clause (c) which provides that all arrears of rent etc. which were not barred by limitation on the date of acquisition, namely, 14th April 1956, which vest in the Government and the second, that the same had not been barred by limitation.

5. There is no dispute in this case that the first condition has been fulfilled as the decretal dues were due and not barred on the date of acquisition by the Government one 14th April 1956, its the decree was obtained on 26th July 1954, but the controversy arises about the second condition. It is contended by the learned Advocate for the respondent that the clause "which have not been barred by limitation" necessarily means that it was not barred on 15th August 1957, whereas it has been contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant that in order to see whether it is barred by limitation, the provisions of section 68‑E shall have also to be looked into. According to him these two sections go to show that by applying the principle of computation as provided in section 68‑E, it cannot be said that the execution petition was filed beyond time inasmuch as under Ordinance No. XIV of 1957 and Ordinance No. LII of 1959, the decree -holder is entitled to exclude 24 months and 48 months respectively calculated on this basis, the application cannot be held to be barred by limitation.

6. These two arguments call for an investigation of the provisions of the aforesaid sections and I am to investigate what was the intention of the Legislature either express or implied as to the determination of the period of limitation. It may be pointed out that before 15th August 1957, the decree‑holder has no right to file an execution proceeding in view of the provisions of section 3, subsection (4), clause (c) of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act. So necessarily, the period from 14th April 1956 to 15th August 1957, must be excluded in computing the period of limitation. From the provision of sections 68‑C and 68‑E it appears to me that in order to determine whether the application is barred by limitation, the provision of section 68‑E must be taken into consideration and that in comp uting the period of 24 months or 48 months must be excluded from 14th July 1956. Hence I am of the opinion that the application for execution is not barred by limitation. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgments and orders of the Courts below are set aside and the execution case is restored to file. Let the execution proceed in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. S. Q. Appeal allowed.