1989 PLP 632 (PLC)

‑‑‑S.25‑A‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199‑‑Grievance petition‑ Limitation‑‑Computation of‑‑Second grievance notice‑‑Effect on limitation‑‑Once the limitation period starts running it does not stop‑‑Where petitioners issued grievance notices on 18‑8‑1977 and 20‑8‑1977, the period of limitation started running against them‑‑Employer was to make a reply to the notices within fifteen days and petitions were to be instituted within two months on the receipt of reply or after the expiry of fifteen days‑‑If limitation was computed from dates of grievance notices, grievance petitions filed beyond statutory period were time- barred‑‑Second grievance notice would have no effect for computing the limitation period from the same‑‑Concurrent findings of fact recorded by Court below based on pleadings of petitioners themselves as contained in their grievance petitions were legally correct on admitted facts‑‑Constitutional petition against concurrent findings of fact was thus misconceived and dismissed in circumstances. S.W.I‑LJaffery v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh and 2 others 1979 P L C 431; M/s. National Motors Ltd. Karachi v. M.Bashir Ahmad 1979 P L C 175 and Emco Employees Union (Regd.), Lahore v. M/s. Emco Ltd. 1984 P L C 1243 ref. This judgment shall dispose of Writ Petitions No.12028/80 and 10136/80 as the same questions of law and facts are involved.

2. The relevant facts for the decision of these Constitutional petitions are that the petitioners are ex‑employees of Habib Bank Limited. They were posted at Sahiwal and they were dismissed from service vide orders dated 11‑8‑1977. The petitioners proceeded to serve respondents Nos.3 and 4 with grievance notices under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Notices of the petitioners in W.P.No.12028/80 are. dated 18‑8‑1977 and 20‑8‑1977 while in case of other petitioner in W.P.No.10136/80, notice is dated 18‑8‑1977. These notices remained unreplied. The petitioners thereafter issued yet another set of notices dated 13‑9‑1977. Respondents Nos.3 and 4 did not make any reply to these notices too. The petitioners thereafter proceeded to file grievance petitions which are dated 10‑11‑1977. The Bank contested these petitions on factual as well as legal planes. There was a preliminary objection to the effect that the petitions are time‑barred. Punjab Labour Court No.9 Multan upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the petitions vide similar orders dated 24‑7‑1978. The petitioners filed appeals before respondent No.l, who dismissed the appeals by one and same order dated 9‑8‑1980. The petitioners have now assailed the orders of respondents Nos.l and 2 through present petitions which were admitted to hearing and notices issued to the respondents. Respondents Nos.l and 2 did not appear in spite of service, therefore, they are proceeded ex parte. It is only respondents Nos.3 and 4 who have contested these petitions.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that the petitions were not time‑barred and respondents Nos.l and 2 have failed to appreciate the case of the petitioners. It is added that it was mentioned in para. 7 that grievance notices were issued on 13‑9‑1977 and if the limitation is computed from this date, then the petitions filed on 10‑11‑1977 were well within time. It is added that respondent No.l was a Court of fact, also, therefore, should have recorded evidence before rejecting the petitions. On the other hand the learned counsel for the contesting respondents has argued that the Courts below worked out the limitation as per averments of the petitioners in para. 9 of their petitions. It is added that the petitioners originally appended grievance notices dated 18‑8‑1977 and 20‑8‑1977 with their respective petitions. The same were the dates given in para. 9 of their petitions. It is submitted that the petitioners during the pendency of their appeals made applications for additional evidence and alongwith these applications for the first appended grievance notices dated 13‑9‑1977 and during the hearing of the appeal they tried to wriggle out of the admission in para. 9 of the petitions and argued that the notices dated 18‑8‑1977 and 20‑8‑1977 are fake. The learned counsel for the respondents have concluded the arguments with the submission that only one grievance notice is envisaged by section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and second notice will not affect the period of omit;; which has already started running. Learned counsel in this behalf has relied the case of S.W.HJaffery v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh and 2 others 1979 p L 431, M/s. National Motors Ltd., Karachi v. M.BashirAhmed 1979 P L C 175 an Emco Employees Union Registered Lahore v. M/s. Emco Ltd. 1984 P L C 1243.

4. I have given my anxious considerations to the arguments of the learned counsel and gone through the record and precedent cases. The following two points arise for determination in this case:‑ Firstly; whether the petitioners did serve the notices dated 18‑8‑1977 and 20‑g, 1977 or they only issued notices dated 13‑9‑1977? Secondly; whether there can be second notice of grievance during the limitation period as prescribed in section 25‑A(1)of I.R.O what will be its effect?

5. Now I take up the first point. The fact that the petitioners originally issued notices in August, 1987 is proved by the fact that they have appended the same notices as B and B/1 with the writ petition. It is not denied that these were the only notices submitted alongwith the petitions. This is not all the petitioners did not even deny the fact that the notices dated l3‑9‑ l977 where submitted for the first time alongwith the petitions for additional evidence flied before respondent No.l during the pendency of the appeal. Respondent No.l has dealt the matter at length. Nether the learned counsel could find any fault with these findings recorded by respondent No.1 nor challenged the same. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:‑ "The appellants after seeing the original notices dated 18‑7‑1977 did not deny their signatures on them. I have myself minutely examined the grievance notices which are duly signed by the ,appellants and ex‑Captain A.D.Baloch as well as the General Secretary, Habib Bank Staff Union (Registered) Sahiwal Zone, Sahiwal (C.B.A.). The notices of Muhammad Nazir and Naseem Tabir, appellants are dated 18‑8‑1977 while that of Ghulam Hussain Hanif is dated 7. 'fhe signatures of the appellants on these grievance notices are the same as on other admitted documents like power of attorney and grievance petitions etc. In fact as mentioned above, the appellants who are present in Court do not deny their signatures on these notices but allege that the Secretary of their union in connivance with the Management maneuvered their signatures on these notices. The position taken up 'try the counsel for the appellants earlier in his arguments was that no grievance notice whatever was sent on 18‑8‑1977 by the appellants and it was then the date was erroneously mentioned in paragraph 7 of the grievance petitions. However, when confronted with the original grievance notices dated 18‑8‑1977 and 20‑8‑1977 Mr.Ghulam Qadir Cheema has given up his previous stand and has tried to argue that the appellants could serve a second grievance notice later on and the period should be counted from that date."

6. It is, therefore, clear that respondents did issue both set of notice d there is nothing wrong with the finding recorded by respondent No‑1 in the behalf.

7. This brings us to the second question whether there can be a second notice and "'hat will be its effect on computing limitation. It is established law that once the limitation period starts running it does not stop. Now in the present case when the petitioners issued grievance notices dated 18‑8‑1977 and 20‑8‑1977, the period of limitation started running against them. The employer was to make a reply to the notices within 15 days and the petitions were to be instituted within two months on the receipt of reply or after the expiry of 15 days. It is admitted position that therefore, there is no question from of here being ha petitions notice and barred, computing the period of limitation from the same otherwise it will amount to leaving the law of limitation to the mercy of the petitioners. A Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of S.W.H. Jaffery upheld the findings of .the Labour Court and of Labour Appellate Tribunal on the point of limitation in similar situation. And to the same effect is the decision of Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind and Punjab in the cases of M/s. National Motors and Emco Employees. The moment first notices of grievance were issued by the petitioners the time starts running. The same cannot be arrested by issuing subsequent notices. There is no provision for a second grievance notice, therefore, the notices dated 13‑9‑1977 are to be ignored while computing the period of limitation.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that the evidence was closed and petitioners were not allowed fullest opportunity to prove their case. On the other hand the learned counsel, for the respondents has argued that the petitioners were allowed repeated opportunities for leading evidence for over a period of 8 months but they failed to substantiate their allegations. It is added that according to subsection (4) of section 25‑A the grievance petitions are to be decided within 7 days. It is also argued that C.P.C. is applicable in view of the provision of section 36 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, therefore, the evidence of the petitioners was rightly closed. This is a comprehensive reply to the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The same is also liable to be ignored because the learned counsel for the petitioners has neither appended the interim orders alongwith the petitions nor even the dates and particulars were available with him, therefore, the same cannot be made subject‑matter of these Constitutional petitions. 9: There is nothing wrong with the concurrent finding on point of limitation recorded by respondents Nos.l and

2. Respondent No.2 has based his finding on the pleadings of the petitioners themselves as contained in para. 9 of the petitions wherein it was stated that the grievance notices have been issued on 18‑8‑1977 B and 20‑8‑1977, therefore, these petitions are within time. This was legally incorrect. The respondents have rightly applied the correct law on admitted facts. If looked from this angle, the present petitions were misconceived.

10. The result is that I do not find any merit in these petitions. The same are dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. A'A'/M‑1300/L Petitions dismissed