P L D 1959 (W (PLP)

Laws Cited

Representation

• Ibadatyar Khan for Petitioners.
• S. M. Raza and Tanzilur Rehman for Respondent.
• Mr. Raza, the learned advocate for the opposite‑party, in the first place, contended that in as much as the plaintiff‑opposite party was employed on payment of salary, the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 were not attracted. `Wages' a. defined in the Payment of Wages Act means all remuneration; capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whither conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed, or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment. The definition of `wages' as given in the Act makes certain exclusion such as gratuity payable on discharge etc., from the wages. In the present case, I am not concerned with the exclusion given in the definition of the word `wages'. In my opinion, the word `remuneration' is wide enough to include monthly salary also. In the present case, according to the plaintiff opposite party, he was employed on a monthly salary. Sections 4 and 5, which deal with fixation of wage‑periods and time of payment of wages, do not in any way negative the conclusion of which I have arrived at that monthly salary could be covered by the word `remunera tion' within the meaning of "wages" given in the Payment of Wages Act. I have not been cited any authority in support of the contention that monthly salary could not be covered by the word `remuneration' as given in the definition of the word `remuneration'. I would hold that the plaintiff opposite‑party was employed on remuneration which was in this case monthly salary which could be covered by the definition of "wages" in the Act.
• Mr. Raza very strenuously contended that section 22 could be no bar to his suit as his client could not recover his dues under section 15 of the Act. Section 15, sub‑clause (1), as reproduced above, would show that the plaintiff under the Act could only claim (i) any deductions from his wages (ii) delay in payment of wages. Mr. Raza contended that delay in payment of the wages is not tantamount to refusal to pay wages. In the present case, his contention is that the defendants applicants had refused to make payment of his wages. It is a well settled rule of law that in order to find out whether the Court has jurisdiction or not the allegations in the plaint alone have to be looked into In the present case, it is admitted by the plaintiff in para. 5 of the plaint that the amount in suit was admitted by the defendants. In these circumstances it cannot be said that there was any refusal on the part of the defendants to make payment to the plaintiff opposite party. It was a case of delay in payment within the meaning of section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Mr. Raza has relied on Sarongdhar Singh and another v. Lakshmi Narayan Wahi (A I R 1955 Pat. 320) in support of his contention that refusal to make payment is not the same as delay in payment. It is clear, however, 'from a perusal of that authority that where payment of wages has been refused on the ground which is extraneous to the terms of the contract between the employer and employee it was refusal to make payment of wages and not delay in payment of wages. Mr. Ibadat Yar Khan, the learned advocate for the applicant, relied on a number of authorities in support of his contention that it is not every refusal to make payment of wages that would give jurisdiction to the Civil Court. He relied on C. V. Narayanaswami Iyer v. K. A. Vasudeva Iyer (A I R 1958 Mad. 360) ; Balkrishna Kashinath Khopkar v. A S. Rangnekar and another (A I R 1957 Bom 288) ; N. Venkatavaradan v. Sembiam Saw Mills, Sembiam, Madras (A I R 1955 Mad. 597) ;
• For the reasons given above I allow the application in revision and order that the plaint may be returned to the plaintiff to be presented to the proper forum. I have no doubt that the person who has been appointed by the Provincial Government under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act would expeditiously dispose of this matter. I may also mention that it was conceded by Mr. Ibadat Yar Khan, the learned advocate for the applicants, that the proper forum for the plaintiff opposite party was to have moved the person. appointed under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act.

Headnotes / Summary

Judgment & Decree