1979 PLP 212 (PLC)

5 (3) In pursuance of direction under subsection (1), the Board may recommend minimum rates of wages for all classes of workers in any grade and, in such recommendation, may specify :‑

(a) The minimum rates of wages for‑ (i) Time work ; (ii) Piece work ; (iii) Overtime work ; (iv) Work on the weekly day of rest and for paid holidays; and (b) The minimum time rates for workers employed on piece work so as to guarantee minimum wages on a time basis for such workers.

3. The time rates recommended by the Board may be on hourly, daily, weekly or monthly basis. (4) The rates recommended under this section for overtime work and work on paid holidays shall not be less than the minimum rates fixed for such work under any other law for the time being in force." These recommendations when accepted by the Government under section 6 (a) became final as laid down in section 6 (7). The minimum wages as accepted by the Government in respect of the cycle industry are contained in the notification referred to in para. 1 above. The relevant portion is as follows :

‑ Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Semi‑skilled including 5-19 135-00 4-94 128-50 Ministerial State. Unskilled and Mis‑ 4‑50 117-00 4-25 110-50 cellaneous.

6. A perusal of these would show that the daily wage is not 1/30 but 1/26 of the monthly wage. Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Minimum Wages Rules, 1961 as reproduced above clearly explains the position about work on holidays. I have, therefore, no doubt that the daily wage fixed in this case include payment for weekly holidays and the method devised appears to be to ensure regular payment without any dispute, controversy, botheration or worry to the workers.

7. The second point raised by the learned counsel was that in any case respondent No. 1 had no locus standi to approach the Labour Court as it was neither a certified 'Collective Bargaining Agent' nor was there any secured right available to be enforced. He submitted that what the respondent wanted was to get an adjudication on the various pro visions of law but not the enforcement of a secured right. It was argued by the learned counsel that section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance which originally contained a deeming clause enabling an only registered Trade Union of a concern to become its 'Collective Bargaining Agent' was subsequently amended with effect from 30th October, 1974 (Ordinance XI of 1974), so as to take away that deeming provision. The law was further amended to provide that a registered Trade Union had to be certified by the Registrar before it could become a 'Collective Bargaining Agent. It was contended that as the respondent had never secured that status, prior to the filing of an application under section 34 before the Labour Court, it had no locus standi to have started these proceedings.

8. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on section 22 (1), as amended, read with section, 52 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, to say that a registered Trade Union was empowered even before it was certified to invoke section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. He relied on National Bank of Pakistan Employees' Front v. National Bank of Pakistan etc. (1975 P L C 188) and Zarina Bibi v. Mehboob etc. (P L D 1979 Lah. 36) in that regard. The learned counsel for the respondent further argued that as respondent No. 1 was the 'Collective Bargaining Agent' at the time of the settlement referred to above, it had the right to see that the settlement was enforced, He relied on National Mill Labour Union (Regd.) Managing Director, National Silk and Rayon Mills Ltd. Lyallpur (1972 P L C 420) In reply the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Awalin Silk Mills Workers' Union, Karachi v. their Management (1977 P L C 427) to controvert the plea taken by respon dent No. 1 that section 52 could be called in assistance by an uncertified registered Trade Union. The contention of the learned counsel was that section 52 comes into play only if there are more than one Unions and secret ballot to determine a 'Collective Bargaining Agent' had not been taken.

9. There is however, nothing in the Industrial Relations Ordinance to support the position taken by the petitioner. Section 52 reads as under :‑

'

52. Any act or function which is by this Ordinance required to be performed by or has been conferred upon a Collective Bargain ing Agent may, until a Collective Bargaining Agent has been certified under the provisions of this Ordinance be performed by a registered Trade Union which has been recognised by the employer or employers." The above provision thus makes it quite clear that the respondent No. 1 could perform the functions of a 'Collective Bargaining Agent' till one was duly certified by the Registrar. It is an admitted fact that the respondent No. 1 had been recognized by the employers before, as the present litigation arose out of a settlement, arrived at the instance of respondent No. 1.

10. The objection that the respondent could not invoke the remedy under section 34 is also not valid. Firstly, the petitioner cannot appro bate and reprobate. He agreed in conciliation to get this matter decided by the Court, and while in Court he could not be permitted to say that the Court has no jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, it was a right secured in a settlement and could be enforced under section 34.

11. However, in view of my finding that the respondent No. 1 had already been allowed the payment of weekly holidays in the daily wages fixed under the Minimum Wages Rules, they could not claim the same all over again. The impugned order is therefore, declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.