1994L17 (PLP)

Petition for revision under section 115, C.P.C. was against a judgment and decree of learned Additional District Judge‑1, Bhakkar passed in appeal on 15‑2‑1993, by which the judgment given in the suit for specific performance on 19‑4‑1992 decreeing it in favour of respondent No.l by the trial Court was maintained. Facts of the case were short and simple. There was not much dispute about them. Lot No.24 comprising an area of 200 Kanals of land situated in Chak No.27/TDA of Tehsil and District Bhakkar belonged to Province of Punjab. It vested in Thal Development Authority and was under its administration. It was allotted under a sale scheme by the Thal Development Authority to Abdul Bari. He was defendant No.l in the suit and respondent No.2 in the Civil Revision before this Court. .On 24‑4‑1962, Abdul Bari agreed for the sale of the allotted lot after conferment of proprietary rights on him to Khushi Muhammad, plaintiff in the suit in the trial Court and respondent No.l here in this Court. Consideration for sale of rights was received by him at the time of execution of agreement. In terms of agreement, Khushi Muhammad bound himself to pay the purchase price for acquiring ownership rights in the lot. Sale in favour of Khushi Muhammad was to be finalized after transfer of ownership rights in the allotted land. It was common ground that entire purchase price in respect of the lot was already made but a conveyance deed was not executed as yet. On 16‑12‑1991, Khushi Muhammad brought a civil suit for spec performance of agreement to sell the land in dispute in his favour against Abdul Bari and Thal Development Authority in the Civil Court at Bakkhar. Plaint gave necessary foundational facts for claiming a decree of specific performance. Defendants submitted separate written statements. Abdul Bari submitted that the plaintiff had no cause of action and the suit instituted by him was barred by limitation. Agreement to sell, however, was admitted by him, but in absence of payment of development charges in the sum of Rs.1,000 payable by the plaintiff, he averred that suit for specific performance could not lie. Thal Development Authority controverted averments in the plaint and raised number of objections to the maintainability of the suit. It was pleaded that plaintiff had no cause of action; suit was barred by limitation; Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit and the suit was barred by res judicata. On merits, it submitted that since the allottee had not fulfilled the terms of allotment, the allotment was cancelled and possession of the land was re‑taken from him on 3‑9‑1968. No proof of cancellation of the allotment and resumption of possession was given at the trial by the Thal Development Authority or the Government of Punjab. Suit was tried on number of issues. Upon the strength of material brought on record by the parties, trial Court found for the plaintiff and decreed specific performance of agreement to him on 19‑4‑1992. Abdul Bari accepted the judgment and did not appeal from it. Thal Development Authority questioned it in appeal but failed on 15‑2‑1993 in the Court of learned Additional District Judge‑I, Bhakkar. Present Civil Revision was, thereafter, filed in this Court. On behalf of petitioner, two points were urged. First point was that in terms of section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, without the consent in writing by the Thal Development Authority or its successor, namely, Government of Punjab, agreement to sell the State land was void and could not be specifically enforced. The second point was that the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation. As regards the first point, suffice it to observe that the learned counsel for the petitioner did not invite me to any provision in the Thal Development Act, 1949 or the terms of sale‑scheme for spelling out a prohibition. Nonetheless, even on the application of section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, agreement for sale of land after transfer of ownership rights in it was not invalid. Colony‑clerk D.W.2 unequivocally conceded that proprietary rights were conferred in respect of the land in dispute on the allottee on 3‑2‑1968 and the payment for acquiring them had already been made. However, conveyance deed was not yet executed. There was, therefore, unrebutted evidence on record to prove that the purchase price for acquiring ownership rights in the allotted land was already paid. It was settled statement of law that proprietary rights vest in the purchaser of the grant upon deposit/payment of the purchase price and the act of transfer to ownership rights was neither dependent upon nor was it suspended until the execution of a conveyance deed in this behalf. Similarly, an agreement to sell relating to such land and the decree for its specific performance before acquisition of proprietary rights was not hit by section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. In the instant case, the purchase price was already paid in respect of the grant and ownership rights in it shall be deemed to have been transferred to the grantee upon deposit/payment of the purchase price, absence of conveyance deed notwithstanding. Therefore, there was no bar for the Civil Court for decreeing specific performance of agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff. As regards the second point, the suit for specific performance was not barred by limitation. Agreement Exh.P.1 did not fix a date or period for the finalization of the sale of the land in dispute. Instead, it agreed to complete the sale on conferment of proprietary rights in land on the demand of the promisee. Article 113 of the First Schedule of Limitation Act, 1908 shall govern the question of limitation. It provided a period of three years for specific performance of a contract and the period commenced from the date fixed for the performance of the contract or if no date was fixed, when the plaintiff had notice that performance was refused. In the instant case, agreement did not specify any date for its performance. Therefore, later part of the Article 113 shall apply and in that eventuality the suit could not be found barred by limitation on any score. There was no evidence to show that the performance of agreement was demanded and refused at a point of time exceeding three years from the date of the suit. In fact, necessary evidence touching on question of limitation was conspicuous by its absence. Onus rested on the party pleading it and it failed to discharge it. In my opinion, the question of. limitation was rightly resolved in favour of the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the petitioner miserably failed to convince us of any real merit in the civil revision. Therefore, it fails on merits with costs. A.A./T‑59/L Revision dismissed