1982 PLP 742 (PLC)

4. In Petition No. 130/81 the petitioners were the office‑bearers of Ghafoor Textile Mills Workers' Union. Their contention is that by unfair means respondents Afrin. Khan and others have proclaimed themselves as the new office‑bearers of the Union and that the respondent No. I registered the change illegally in connivance with the new office-bearers. They went in appeal before the Sind Labour Court under section (7) of the

1. R. O. with a prayer to adjudicate the dispute and direct the respondent No. 1 to hold fresh elections. The learned Labour Court without deciding the case on merits by the impugned order dated 16th July, 1981 dismissed the appeal finding it legally not main tainable.

5. I have heard the learned advocates for the parties at considerable length. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the appeal not only lies against the refusal of the change by the Registrar of the Trade Unions under section 8(5) of the I. R. O. 1969, but it would also lie against the registration of the change by the Registrar as provided by section 8(7) of the

1. R. O. and their application or appeal was legally competent. The contention raised on behalf of the respondents by their learned advocates is, that the dispute under section 8(7) ceases to exist as soon as the Registrar registers the change of the office‑bearers and that the appeal shall lie only against refusal of the change under clause (5) of section 8 of I. R. O.

6. The case‑law relied on behalf of the petitioners is Abdul Rauf v. Registrar, Trade Tnions N. I. R. C. etc. (1980 P L C 912), Syed Muzafar Hussain Shah v. Registrar, Trade Unions Rawalpindi and 11 others (1980 P L C 219) whereas on behalf of the respondents reliance has been placed on Asmat Javed President of PIAC Employees Union (registered), Karachi v. Rafique Ahmad and others (1979 P L C 96), Chaudhry Dost Muhammad & 9 others v: Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah, Gujrat (1980 P L C 908). The decision passed by the trial in the latter case has been overruled in writ petition by the Lahore High Court in 1980 P L C 219 relied on by the petitioners. The case involved the same facts and was between the same parties.

7. The short point arising in these petitions is the interpretation of section 8(7) of the I R O, 1969. It would be useful to reproduce clauses 4, 5 and 7 of that section which read as under:‑ "Sec. 8(4)‑Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Ordinance, every alteration made in the constitution of a registered Trade Union, and every change of its officers shall be notified by Registered post by the trade Union to the Registrar within fifteen days of such change." "Sec. 8(5)‑‑The registrar may refuse to register such change or alteration if it is in contravention of any of the provisions of this Ordi nance or if it is in violation of the constitution of the trade Union." "Sec. 8(7)‑In case there is a dispute in relation to the change of officers of a trade Union, or any trade Union is aggrieved by the refusal o1 the Registrar under subsection (5) any officer or member of the trade Union may apply or appeal to the Labour Court, who shall within seven days of receipt of the application or appeal, as the case may be, pass an order either directing the registrar to register the change or alteration in the constitution or in the officers of the trade Union or may, for reason to be recorded in writing, direct the Registrar to hold fresh elections of the Union under his supervision."

8. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (XII Edition) by B. St. J. Langan says at page 47 "every clause of a statute is to be cons trued with reference to the context and other clauses the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute". It further says on the same page "statutory langu age is not read in isolation, but in its context. If we consider the above provisions of the I. R. O. in the light of these rules of interpreta tion, subsection (4) of section 8 of I R O, 1969, says that the change is to be notified to the registrar of trade Unions for his approval, whereas sub section (5) of the same section says that the Registrar may refuse to register such change or alteration if it is found in contravention of any of the provisions of

1. R. O. and in violation of the constitution of the trade Union. Subsection (7) says that in the case there is a dispute in re lation to the change of the oflicer3 of the Trade Union, or any trade Union is aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar under subsection (5) any officer or member of the Trade Union may apply or appeal to the Labour Court. The language of subsection (7) shows that an aggrieved party can approach the Labour Court in application, firstly, when there is a dispute in relation to the change of office‑bearers of a trade Union and secondly, in appeal in case where the Registrar refuse to approve the change of the office‑bearers. The word "dispute" has a wider meaning than "refusal" and would cover even a case in which the change has been registered by the Registrar to give rise to a remedy in appeal to the office‑bearers of the Union who have been replaced by the newly‑elected office‑bearers. In case the relevant portion of the section is splitted as under, the intention of the Legislature and the meaning of the provision would become quite clear:‑‑ "Any officer or member of the trade Union may apply or appeal to the Labour Court‑ (i) in case there is a dispute in relation to the change of the officers of the trade Union, or (ii) any trade union is aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar under subsection (5) of section 8,

1. R. O. The rest of the subsection is about the obligation of the Court to give relief in one or the other form as is appropriate in the circumstances of the case.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the dispute does not cease to exist as soon as the change is registered by the Registrar and that the view taken by the learned Labour Court in that respect is not correct. The plain‑ reading of this subsection (7) would make it clear that the two situations arise, firstly, when there is a dispute in relation to the change of the office‑bearers of a trade union, and secondly, when there is a refusal by the Registrar under subsection (5) and that these two situations would be read independently with the latter portion of subsection (7) of section 8 of the

1. R. O. The language of the section would make it clear that the latter portion of the subsection would apply to both the situations individually. The conclusion, therefore, would Cot e the plain reading of this subsection that the dispute would not come to an end as soon as the change is registered. The dispute continues as, the replaced office‑bearers continue to be aggrieved by the registration of the change and continue to be in dispute in that respect. It has been contended that subsection (5) of section 8 does not give any power to the Registrar to decide the case with regard to the registering of change on its merits as be can refuse to register such change only in case it is in contra vention of the provisions of this Ordinance or if it is in violation of the constitution of the Trade Union. It appears he has no power beyond the scope of this subsection to go into the merits of the case with regard to the change. This subsection gives him only a mechanical power to examine as to whether the change would be in contravention of the provi sions of this Ordinance or it is in violation of the constitution of the trade union. Accordingly there seems to be no force in the contention that since the change is registered the dispute as contemplated in the opening words of subsection (7) of section 8 ceases to exist. What I further find that in view of this subsection (7) the remedy is available only to the aggrieved trade union by the refusal of the Registrar under subsection (5) of section 8 and not to the group of the newly‑elected office‑bearers and that the Trade Union alone is competent to file appeal against such refusal. It would, therefore, appear that reading of this sub‑section (5) in isolation is likely to result in misleading situation, which obviously is incorrect. One would hardly think that the legislature could have con templated such an absurdity by providing for relief to an aggrieved party only in case of refusal of approval by the Registrar under subsection (5) and failing to provide for appropriate relief in case of acceptance of the change by the Registrar. When such is the case, Maxwell on interpretation of statute at page 199 says "an intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available".

10. Plain reading of subsection (7) of section 8 shows that this provision is neither ambiguous nor mysterious. The observations of the Supreme Court in P L D 1965 S C 527 are relevant in that respect. They read at page 565 as under:‑ "I may here point out that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. When the words used are clear and unambiguous it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any hypothetical construction. The language of the section being clear it was not open to the learned Judges to read into the matter which was not there by reference to other extraneous con siderations." It would appear from the very words and construction of the pro vision of section 8(7) itself that an appeal is provided both ‑in case of, dispute in relation to change of officers of Trade Union or refusal on the E part of the Registrar to register the change under section 8(5) of the In dustrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. 1 am, therefore, in respectful agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at in the case Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shan v. Registrar, Trade Unions, Rawalpindi and 11 others reported in 1980 P L C 908, which authority has overruled the decision reported in 1980 P L C relied on by the learned Labour Court.

11. The result is that the three petitions .are allowed and the appeals shall be deemed to have been waiting for decision on merits before the learned Labour Court, who shall decided the same finally in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.