CLC 2025

2025 PLP 797 (CLC)

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY through General Manager and another — Appellants Versus ABDUL HAMEED and another — Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2025 PLP 797 (CLC)
Forum / Court Lahore
Bench Members N/A
Parties CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY through General Manager and another — Appellants Versus ABDUL HAMEED and another — Respondents
Primary Law Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2025 PLP 797 (CLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2025 PLP 797 (CLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2025 PLP 797 (CLC) (CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY through General Manager and another — Appellants Versus ABDUL HAMEED and another — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)

Representation

  • Azmat Hayat Khan Lodhi and Hafiz Sohaib Raza Advocates with Muhammad Ali, D.D. Legal NHA for Appellants.
  • Hafiz Shaukat Ali Wains for Respondents.

Headnotes / Summary

O. V, Rr.19 & 20

Mode of service to summon defendant(s)

Substituted service, resorting to

Scope

Examination of service officer

Scope

Appellant/defendant assailed ex-parte proceeding/decree as the Trial Court rejected application to set-aside the same

Validity

Record divulged that the Trial Court ordered to issue notices to the appellants (National Highway Authority) subject to deposit of process fee and Talbana by the plaintiff (land-owner/respondent) but the same was not deposited despite grant of different dates and the Trial Court without considering the same resorted to substituted service through publication of court notice in the newspaper

Even if it is presumed that the process purportedly issued for the service upon the appellants was served or refused to be accepted, the Trial Court, before resorting to substituted service under R. 20 of O. V, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.), could satisfy itself by recording statement of the process server as required under R. 19 of the O. V of the C.P.C.

When the position remained as such, the act of the Court in resorting to substituted service could not be said to be more than an illegality and nullity in the eye of law

It is a settled principle of law that unless all efforts to effect service in the ordinary manner are verified to have failed, substitute service cannot be resorted to

Thus, the orders for substitute service were passed in a mechanical fashion and without proper application of mind

Such orders were passed without ascertaining the reasons for non-service and without verifying the factum as to whether all other modes of service were exhausted and were rendered futile

In such circumstances the substituted service being in violation of the law/Rule could not be deemed to be valid service

Therefore, when the basic order for initiating ex-parte proceedings against the appellants had no backing of law and had been passed without adopting due process of law, the superstructure and edifice built thereon i.e. subsequent ex-parte decree could not stand because if the same was allowed to hold field, it would definitely infringe the appellants' inalienable right of defending the case and would amount to condemning the appellants without affording an opportunity of hearing

Said fact was sufficient to condone the delay in filing the application under O. IX, R. 13, C.P.C.

High Court set-aside impugned judgment and decree and ex-parte proceeding order; consequently, the application under O. IX, R. 13, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, moved by the appellants stood allowed, and Trial Court was directed to proceed with the reference after obtaining reply from the appellant and conclude the same

Appeal , filed by Acquiring Agency, was allowed, in circumstances.

Judgment & Decree

SHAHID BILAL HASSAN, J.

Tersely, the facts of the case relevant for the disposal of this appeal are that a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 26.05.2007 was issued for the construction of Habibabad Flyover Bridge, Tehsil Pattoki, District Kasur. Later on, Notification under Sections 17(4) and 6 of the Act dated 03.10.2014 was also issued. After following all the procedural and codal formalities, the Award for the acquisition of the land measuring 285-Kanals was announced on 17.03.2015 whereby the acquired land of the respondents was evaluated at Rs.75,000/- per marla along with 15% requisition costs and 8% compound interest. Additionally, Rs.1,458,000/- was adjudicated as compensation for the building. Being dissatisfied with the quantum of the evaluation in the Award dated 17.03.2015, the Respondent No.1 filed a reference under Section 18 of the Act, challenging the Award, on 23.04.2015. Along with the reference, the Respondent No.1 also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for the condonation of delay. The reference was entrusted to the learned trial Court on 20.06.2015, wherein notices were issued to all the appellants initially vide order dated 20.06.2015. The Respondent No. 1 did not deposit the process fee and Talbana and the similar position remained till 16.06.2016. However, on 27.06.2016, ignoring the fact that the Respondent No. 1 did not deposit the process fee and Talbana, the learned trial Court resorted to issuance of notice through publication in newspaper and adjourned the case for 29.07.2016 and on the said date the present appellants were proceeded against ex parte. Eventually, the reference was decreed ex parte after recording evidence vide ex parte judgment and decree dated 09.11.2021. The appellants on gaining knowledge on 20.11.2021 filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for setting aside ex parte proceedings dated 29.07.2016 and decree dated 09.11.2021. The Respondent No. 1 contested the said application by filing its written reply. The learned trial Court vide impugned order dated 24.10.2022 dismissed the said application. The appellants earlier filed a writ petition against the said order but the office raised objection which was sustained vide order dated 20.01.2023; hence, the instant appeal.

2. Heard.

3. Considering the arguments and going through the record, it is observed that the matter requires consideration with regard to the applicability of the provisions contained under Order V, Rule 20, C.P.C. Record divulges that the learned trial Court ordered to issue notices to the appellants subject to deposit of process fee and Talbana by the Respondent No. 1 but the same was not deposited despite grant of different dates and the learned trial Court without considering the same resorted to substituted service through publication of court notice in the newspaper. Even if for the sake of arguments it is presumed that the process purportedly issued for the service upon the present appellants was served or refused to be accepted, the learned trial Court, before resorting to substituted service under Rule 20 of Order V, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, could not satisfy itself by recording statement of the process server as required under Rule 19 of the Order V of the Code, 190, which stipulates:- '

19. Examination of serving officer. Where a summons is returned under Rule 17, the Court shall, if the return under that rule had not been verified by the affidavit of the serving officer, and may, if it has been so verified, examine the serving officer on oath, or cause him to be examined by another Court, touching hi proceedings, and may make such further inquiry in the matter as it thinks fit; and shall either declare that the summons has been duly served or order such service as it thinks fit.' When the position remained as such, the act of the Court for resorting to substituted service cannot be said more than an illegality and nullity in the eye of law. It is a settled principle of law that unless all efforts to effect the service in the ordinary manner are verified to have been failed, substitute service cannot be resorted to. There is a series of authorities on this proposition of law. However, the reference can be made to Mrs. Nargis Latif v. Mrs. Feroz Afaq Ahmed Khan (2001 SCMR 99) and Haji Akbar and others v. Gul Baran and 7 others (1996 SCMR 1703). I have no, slightest doubt in holding that the orders for substitute service were passed in a mechanical fashion and without proper application of mind. Such orders were passed without ascertaining the reasons for non-service and without verifying the factum as to whether all other modes of service were exhausted and were rendered futile. In such circumstances the substituted service being in violation of the law and the rule laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court as referred above could not be deemed to be valid service. Therefore, when the basic order dated 29.07.2016 for initiating ex parte proceedings against the present appellants has no backing of law and has been passed without adopting due process of law, the superstructure and edifice built thereon i.e. subsequent ex parte decree dated 09.11.2021 cannot stand because if the same is allowed to hold field, it would definitely infringe the rights of the appellants' inalienable right of defending the case and would amount to condemn the appellants without affording an opportunity of hearing. The above fact is sufficient to condone the delay in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

4. In view of the above, the appeal in hand is accepted, impugned judgment and decree dated 09.11.2021 and order dated 29.07.2016 are set aside, consequent whereof the application under Order IX, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 moved by the appellants stands allowed. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the reference after obtaining reply from the present appellant and conclude the same preferably within a period of three months, even if it has to fix the case on day to day basis. MQ/C-25/L Appeal allowed.