1988 PLP 877 (PLC)

Khalif Shah, the petitioner herein, was in the service of the Pakistan Engineering Company, Kot Lakhpat, Lahore, as Security Guard. On 9‑4‑1980. Muhammad Ashraf, a Jamadar of the Company asked the petitioner to appear in the office of the Manager Administration at 9.00 a.m. The petitioner, however, refused to obey the order on the ground that in the absence of written order duly signed by the competent person he could not leave his place of duty. The petitioner thus failed to appear in the office of the Manager Administration. This omission on his part was considered as misconduct. He was accordingly charge sheeted and an enquiry was conducted in this behalf. The Inquiry Officer found him guilty and recommended his dismissal from service. After the service of show‑cause notice, the petitioner was dismissed on 29‑5‑1980. Thereafter, he served grievance notice on the employer and ultimately in June, 1980, he filed an application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance before the Punjab Labour Court No. 2 Lahore, seeking his reinstatement. The grievance petition was, of course, resisted by the employer. After hearing the parties, the learned Labour Court dismissed the petition on 23‑5‑1981. 2 Feeling aggrieved the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal. His appeal was accepted by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal on 20‑10‑1982, but he was not allowed the payment of back benefits.

3. Through the present constitutional petition, the petitioner has assailed the aforementioned order dated 20‑10‑1982, passed by the learned' Labour Appellate Tribunal to the extent, it refused the payment of back benefits to the petitioner.

4. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner .that the impugned order whereby back benefits have been withheld is not well reasoned and is conjectural and whimsical. It has further been maintained that after his removal from service having been found to be illegal and wrongful, the petitioner was entitled to the payment of back benefits, but through the impugned order he has been deprived of this entitlement which was virtually his substantive right.

5. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner have been fully considered and thoroughly analysed. While refusing back benefits to the petitioner it has been observed by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order: "Since the appellant was not courteous enough to get himself medically examined by appearing before the Manager. Administration in spite of the fact hat he had received information to that effect even thou the order conveyed to him was not bearing the signatures of his officer." here is no guaranteed right of a workman employed in an industry like that of respondent to disre and the verbal orders of his superior. Every order is not necessarily to be communicated in writing if the Manager Administration wanted the petitioner to come to his office to get him medically examined, he could send for the petitioner a verbal message. In the present case, such verbal message was conveyed through the person who was superior to tile petitioner. The petitioner in the circumstances was not fully justified to disregard the order which he received through his immediate superior. The learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has,; therefore, justifiably observed that disregard of the order of the Manager' Administration on the part of the petitioner was not justified. In such an' eventuality the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal in exercise of his judicial discretion could lawfully refuse back benefits to the petitioner. Needless to add that the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal was possessed of the jurisdiction to award or to refuse the back benefits to the petitioner after ordering his jurisdiction exercised by the learned Labour reinstatement in service. The, Appellate Tribunal in this behalf' does not warrant an interference by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the order passed by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal refusing back benefits to the petitioner is whimsical or conjectural. In fact, it is a well‑reasoned order. Actually no substantive right vests in the workman regarding back benefits. In the eventuality of his reinstatement by the Labour Court or the Labour Appellate Tribunal, it is discretionary with such Court or the Tribunal to award or to refuse back benefits keeping in view the circumstances of each case. In Habib‑ur‑Rehman v. Malik Cotton Factory (1983 P L C 1279), it was held by this Court that back benefits could not be claimed by a workman as a matter of right on his reinstatement and that it was within the discretion of the Court/Tribunal to allow or to refuse back benefits. It was further ruled that since it was in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal to allow or to refuse back benefits and he has roused the same with reasons, the High Court did not consider it expedient to interfere in the matter while sitting in writ jurisdiction. In Din Muhammad Jaffary v. Managing Director (1986 P L C 1166) also it was held that where finding of tribunal was based on appreciation of evidence and the Labour Appellate Tribunal Tribunal did not commit any illegality in disallowing back benefits to the workman, interference by the High Court through Constitutional jurisdiction would be uncalled for.

6. In the under consideration case, it has already been concluded that no illegality has been committed by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal while disallowing back benefits to the petitioner. No interference with the impugned order is, therefore, warranted. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. S.Q./K. 93/L Petition dismissed.