P L D 1960 Dacca 660 (PLP)

(2) that as it involved transfer of immovable property it should have been properly stamped and registered under the Registration Act ; and (3) that the said transfer of immovable properties was contrary to the provisions of the law relating to evacuee property.

6. It was further contended that renewal of licence for the Cinema was refused on receipt of a report from the Sub‑divisional Officer that the owner, Hanuman Prasad Shroff, an Indian national, was permanently residing in India and that the Cinema House was not functioning properly. Further, there was a report from the Anti‑Corruption Department. about the use of forged Amusement stamps and also about smuggling of Pakistan money to the owner in India by the Manager of the Cinema. The Govern ment, therefore, decided to requisition the Cinema House.

7. In Writ Petition No. 103, the case of the petitioner‑firm is that towards the end of February 1958, the owner Shroff had to stop the running of the Mills and the Factory due to some differences with his constituted Attorney and also due to scarcity of raw materials. It was further contended that on receipt of a letter on 4‑11‑58 from the District Magistrate directing Shroff to bring the Mills and the Factory into operation within a month, all arrangements were made for running the Mills and the Factory and the undertakings actually came into operation with effect from 5‑2‑

59. The Government, however, at the instigation of respondent No. 4 Atiqullah, who coveted the Mills, illegally issued orders for requisition. In short, this requisition was made mala fide and that it was not for a public purpose.

8. Mr. Alauddin Sikdar, the Assistant Secretary, has chal lenged the locus standi of the Firm to make this application. He has further stated that the Mills were lying idle to the detriment of public interest, and Government revenue and hence the District Magistrate was justified in requisitioning the Mills and the Factory.

9. The learned Advocate for the State has taken a preli minary objection as to the entertainment of these applications. He has contended: (1) that there was no real partnership at all between the owner Hanumaa Prasad Shroff, an Indian national, and the other two, namely, Laduram Maheswari and Satish Chandra Rai, Pakistani nationals, and that these Pakistani nationals merely lent their names to help the owner; (2) that this partnership related to immovable property and required registration under section 49 of the Registration Act and, as it was admittedly not so registered, the partnership could not be proved and the application must fail ; and (3) that the question of title cannot be adjudicated upon in the absence of the owner Shroff.

10. Mr. Sayem, the learned Advocate for the Firm, has con tended that, though the Partnership Deed affected immovable property, it can be used for collateral purposes, namely, for establishing that there was a partnership agreement. He has further pointed out that as this partnership was duly registered with the Registrar, Joint Stock Companies, the Firm was entitled to make these applications.

11. Now, before entering into the merits of the case, we have to consider: (1) Whether on the basis of the Deed of Partnership the plaintiff‑firm is entitled to any relief ; (2) Whether the Partnership Deed has the effect of a transfer of the right in the immovable properties to the partnership and requires registration under section 49 of the Registration Act ; (3) Whether the requisitioned properties belong solely to Hanuman Prasad Shroff or to the partnership firm ; (4) Whether this question of ownership can be decided in the absence of Shoff ;and (5) Whether this partnership is a bona fide transaction.

12. In our opinion, these serious disputed mixed questions of fact and law cannot be satisfactorily determined in this summary proceeding where the only evidence relied upon consists of affidavits of the parties and certain documents produced by them. It is well‑settled that in a writ petition the Court will not generally enter into such disputed questions of fact. Some Courts have gone so far as to say that where facts are disputed the Court should not exercise this extraordinary jurisdiction. It is incumbent upon a party applying for a writ to show that he has a clear legal right and that the right is so clear as not to admit of a reasonable doubt or controversy. On the facts of this case, we are of opinion that the question of title cannot be properly adjudicated upon in these petitions. Here we may quote the following observation from the decision in Kesho Prasad Singh v. The Board of Revenue (I L R 38 Cal. 553): "It is an elementary principle that the title to property will not be tried in mandamus proceedings, and the writ will not issue when it is necessary to try or decide complicated or extended questions of fact."

13. We may further point out that according to the petitioner this partnership firm came into existence on 9‑4‑

59. On 9‑4‑59, Shroff took Laduram Maheswari and Satish Chandra Rai as his partners and he executed the Deed of Partnership on 30‑4‑

59. The fact however remains that on the 18th April 1959, Hanuman Prasad Shroff in the petition presented through his constituted Attorney Ishaque Ali mentioned himself as sole proprietor of the Mills, the Factory and the Cinema House. On receipt of notice, dated 8‑5‑59, Hanuman Prasad Shroff's lawyer wrote to the Government demanding justice and therein he again claimed the Cinema the Mills, and the Factory for Hanuman Prasad Shroff alone. On 11‑5‑59, a Writ Petition, being Writ Petition No. 46 of 1949, was moved on behalf of Hanuman Prasad Shroff against the order of requisition of the Oil Mill. He however withdrew the said petition with liberty to file a fresh petition. The above shows that even after the execution of the alleged Deed of Partner ship Hanuman Prasad Shroff claimed to be the sole owner of these properties. In these circumstances it will not be proper to decide the question of title of the requisitioned properties in his absence.

14. On a careful consideration of whatever materials that have been produced, we are inclined to think that there is a genuine dispute as regards title of the petitioner to the properties which are the subject‑matter of requisition and the said dispute cannot be decided in these proceedings. In this view of the matter, we have not entered into the merits of the case.

15. We accordingly dismiss these applications and discharge the Rules but without any order as to costs. ASIR, J.‑I agree. K. B. A. Applications dismissed: Rules discharged.