PLD 1990 Supreme Court 95 (PLP)

NAIMUDDIN, J.‑‑This appeal, by leave is from the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 22‑4‑1976 passed in W.P.No.3175 of 1975 whereby it allowed the writ petition and set aside the order dated 26‑8‑1975 passed by the Land Commissioner and the order dated 25‑11‑1975 passed by the Additional Chief Land Commissioner.

2. Leave was granted to consider the question whether the orders could be reviewed in pursuance of the application submitted by the appellant and if so, whether the High Court could interfere on its view that review should not have been granted and substituting it opinion for that of the statutory authority.

3. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that the land in question was resumed from the land‑owner under M.L.R. 64 of 1959. The appellant was in undisputed possession of the land as a tenant during the crucial harvest, which was sold to the father of respondents Nos.1 to 3 under the upgrading scheme though under the sale scheme the appellant had a prior right to the land. The father of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 had a lower priority under the upgrading scheme as compared to the sale scheme. The appellant filed an appeal against the order of the Assistant Land Commissioner in the Court of the Deputy Land Commissioner questioning the sale of the land to the father of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 under the upgrading scheme, but the Deputy Land Commissioner dismissed the same on 10‑5‑1951. The appellant's revision before the Additional Chief Land Commissioner also met with the same fate on 31‑12‑1963. After some time, the appellant moved a miscellaneous application whereupon the Land Commissioner reviewed the order of sale on 16‑9‑1969 without affording an opportunity of hearing to the respondents, therefore, the High Court, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction on a writ petition, set aside the order of review and remanded the case to the Land Commissioner on 9‑3‑1971.

4. On remand, after hearing the parties, the Land Commissioner reviewed the original order of sale and set aside the same by the order dated 26‑8‑1975 which was‑ again questioned first in a revision petition before the Additional Chief Land Commissioner and then in a constitutional petition in the High Court resulting in the impugned judgment.

5. It is not disputed before us that the appellant had, under the sale scheme, superior claim over the land. it is also not questioned that the Land Commissioner had power to suo motu review the order. The 'contention, however, is that the Land Commissioner could not review the order on the application of the appellant if the same was barred by time.

6. The ' power of review is contained in Rule 12 of the Punjab I and I Reforms Rules, 1972, which reads as follows:‑‑ "Review.‑‑(l) The Chief Land Commissioner, the officer to whom the case was transferred for final disposal under rule 5(2)(a), a Land Commissioner, Legal Adviser, a Deputy Land Commissioner, an Assistant Land Commissioner, or a Sub‑Assistant Land Commissioner, may at any time, of his own motion or within twenty days from the date of the impugned order, on an application of any party interested therein made to him in that behalf, review and on so reviewing modify, reverse or confirm, any order made by himself or by any of his predecessors‑in office. It is therefore, obvious that there is no time limit in the matter of suo motu exercise of power of review.

7. However, the question is whether the High Court could interfere with the order passed by the Land Commissioner in exercise of the power of review. There is no doubt that the application for review by an interested party could be made within 20 days. But the Land Commissioner unquestionably had power to review his order without any time limit. He did so because the order sought to be reviewed was passed in disregard of the statutory provision and injustice was done to the appellant who had superior right and claim to the land qua the respondent. By doing so he had done justice between the parties. His order could not be termed as without lawful authority simply because the appellant had moved beyond time. He could dismiss the application and yet could act suo motu on the information laid before him. Once he had jurisdiction and passed order in exercise thereof, the High Court could interfere only if the order was without jurisdiction or in other words without lawful authority. At least the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution which is discretionary to perpetuate an illegality or injustice done to the appellant. In the case of Mst. Fehmida Khatocin v. Additional Deputy Commissioner (Consolidation), Lahore and another PLD 1975 Lah. 942, the High Court had fretted an application for review, which was‑barred by time, as one under section 151, C.P.C. as the Court was satisfied that there had been a flagrant abuse of its own process and removal of an apparent injustice done to the applicant was found necessary. Reliance was placed on Kawdu v. Bearer Ginning Co. Ltd. AIR 1929 Nag.

185. In that case the order was obtained in the absence of a person, named Narayan, whose presence was otherwise necessary for the adjudication of the question involved. When Narayan came to know about the order he made an application for review of the same. His application being time‑barred was held to be otherwise liable to be treated as an application under section 151 C.P.C. for removing the appellant injustice done to him on account of his non‑impleading as party in the case.

8. It may be stated that an interested person cannot claim as of right review of an order passed earlier if his application has become barred by time. However, when a statutory functionary is given power to review his own order or revise an order without any time limit that power can be equated with inherent power possessed by a Civil Court under section 151 C.P.C., or by a Criminal Court under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. to do complete justice or advance the cause of justice. Therefore, the Land Commissioner ' could review the order passed by him or his predecessor‑in‑office at any time if illegality of the order was apparent on the face of the record and injustice was done to the appellant irrespective of the fact that his application had been barred by time.

9. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the order of the Land Commissioner dated 26‑8‑1975. However, in the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. M.BA./S.493/S Appeal allowed.