2026 PLP 1012 (YLR)

Khadim Hussain Soomro, J.

Through this bail application, the petitioner has prayed for his post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 1025, dated 29.09.2025, under sections 302, 148, 149, 34, P.P.C, PS Shahzad Town, Islamabad.

2. Concisely, the facts referred to in the instant FIR are that he, along with the co-accused, attacked the complainant party while armed with a deadly weapon, two people succumbed to firearm injuries. Hence, this FIR.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is an unexplained delay of about one hour in the registration of the FIR, which casts doubt on the prosecution's version. It is further contended that the prosecution itself has attributed an active and principal role to co-accused Shani Gujjar and Farhan, whereas the allegation of ineffective firing was assigned to co-accused Abdur Rehman and Ahsan, both of whom have already been granted the concession of bail. As regards the present petitioner, it is alleged that he threw a brick which struck the deceased on the forehead. It is further argued that, according to the statement of a co-accused, the act of throwing the brick has been attributed to Kamran and not to the present petitioner, thereby creating a serious inconsistency in the prosecution's case. In these circumstances, learned counsel submits that the principle of consistency squarely applies, and the petitioner is entitled to the same treatment as extended to similarly placed co-accused. On these grounds, it is prayed that the petitioner be granted the concession of bail.

4. Learned State Counsel, assisted by learned counsel for the complainant, opposes the bail application and submits that the FIR was promptly lodged and the petitioner has been specifically nominated therein with a distinct and assignable role. It is contended that the participation of the petitioner at the place of occurrence has not been denied at any stage, and the allegations against him are supported by the material collected during the investigation. Learned counsel further submits that the case involves a heinous offence attracting capital punishment, in which two persons have lost their lives, thereby rendering the matter of grave seriousness. It is argued that, in view of the nature of the offence, the role attributed to the ktitioner, and the severity of punishment prescribed by law, the petitioner does not qualify for the concession of bail.

5. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record with their able assistance.

6. The FIR has been promptly lodged, and the alleged delay of about one hour stands sufficiently explained. The place of occurrence is situated at a distance of approximately two kilometers from the concerned police station. Moreover, in the said incident, two persons lost their lives, and the complainant was naturally occupied with shifting the injured/deceased to the hospital and attending to the immediate aftermath of the occurrence. In these circumstances, the lapse of one hour in lodging the FIR is neither inordinate nor unexplained and does not, by itself, cast any doubt on the prosecution's version.

7. The petitioner has been specifically nominated in the FIR with an active role of throwing a brick upon the deceased. Nazar Muhammad, which struck him on the head. The complainant, as well as the eye-witnesses of the occurrence, namely Kamal Din and Muneed, have recorded their statements under Section 161, Cr.P.C., wherein they have categorically stated that it was the petitioner who threw the brick at the deceased, resulting in a head injury. The medical evidence also corroborates the ocular account, as the post-mortem report reflects that the deceased sustained an injury on his forehead. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the role of throwing the brick was assigned to one Kamran Ali is not supported by any independent or admissible material. The reliance placed on the statement of a co-accused, recorded in his defence, is of no legal consequence, as such a statement not admissible in evidence under the law. Consequently, the plea raised by the petitioner lacks substance and does not create any ground for further inquiry at this stage.

8. The presence of the petitioner at the place of occurrence, along with the co-accused who were duly armed with deadly weapons, has not been denied. It is also pertinent to note that the co-accused, namely Shani Gujjar and Farhan, who have been attributed the principal role of firing, are the real sons of the petitioner. The petitioner's presence at the scene of the incident and his association with the co-accused during the occurrence, therefore, stand admitted, lending further support to the prosecution version at this tentative stage. Reliance is placed in the case of "Muhammad Baqir v. The State" [2022 SCMR 363]. "Allah Dad v. The State" [2023 SCMR 1724], "Ghazi Khan v. Mst. Mir Shumah and others" [2021 SCMR 1157].

9. Reverting to another ground agitated by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the grant of bail to co-accused Abdur Rehman, a perusal of the record reveals that the roles assigned to the said co-accused and the present petitioner are materially different and distinguishable. Co-accused Abdur Rehman and Ahsan have been attributed the role of aerial firing, whereas the present petitioner has been assigned a specific and active role of raising lalkara and throwing a brick at the deceased, Nazar Muhammad, which struck him on the head and resulted in fatal injury. Thus, the nature and degree of participation attributed to the present petitioner is distinct from that of the co-accused who have been granted bail. It is a settled principle of law that the rule of consistency is not to be applied mechanically, but is to be determined on the basis of the role, participation, and culpability of each accused in the commission of the offence. Reliance in this regard is placed on Bukhati Rahman v. The State (2023 SCMR 1068) and Mir Afsar v. The State and others (1998 SCMR 49), wherein the august Supreme Court has held that parity in bail matters depends upon similarity of role and not merely on the grant of bail to a co-accused.

10. Another important aspect of the matter is that the present petitioner, being the father of co-accused Shani and Farhan, was in a position of dominance and authority over them and, therefore, capable of influencing their conduct. The raising of lalkara by the petitioner, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be treated as a mere verbal utterance. Rather, given his position of authority and dominance over the co-accused, the lalkara carried a commanding and overwhelming effect, which constituted an active overt act facilitating the commission of the offence. The Petitioner's conduct. viewed in this context. prima facie reflects instigation and encouragement, thereby attracting vicarious liability. Accordingly, the lalkara raised by the petitioner cannot be brushed aside as insignificant or proverbial in nature, but is to be construed as a deliberate and commanding act contributing to the occurrence. In a case reported as Chiragh Din and others v. The State (PLD 1967 Supreme Court 340), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan declined post-arrest bail to an accused attributed role of lalkara with the following observation:- "That question must be decided by the trial Court on an appreciation of all the facts, including the degree of interest in the crime possessed by the person who shouted the lalkara and the part he played in the background of the affair. There are circumstances in which mere presence at the scene of the crime is a sufficient overt act to support a conviction, by the application of section 114, P.P.C. Shouting of a lalkara may, in such circumstances, have effect as a further overt act of abetment".

11. In another case reported as Muhammad Ashraf v. The State [1996 MLD 884 (Lahore)], the post-arrest bail was refused to an accused who was assigned the accusation of shouting lalkara in a murder occurrence with the observation mentioned hereinbelow:- "During the investigation, it has been established on the record that the petitioner is son-in-law of Rehmat co-accused and also the maternal-first cousin of Muhammad Asghar etc. It was held in the case of Noor v. State 1994 PCr.LJ 311 that Lalkara was always to be adjudged in its true perspective taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. It was also held that the degree of interest in the crime possessed by the person who shouted the Lalkara and the part he played in the background of the affairs is also to be seen. In the instant case, the petitioner is closely related to the other co-accused, as such, the role attributed to him is not that of simple proverbial Lalkara but amounts to instigation." Likewise, in the case reported as Akhtar Ijaz Khan Yazdani v. The State (1998 SD 130), the plea of grant of post-arrest bail was rejected with the following observation:- "Petitioner is named in the FIR. He came to the spot along with his two sons who were armed and on his lalkara his sons launched attack which resulted in the death of first informant's son. In such circumstances, even if the petitioner was not armed it would not have any bearing on the merits of his case because his sons were acting under his command." Reliance is also placed in the case of "Muhammad Asif v. The State" [2017 PCr.LJ 161] and "Anayatullah v. The State" [2003 YLR 1856]. 11.(sic) In view of the foregoing discussion, the specific and active role attributed to the petitioner, the corroborative ocular and medical evidence, the commanding nature of the lalkara raised by the petitioner in the backdrop of his position of dominance over the co-accused, and the settled principles governing the grant of bail in cases involving heinous offences, this Court is of the considered view that the case does not call for the concession of bail at this stage. The petitioner has failed to bring his case within the ambit of further inquiry or to demonstrate any ground warranting exceptional relief. Accordingly, the bail application is dismissed. The observations made herein are tentative in nature and shall not prejudice the case of either party before the learned Trial Court, which shall decide the matter strictly in accordance with law. MH/13/Isl. Application dismissed.