P L D 1976 Quetta 94 (PLP)

Basharatullah for Appellant. Muhammad Moqeem Ansari for Respondent. Date of hearing : 8th June 1976. This first appeal is directed against an order dated 13-5-1971, made by the learned Additional District Judge, Quetta, in Civil Suit No.-6 of 1970 whereby the plaint has been directed to be returned to the plaintiff/appellant for presentation to the proper Court.

2. The facts are that on 24-9-1966, the plaintiff, through the Additional Commissioner, Quetta, forwarded an offer for purchase of majority shares in Harnai Woollen Mills belonging to the respondent, west Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, which offer was accompanied by a Call Deposit Receipt of Rs. 1,00,000 in favour of W. P.I. D.C., Karachi. Both the offer as well as the call Deposit Receipt were forwarded from Quetta to the Head Office of W.P.I.D.C. at Karachi by post. It is the plaintiff's case that this offer was not accepted. There were as many as six further offers made by the plaintiff. Ultimately, their offer dated 6-2-1966, made at Lahore, was accepted by the W.P.I.D.C. and they received a communication from W.P.I.D.C. Karachi addressed to them at Quetta on 5-8-1968 which contained the acceptance of their revised offer which they had made at Lahore on 6-2-1968. Following this letter differences arose between the plaintiff and the W.P.I.D.C. in as much as the former sought extension of time to make certain payments which the W.P.I.D.C. was not prepared to accede to unless at least 10 % of the agreed price was paid to them by a specified date. According to W.P.I.D.C. since this amount was not paid, they, by their letter dated 2I-9-1968 written from Karachi to the plaintiff at Quetta informed the latter that they have forfeited the sum of Rs. 100,000 paid as aforesaid vide their offer dated 24-9-66. The plaintiff's case in the plaint is that the payment of Rs. 1.00,000 by the plaintiff to the W.P.I.D.C. was an independent transaction and had nothing to do with the subsequent offers made by the plaintiff. It is further alleged that this payment was made initially only as a token of their earnestness and not subject to any conditions and. therefore, the W.P.I.D.C. was not entitled to forfeit the same by reason of an alleged breach of contract which was arrived at in the year 1968 by the W.P.I.D.C. acceptance dated 5-8-1968 of the plaintiff's revised offer made at Lahore on 6-2-1968.

3. In the written statement W.P.I.D.C. took a preliminary objection as to the Court's jurisdiction for according to it no part of cause of action bad arisen within the jurisdiction of the Quetta Court. A preliminary issue was framed which has been, as aforesaid, answered against the plaintiff and the order made is for the return of the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to a proper Court.

4. Mr. Mohammad Moqeem Ansari, the learned counsel for W.P.I.D.C. contended that the plaintiff could have filed the suit before the Senior Civil Judge, Quetta only if not only a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court but there was also a subordinate office of the W.P.I.D.C. within the jurisdiction of this Court contemplated in Explanation II of section 20, C. P. C. the learned counsel contended that it was not the plaintiff's case that the W.P.I.D.C. had a subordinate office within the jurisdic tion of the Court and accordingly the Senior Civil Court at Quetta had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The question that arises is whether it is the requirement of law that not only a part of the cause of action should have arisen at Quetta but that additionally, W.P.I.D.C. had a subordinate office at Quetta. If Explanation II is to be given effect to, it is obvious that it is not sufficient that part of the cause of action had arisen at Quetta.

5. Mr. Basharatullah, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that under clause (c) of section 20 of the Code of Civil of Procedure, the additional requirement of a subordinate office is unnecessary for it is enough if a part or whole of the cause of action had arisen within this Court's jurisdiction. Mr. Maqeem Ansary, the learned counsel for W.P.I.D.C. invited my attention to decision reported in Rehmania Trading -Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. (P L D 1960 S C 202) but in that case the question was confined to the effect of Explanation II on clause la) of section 20 of C. P. C. and the judg ment expressly mentions that the Court was not called upon and, therefore, did not decide the question whether the Corporation can be sued in a place where the whole or a part of the cause of action arises if it has neither its principal office nor a subordinate office there. If as was contended be Mr. Basharatullah, the learned counsel for the plaintiff the requirement of law, to give a Court jurisdiction was confined to cause of action wholly or in part arising within the jurisdiction of that Court, then it is obvious that Explanation 11 will become redundant. It is settled rule of interpretation that redundancy is not to be attributed to Legislatures. In construing a statute A we should also avoid, if possible, creating any repugnancies between its provisions and give meaning and effect to every portion thereof. To my mind, therefore, clause (c) and Explanation II have to be read together and .given a consistent meaning. So read the law appears to be that if the defendant is a Corporation then it can be sued at the place where its sole or B principal office is situate and it can be sued elsewhere only if a part of the cause of action bad arisen at that place and the Corporation has also subordinate office at such place. Since it was not the plaintiff's case that W.P.I.D.C. had a subordinate office within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit was filed, the Court at Quetta did not have the jurisdiction to enterain the suit.

6. Independently of the above the Court at Quetta did not possess the jurisdiction as no part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction. Mr. Basharatullah, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that part of the cause of action had arisen at Quetta, inasmuch as payment was made at Quetta. the offer was made at Quetta and the acceptance was also made at Quetta. As regards the payment the fact is that the plaintiff had obtained from their bankers at Quetta a call Deposit Receipt of Rs. 1,00,000 which they forwarded to W.P.I.D.C. at their Head Office at Karachi together with their offer and that receipt was encashed by W.P.I.D.C. at Karachi. Merely, because the plaintiff deposited the amount represented by the Call Deposit Receipt at Quetta or obtained through their bankers Call Deposit Receipt in the name of W.P.1.D.C. would not result in payment of the sum represented by the Call Deposit Receipt to W.P.I.D.C. at Quetta. Furthermore, no part of contract can be said to have been made at Quetta merely because it was the place from where the offer was despatched by the plaintiff or because that was the place where the letter of acceptance was received as distinct from the place where the acceptance was despatched. The forfeiture, which gave rise to the suit also took place at Karachi. Therefore, no part of the cause of action arose in the present case within the jurisdiction of the Quetta Court.

7. The result is that appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. S. Q. Appeal dismissed.