P L D 1983 Lahore 161 (PLP)

This order will dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 5799/S-78, 548/S-79, 549/S-79, 7547/S-79, 8018/S-79, 4864/79, 6785/S-79 and 285/S-80 as well as Writ Petitions Nos. 4393]79, 6949/79, 1543/S-79 and 6947/79.

2. Relevant facts for the disposal of these cases are that Pakistan Television Centres were taken over allegedly by the petitioners, employees of the Pakistan Television. Petitioners in the first eight cases were convicted by a Summary Military Court. Their services as well as of the petitioners in the last four petitions have been terminated by the management. This action is challenged through the above-titled Constitutional petitions.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners in the first eight cases contended that on account of the conviction of the petitioners by the Summary Militar Court their services have been terminated. This could not be done without) further proper proceedings. Reliance is placed on Pakistan Cycle Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Muhammad Javed aril another (1) and Pakistan Cycle Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Muhammad Sarwar Butt etc. (2).

4. Next the learned counsel for all the petitioners contended that the termination of the petitioners' services which amounts to dismissal is illegal for the reason that under section 15(4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 they were required to be informed in writing of the alleged misconduct within 30 days which according to the respondents had happened on 16-2-1978 but the petitioners were not informed until 16-4-1978. Reliance was placed on Ghulam Mustafa v. Ulfat Hussain Qureshi (3). Secondly, neither enquiry report nor second show-cause notice was given to the petitioners, therefore, the orders of termination are illegal. Reliance is placed on Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. v. M. Babar Zaman (4). 1) 1982 P L C 275 (2) 1982 P L C 758 (3) 1979 P L C 446 (4) 1981 P L C 219 Learned counsel appearing for the Pakistan Television Corporation etc., the respondents, has submitted that the petitioners' services have been terminated after giving them one month's pay in lieu of notice. Section 15(4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable. He has secondly submitted that no enquiry report nor show-cause notice was required to be given. He has placed reliance on Dawood Cotton Mills v. Guftar Shah and another (P L D 1981 S C 225).

6. Lastly and more emphatically the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioners are employees of the Pakistan Television Corporation which has been declared as essential service under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act of 1952 and according to the judgment of the learned Supreme Court reported in Karachi Electric 174pply Corporation Ltd. v. National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) and another (P L D 1982 S C 113) the only remedy available to the petitioners against termination or cessation of their services is a recourse to section 7 of the aforesaid Act and, therefore, the petitioners have no right to maintain these Constitutional petitions.

7. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that section 7 of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 gives no right to the petitioners but to the Central Government and thereunder at best the guilty employer can be convicted but that is no solace to the petitioners because they want their jobs for their livelibood and as they cannot have this relief elsewhere, they have a right to maintain these Constitutional petitions and this remedy is unaffected by the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act of 1952. They also submitted that the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents was in a different context. They addressed lengthy arguments.

8. It is undisputed that the service of the Pakistan Television Corporation has been declared as essential under the Pakistan Essential Service (Maintenance) Act, 1952. According to the judgment of the learned Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. referred to above by the learned counsel for the respondents wherein it, has been observed that "Where a Statute provides a forum for dealing with the violation no other authority can be a substitute for it, the moreso when the Act is an emergency legislation and has taken care to exclude the application of other laws which provides a forum for resolving the dispute between the employer and the employee, arising from the violation of the terms and conditions of service",' and further that "section 5 deals with the cessation of employment either at the behest of the employers or the employee. I would thus include termination of service according to the terms and conditions, discharge, dismissal, absence or abandonment and retrenchment. Therefore; if the respondents felt aggrieved either by their termination of service or dismissal, they should have taken steps to institute the proceeding as provided by section 7 and in that event it would have been open to the Court to determine as to whether the termination, according to the terms and conditions of service, or by way of dismissal or discharge, was without lawful excuse or not as the expression "without reasonable excuse" signifies an excuse which is not lawful, the only right. of an employee against wrongful termination of service recognized by law is a recourse to proceedings under section 7 of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952. In the case of Khuda Bux v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation and 2 others (1983 P L C 16) a learned . Division Bench of the Sind High Court held that "in view of the express observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the above KESC's case, particularly with reference to the aforesaid. Lahore case of 1977 and Peshawar case of 1980 to the effect that no other forum can resolve the dispute between the employer and the employee than the forum provided by the Act, it is not open to the Court to hold otherwise." So is the position of this Court. Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind presided over by retired Mr. Justice Z. A. Channa in the case of Maula Bakhsh v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. and 2 others (1982 P L C 491) after quoting the above observations of the learned Supreme Court held that "It would thus, appear, that the view taken by the Supreme Court is that a person whose employment is regulated by the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 if he is aggrieved by the termination of his services for whatever cause and in whatever manner, can have resort only to the forum and according to the procedure provided in the said Act and to. no other remedy and in no other manner." Since the petitioners challenged the termination of their services, they can only have recourse to section 7 of the Essential Services (Maintenance) Act of 1952 as held by the learned Supreme Court of Pakistan and will, therefore, have no right to question C the dismissal or termination of their services in any other manner.

9. In view of the above, the aforetitled petitions would appear to be unmaintainable. Consequently, these are dismissed. In the circumstances the parties shall, however, bear their own costs. M. Y. M. Petition dismissed.